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xChronology of the EU’s Development and Enlargement
 In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was 
established after six European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany) signed the 
Treaty of Paris.
 In 1957, the six European countries signed the Treaty of Rome, 
which extended the earlier co-operation within the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) and created the European Economic 
Community (EEC). In the same year these countries also signed the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). 
 In 1967, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European 
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community officially merged and established the European 
Community (EC). 
 In 1973, the EC enlarged to include Denmark, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom.
 Greece joined the EC in 1981.
 In 1986, Portugal and Spain joined the EC and became twelve 
members.
 In 1990, the former East Germany became part of the Community as 
part of a newly united Germany.
 1992, the European Union (EU) established according to the 
Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the European Union (TEU)).
 In 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the newly established
EU. Accordingly, the EU members became fifteen. 
 In 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary , Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the Union.
 On 1 January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria became the EU's 
members. 
xi
Abstract
In a complex political system such as the European Union (EU), 
ensuring adequate interaction and coordination among institutions and 
actors is a challenging task. The EU’s foreign policy framework is complex 
and difficult to navigate due to the myriad institutional elements involved, 
ranging from intergovernmental negotiations and trans-governmental 
relations through to supranational implementation. Thus, this study 
examines the nature of interactions between key EU actors across all levels 
throughout the formulation and implementation stages of foreign policy. It 
explores the extent to which these interactions affect EU foreign policy 
overall. In analysing the affect of these interactions, this study examines the 
EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq during 2001-2009 as a case study. 
Specifically, this study argues that low interaction and coordination between 
EU actors had a fundamental impact on the EU’s foreign policy towards 
Iraq during 2001-2009.
In an attempt to measure the degree of interaction between EU foreign 
policy actors across all levels and pillars, this study applies the multi-level 
governance (MLG) approach as a theoretical framework. To employ the 
MLG approach, this study proposes a form of thematic content analysis that 
tempers the analysis of content with reference to the interaction and 
coordination context within which the texts are formulated. The data 
extracted as a result of the thematic content analysis is used as a strong
indicator to explain the nature of coordination and interaction among key 
actors in the formulation and implementation of the EU’s foreign policy.
The following factors had an impact on the EU’s foreign policy 
towards Iraq during 2001-2009: 
a. A lack of authority of the EU supranational institutions; 
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b. An absence of clearly defined competencies and 
responsibilities of the various foreign policy actors;
c. An unwillingness by key member-states to transfer part of 
their sovereignty to the EU in relation to foreign policy, 
affecting European political integration;
d. A lack of coordination between the actor representatives 
during the policy implementation stage;
e. The presence and influence of the United Nations and the 
United States in Iraq; and
f. Insufficient Iraqi capacity, underpinned by a lack of robust 
political infrastructure.
The EU, through its foreign policy towards Iraq during 2001-09, also 
faced the challenge of acting confidently as an international player. The case 
of Iraq was considered a particularly difficult challenge for the EU, and 
accordingly, it re-examined its foreign and security policy priorities and 
responses. In order to be prepared effectively address similar crises in the 
future, the EU established the European Security Strategy in December 
2003 and, more recently, the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 
December 2009. However, this does not mean the EU will avoid facing the 
challenges of confidence in the near future; to fully embed the structures the 
EU requires to develop effective foreign policy will inevitably take 
significant time. 
Chapter 1:
Introduction
21.1. Rationale and Significance of the Study
This study examines the nature of interactions between key EU actors 
throughout the formulation and implementation stages of EU foreign policy. 
It explores the extent to which these interactions affect EU foreign policy 
overall. In order to pursue such aims, this study focuses on the EU’s foreign 
policy towards Iraq during 2001-2009 as a case study.
After World War II, the international political order was dominated by 
the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union. This dominance 
evolved into a ‘cold war’ driven by the different political systems and 
values of the two super powers which continued for several decades. 
Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the international 
system became unipolar controlled largely by the United States. The 
emergence of this uni-polarity was not foreseen by some scholars including 
Hill & Smith (2005) and Hughes (2003), who posited at the time that the 
international order would eventually evolve into a multi-polar system. They 
attributed their predictions to the emergence of new international regional 
powers, and in particular the EU, which was gaining prominence in the 
international political arena. While such predictions about the EU have 
eventuated to an extent in terms of its economic, monetary and trade 
performance, its foreign policy performance has remained relatively 
problematic.
The EU’s foreign policy is complex and difficult to navigate due to the 
myriad of institutional processes involved, ranging from intergovernmental 
negotiations to trans-governmental relations to supranational 
implementation (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007). Furthermore, this is 
characterised by a complex mixture of different policy-making regimes and 
actors. For example, EU foreign policy is not only pursued through the 
Union's second pillar - the Common Foreign and Security Policy/ European 
Security and Defense Policy (CFSP/ESDP) - but also through its first -
Community- pillar, and is predominantly a shared agenda between the EU 
3and its member states. Accordingly, the EU’s foreign policy making is 
characterised by interaction between different actors across various pillars 
and levels. Functionally, all of these actors incorporate and interact within a 
unified framework: the EU (Stetter, 2004). In addition, within this 
framework, the overlapping competencies and responsibilities of the various 
EU actors further add to the complexity (Keukeleire and Justaert, 2009). 
In a complex political system such as the EU, ensuring adequate 
interaction and coordination among its numerous institutions and actors is a 
difficult task. In order to explore interactions among foreign policy 
institutions and actors in the EU, this study employs the notions of 
horizontal and vertical relations (Marks 1993; Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 
2003; Kaya, 2005; Abellan, 2002). Horizontal relations pertain to inter-
institutional interaction and coordination. For the purposes of this study, the 
concept is used to examine the extent to which there is structural coherence 
and synthesis between various EU institutions involved in foreign policy 
(Christiansen, 2001b: 748). Coherence, in this context, implies that policies 
across different institutional pillars have to be coordinated in order to create 
effective foreign policy (Portela and Raube, 2009). Effective horizontal 
relations require actors to have knowledge of the goals and objectives of 
special policy initiatives. They also require ongoing evaluation of whether 
different initiatives buttress the same goals or pursue different goals (Olsen, 
2008).  Accordingly, effective horizontal coordination requires that policies 
advocated by different parts of the EU machinery, even those pursuing 
different objectives, should, to some extent, be coherent in relation to each 
other (Nuttall, 2005). In summary, there are three major issues concerning 
horizontal coordination in the EU:
a. The distribution of power and authority between EU institutions;
b. The effectiveness of any entity that requires the political will to act 
and is required to use all available instruments in a strategic way; and
c. The nature of the competencies of the EU institutions.
4Vertical relations, on the other hand, pertain to inter-level interactions 
and coordination. In other words, the interactions and coordination between 
key EU foreign policy actors working at different levels within particular 
EU institutions (namely, the European Commission (EC), the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), 
and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union) and the member 
states (Christiansen, 2001b: 748). An examination of vertical relations in the 
EU reflects the extent to which there is coherence between the inter-
governmental level and the supranational level (Kaya, 2005). Theoretically, 
the foreign policies of the member states should cohere with, and therefore 
be complementary to, EU foreign policy (Portela and Raube, 2009). Such
coherence may be achieved through interaction and coordination between 
the foreign policy actors of the 27 member states and EU-level foreign 
policy actors. This study assesses the importance of such coordination to the 
coherence and, therefore, efficacy of the EU’s foreign policy. To this end, 
this study focuses on individual players who participate in preparing the 
foreign policy agenda of the EU, as well as the key people who have 
influence over the decision-making and implementation processes. Such a 
focus will facilitate an examination of the nature of the interaction and 
coordination between member states and the EU institutions and the extent 
of its coherence.
This study uses Iraq during 2001-2009 as a case study. This case study 
is significant as the pre-war period of 2003 as well as the post war era 
represented significant challenges to the EU in terms of formulating and 
articulating a coherent foreign policy. This difficulty can be explained with 
reference to a number of inter-related factors.
First, 2001-2009 was an important period in Iraq’s history and 
represented a highly politicised and divisive foreign policy issue for the EU. 
Throughout this time Iraq endured a US-led war in 2003 and the toppling of 
the long-standing, authoritarian Baathist regime. The nation struggled to 
5rebuild in the midst of major political transition, violence and instability 
(Dodge, 2006; Youngs, 2004; Martinez, 2006).
Second, the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq presented 
inconsistencies throughout this period. This case study allows a closer 
evaluation of the extent to which EU foreign policy towards Iraq was 
inconsistent and the reasons for such positions (Youngs, 2004). 
Third, many structural changes were made to the EU’s key foreign 
policy-making institutions during this period. These changes were made in 
accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (2001) and, 
more recently, the Lisbon Treaty (2007). The changes will be examined to 
ascertain how they have affected the nature of the interaction and 
coordination among the key foreign policy actors within the EU (Hix, 2005; 
Hammel, 2009; Allerkamp, 2004; Gaspers, 2009; Verola, 2010).
Finally, this case study is significant because although there is an 
increasing number of studies on the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq, 
especially after 2003, the majority of these studies focus on individual EU 
member states’ rather than the EU’s overall foreign policy position (Gardner, 
2003; Stuchlik, 2005; Forsberg, 2005; Wood, 2003; Gordon and Shapiro, 
2004; Schweiger, 2004; Jorgensen, 2004). 
1.2. The History of EU-Iraq Relations
The countries of Europe have a long-standing historical relationship 
with Iraq. The nature of Iraq-Europe relations has changed considerably in 
the past two centuries. The modern Iraq exists on land, known in ancient 
times as Mesopotamia, located between two rivers: the Tigris and the 
Euphrates; these rivers were used to transport agricultural goods to 
neighbouring regions (The Law Library of Congress, 2004: 1). Desire for 
control of the rivers resulted in several invasions by external powers. From 
the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, Iraq was under the control of the 
6Ottoman Empire which ruled from Istanbul and controlled Eastern Europe, 
North Africa, Egypt, the Middle East and the region of Central Asia, 
northwest of the Caspian Sea (Tripp, 2000: 8-20; Law Library of Congress, 
2004: 6-8). Following the Ottoman Empire’s collapse in 1918, Britain 
assumed control of Iraq in accordance with the Sykes-Picot agreement 
reached with France (Dodge, 2006; Law Library of Congress, 2004: 11).
Iraq became a member of the League of Nations in 1932 and was recognised 
as an independent state; however, Iraq did not have the economic or military 
strength to protect itself from foreign invasion and remained financially 
dependent on Britain (Dodge, 2006: 3). Thus, from 1918 until 1958, Iraq 
was practically ruled under a British mandate.
In July 1958, the Free Officers, a secret military group led by General 
Abdul al-Karim Qasim, overthrew the Iraqi monarchy, ending the British 
mandate and ushering in the first years of the Republic of Iraq (Johnson, 
2004; Millen, 2003). The new republic quickly established relationships 
with the former Soviet Union and many Western countries, including France 
and the US, while maintaining relationship with Britain. On 8 February 
1963, Colonel Abdul al-Salam Arif led a coup which overthrew General 
Qasim and ended his rule; Arif’s brothers then ruled Iraq from February 
1963 until July 1968. They established strong relationships with Arab 
nationalists such as Egypt’s President, Abdul al-Jamal Nasir. Furthermore, 
during this period, Iraq developed its relationships with the communist bloc, 
in particular the former Soviet Union (Ritter and Pitt, 2002; Johnson, 2004).
In July 1968, a bloodless coup brought to power the Baathist General 
Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as a President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein as a Vice 
President (Ritter and Pitt, 2002), and subsequently the Baath regime ruled 
Iraq until 2003. During General al-Bakr’s period of rule (1968-1979), 
strategic imperatives, trade and oil dominated European foreign policy 
considerations toward the country, especially following the nationalisation 
of Iraqi oil on 2 June 1972. In 1979, Saddam Hussein used his growing 
power to push al-Bakr aside and rule Iraq until the US invasion in 2003 
(Baylis et al. 2007; Johnson, 2004). During this time, the Iran-Iraq War of 
71980-88 ushered in an important phase of improved Europe-Iraq relations 
(Hunt, 2005). Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein’s regime 
benefited from significant military support from Britain, France, West 
Germany, the US and the former Soviet Union (Simons, 1996a; Totman, 
2006; Nissen and Heine, 2009: 159; Hinnebusch, 2003).  However, the 
nature of Iraq’s relationship with its allies changed following its invasion of 
neighbouring Kuwait in 1990. The majority of European countries 
supported the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in their opposition 
to the invasion by providing military, financial and technological support to 
the ensuing war against Iraq. Subsequently, these countries imposed 
economic sanctions on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 (Nissen and Heine, 2009; 
Degerfelt, 2008; Saikaly, 2009). 
Europe was divided over its foreign policy approach to Iraq during the 
most recent crisis that began in 2001. Some countries, such as France and 
Germany, did not participate in the US-led war against Iraq which was 
waged outside the official auspices of the United Nations. The US was 
supported by other European countries including Britain, Spain and Italy. 
Division on this issue affected the EU's foreign policy towards Iraq 
throughout this time (Goldthau, 2008).
Recent studies have suggested that the EU member states’ nationally 
framed foreign policy agendas considerably influenced the overall EU 
policy position on Iraq during 2001-2009. For example, Germany and 
France’s opposition to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was largely 
informed by public opposition to the war and their respective national 
electoral campaigns (Harnisch, 2004: 1; Timmins, 2006; Davidson, 2008). 
The decision by other EU member states to support the US-led invasion is 
considered to have been influenced by the broader and long term benefits of 
their respective economic, trade and military ties to the US and Britain 
(Kavalski and Zolkos, 2007; Davidson, 2008). 
81.3. Research Questions
Going beyond such uni-dimensional analyses, the aim of this study is 
to examine a key dimension of EU governance which may have affected its 
foreign policy formulation towards Iraq. Accordingly, this study attempts to 
analyse the extent of interaction and coordination among EU foreign policy 
actors as played out towards Iraq during 2001-2009. In order to undertake 
such an examination, the following research questions will be addressed:
a. Which are the key institutions that shape the EU's foreign policy 
formulation and implementation processes?
b. What is the nature of vertical and horizontal relations between 
the EU’s foreign policy actors during the foreign policy 
formulation and implementation processes? 
c. To what extent did the vertical and horizontal relations between 
the EU’s foreign policy actors affect its foreign policy approach 
towards Iraq from 2001-2009?
d. What are the key external factors, if any, that might have 
affected the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq during 2001-2009?
These research questions are addressed through the collection of 
qualitative primary data as well as a range of secondary data in the context 
of the Iraqi pre-war period of 2003 as well as the post war era. Semi-
structured interviews with EU officials and academic experts formed the 
key source of primary data. The secondary data used in this study includes 
meeting records, government documents, EU declarations, EU treaties, 
Council statements, newspaper articles and previous interviews with EU 
officials. 
To explore these inter-related research questions, the innovative 
theoretical approach, referred to as the multi-level governance approach 
(MLG), is employed. This approach has the potential to account for the 
9nature of interaction and coordination among many actors within complex 
political systems such as the EU (Bjorn, 2008; Bache and Flinders, 2004). 
The MLG approach is used as it deals with non-state actors and accounts for 
the multiple levels within which these actors operate. This theoretical 
approach takes into account the multiple levels of agency within the 
European political system: agency to non-state actors as well as state actors 
(Marks, 1993). MLG theory highlights the interplay of supranational, inter-
governmental and sub-national levels in foreign policy formulation and 
implementation. When applied to the context of the EU, it can act to 
highlight the interactions between EU institutions (supranational level), EU 
member states (inter-governmental level), and public and private institutions, 
such as interest groups, lobbyists and public opinion (sub-national level), 
and how these interactions affect EU foreign policy formulation and 
implementation (Marks et al., 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bache and
Flinders, 2004).  Using this approach, the effectiveness of the EU's foreign 
policy may be examined in terms of the key variables linked to the range of 
interaction and coordination among various actors.
1.4. Chapter Structure 
Chapter one discusses the study’s rationale and significance, its 
research questions and a brief background discussion of the overall topic.
Chapter two provides a background to the EU‘s foreign policy. EU 
foreign policy has developed over many stages, starting with commercial 
and trade policies in 1957. The establishment of the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) in 1969 and the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 
marked stages of development in which a greater focus on political 
considerations was afforded. The crucial stage of the EU’s foreign policy 
development came in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty came into effect. 
This treaty determined the structure of the EU’s foreign policy and the 
mechanisms through which it was to operate. Since 1992, more treaties have 
been established to address and overcome the foreign policy issues facing 
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the EU. Notable among these treaties are the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) the 
Nice Treaty (2001) and the Lisbon Treaty (2007). Chapter two considers 
these treaties in greater detail. This chapter also examines the mechanisms 
through which EU foreign policy is formulated and implemented, and 
highlights the main actors involved in the process. The nature of interactions 
among EU institutions will be examined under a number of themes 
including: the distribution of power and authority; the nature of institutional 
competencies; and the available instruments. The nature of the interactions 
between EU institutions and member states during foreign policy 
formulation and implementation is also examined under a number of themes 
including: agenda-setting, decision-making and the implementation process.  
Chapter three discusses the historical relationship between Europe and 
Iraq from 1921 to 2009. The first part of this chapter reviews the European 
countries’ relations with Iraq during the colonial era  of 1921-58; throughout 
this period, several European countries, including Germany and Britain, 
competed with one another to control Iraq’s economic, political and military 
future. This part of the chapter goes on to examine the relationship between 
Iraq and European countries during the following periods:  the new republic 
of Iraq between 1958-79; the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-88,; and Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990 and the economic sanctions implemented by the 
international community thereafter. The second part of this chapter focuses 
on the pre-war period (2001-03) in order to explore the attitudes of different 
EU member states leading up to the US-led war, and to explain the factors 
which led to the division between member states upon dealing with this 
foreign policy issue. The final part of Chapter three concerns the EU’s role 
in Iraq during the post-war era that began in 2003. 
Chapter four outlines the theoretical framework of this study. The first 
section of this chapter examines the connections between EU foreign policy 
and various international relations and integration theories. This 
examination demonstrates that not one of these theories facilitates an 
examination of both vertical and horizontal interactions within EU foreign 
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policy. The second section of this chapter outlines the MLG approach as a 
relevant framework for this study. This approach enables the study to 
address the nature of interaction among EU foreign policy actors. Through 
the use of multiple themes, this approach allows for an examination of the 
effects of coordination and interaction between the EU’s key actors on 
foreign policy in general, and foreign policy towards Iraq in particular. Such 
themes provide coherent frames of reference for the discussion and 
conclusion of this study. 
Chapter five outlines the methodological approach used in this study. 
This chapter elaborates on the type of thematic content analysis employed in 
the research. Primary and a range of secondary data are used in this study: 
Semi-structured interviews with EU officials and academic experts are the 
key primary resources; the secondary data includes meeting records, 
government documents, EU declarations, debates, EU treaties, Council 
statements, newspaper articles and existing interviews with EU officials. 
Chapter five also outlines the tools of discourse analysis utilised in this 
study. The discourse analysis is based on the following themes: the nature of 
power and authority of the EU's foreign policy actors; the nature of the 
competencies of each actor; available foreign policy instruments; 
participation in preparing the agenda of the Council meeting; the process of 
decision-making; and the mechanisms of foreign policy implementation. 
Specific attention is given to the central theme of the EU's foreign policy 
towards Iraq, and in particular the influence of interaction and coordination 
between the key foreign policy actors on this issue.
Chapter six presents the qualitative analysis of the primary and 
secondary data. The analysis involves an examination of key themes 
abstracted from the semi-structured interviews and EU documents with a 
focus on:
a. The distribution of power, authority, competencies, and 
instruments across supranational, intergovernmental and sub-
national levels;
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b. Preparation of foreign policy agendas;
c. Decision-making and implementation procedures; and 
d. The EU foreign policy response to the Iraq war in 2003.
Chapter seven discusses the study’s findings in terms of the broader 
theoretical debate (MLG approach). When examined in relation to the 
existing literature on the EU's foreign policy towards Iraq, this study’s 
findings provide new perspectives on the horizontal and vertical interactions 
among EU foreign policy actors. It argues that this is an important theme to 
engage in order to reach a deeper understanding of the EU’s foreign policy 
in general and, more specifically, towards Iraq. The concluding chapter 
summarises the main argument of the study and the lessons learned.   
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Chapter 2:
Overview of the EU’s Foreign 
Policy
14
The European Union (EU) is one of the most important actors in 
contemporary international politics (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Hill and 
Smith 2005; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Churruca 2003; Hettne 2008; 
Kallberg 2007; Ginsberg and Smith 2007).  Comprising 27 European 
countries, member states have established strong economic and trade 
relations, and accordingly, the EU has become a powerful global economic 
player.  France, in particular, has championed political cooperation within 
the EU and has supported the idea of facilitating strong foreign policy 
cooperation among members to complement the EU’s commercial and trade 
relations. In January 1960, the first foreign ministers’ meeting of the 
European Community member states was held in Paris; the result of which 
was the establishment of the Council of General Affairs for External 
Relations. A year later, on 10-11 February 1961, French President Charles 
De Gaulle hosted a summit of the leaders of the European Community 
members. This summit established what is currently called the European 
Council (Bindi, 2010). The summit also led to the development of stronger 
political ties through the formation of the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) in 1969, and later the passing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 
1986. However, the main development in European political cooperation 
occurred in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. As a result of this 
treaty, the EU was established and it foundation strengthened with the 
creation of a three-pillar structure: the European Community (EC); 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and Justice and Home 
Affairs (Bomberg and Stubb, 2004).
Each of these pillars has particular functions and responsibilities 
within the EU framework. The EC pillar is concerned with external trade, 
internal markets, agriculture, economic and monetary union, and 
immigration (Hix, 2005; Staab, 2008). The second pillar, the CFSP, is 
responsible for the common foreign policy of the EU, security and defence 
issues, as well as trade and commercial policy and diplomacy with external 
states (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Eliassen, 1998). The third pillar, 
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Justice and Home Affairs, focuses on criminal law and police cooperation 
(Wallace and Wallace, 2000). 
Scholars face difficulty in conceptualising the EU's foreign policy due 
to “the unorthodox setting of foreign policy within the EU framework” 
(Guraziu, 2008: 20). Some scholars, such as Hix (2005) and Hettne (2008),
argue that the most accurate analyses of EU foreign policy are limited to the 
CFSP pillar, which is to be distinguished from the other pillars. In contrast, 
some analysts, such as Stetter (2004), Keukeleire & Justaert (2009), Portela 
& Raube (2009), Kaya (2005) and Ginsberg & Smith (2007), argue that a 
full understanding of EU foreign policy should incorporate all three pillars 
collectively. According to this approach, EU foreign policy is understood as 
a multi-dimensional system that includes output from all three pillars, not
just the CFSP (Guraziu, 2008: 20). Thus, EU foreign policy incorporates  
“all declarations, decisions, and actions that are made by the use of all 
instruments the EU has at its disposal, that are decided at the EU level, and 
conducted in its name toward a country or an area outside its borders” 
(Bicchi, 2007: 2).
The first part of this chapter examines the development of European 
foreign policy. The second part examines the nature of interaction and 
coordination among its actors in order to explore the EU’s foreign policy 
making process.
2.1. The Development of EU Foreign Policy
The foreign policy making apparatus of the EU has developed over 
many stages. The first stage was initiated with the multiple commercial and 
trade policies of European Community member states (EC) in 1957, which 
were characterised by poor political considerations (White, 2001). The 
second stage, from 1969 to 1992, saw an increase in political considerations, 
particularly after the establishment of the EPC in 1969, and the passing of 
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the SEA in 1986. However, it was the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that was the 
main step towards setting up a comprehensive system capable of developing 
an EU foreign policy. This treaty determined the framework of the EU’s 
foreign policy, even though many problematic practical issues were still 
apparent. In order to overcome these remaining problems, and to improve its 
performance, EU member states signed additional treaties. Significant 
among these treaties are the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the 2001 Nice Treaty, 
and more recently, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty.  
The following sections examine in further detail these various 
development periods of the EU’s foreign policy.
2.1.1. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) 1969
On 1-2 December 1969, on the initiative of the French President 
Georges Pompidou, the heads of state or government of the then six 
European Community (EC) members (Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) met in the Hague 
in order to define the methods of reviving the European integration process 
(Geary, 2012). This summit achieved three key deliverables:  the 
completion of the Common Market by 1 January 1970; the deepening of the 
Community’s ties, especially in the field of economic and monetary policy; 
and the enlargement of the EC to include Britain, Ireland and Denmark, 
with the condition that the Community would adopt a common position 
before negotiations (Bindi, 2010: 18; Hammel, 2009; Hix, 2005). 
Furthermore, the leaders of the six member states discussed the possibilities 
of creating political unification. This discussion led to the Luxembourg 
Report (also referred to as the Davignon Report: Etienne Davignon, the 
political director of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, was charged with 
studying potential future steps which could lead to stronger European 
political integration) which was adopted by the foreign ministers of the EC 
members on 27 October 1970. This report provided the basis for the 
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European Political Cooperation (EPC), which came into force in November 
1970 (Möckli, n.d.: 4; Bindi, 2010: 18).
Although the EPC represented the first step in establishing political 
cooperation between the EC and its members, this mechanism for 
cooperation was not legally binding on the participating parties (Möckli, 
n.d.: 5). Accordingly, the EPC was characterised at this stage by three 
elements: 
1. The main objective of the EPC was to harmonise the national foreign 
policies of the EC members (Möckli, n.d.: 5); 
2. EC cooperation in the field of foreign policy was to be achieved 
through collaboration between the foreign ministers of the member 
states in the absence of any specific supranational body being 
established. Thus, the EC institutions such as Commission and 
Parliament remained very limited (European Political Cooperation, 
1988; Möckli, n.d.: 5)
3. The EPC’s formation was based on a minimalist conception. Defining 
a loose mechanism for political consultations only, it had no 
permanent institutions and was overseen by the rotating EC 
Presidency (Möckli, n.d.: 4). 
On 23 July 1973, the foreign ministers of EC member states issued the 
Copenhagen Report, which established the basic obligation of the member 
states to consult each other on all important foreign policy questions before 
adopting their own final positions. Furthermore, according to this report, 
cooperation in terms of European unification between the EC and EPC 
(member states’ foreign policies) had been established (European Political 
Cooperation, 1988: 15). At the Paris summit, held on 9-10 December 1974, 
the heads of the EC member states agreed to establish the European General 
Affairs Council. The Council would provide a forum for foreign ministers to 
discuss political cooperation between EC members, and discuss the internal 
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and external problems of Europe more comprehensively (European Political 
Cooperation, 1988: 15). Accordingly, the EPC enabled EC members’ 
foreign ministers and heads of government to debate broader political and 
security issues in the European General Affairs Council. 
The EPC mechanism demonstrated its strength from 1970 to 1973
(Bronstone, 2000). However, the EPC did not lead to unanimity among 
member states regarding some major international crises of the time, such as 
the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) embargo in 1973, and the former Soviet Union’s invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979 (Hammel, 2009).  This demonstrates that there was 
no pooling of sovereignty at the supranational level, despite the increase in 
political collaboration and dialogue among member states.   
On 13 October 1981, EC foreign ministers introduced some 
improvements to the administrative structure and political decision-making 
process of the EPC. These improvements included:  defining joint action as 
the primary goal of the EPC; strengthening the obligation of member states 
to consult each other; establishing contacts between the EPC and third 
countries; supporting the Presidency with a mobile team of officials; 
improving relations with the European Parliament; incorporating the 
Commission into political co-operation; and the determination of 
consultative procedures in the event of a crisis (European Political 
Cooperation, 1988: 16). In addition, on 19 June 1983, the Stuttgart Solemn 
Declaration enlarged the EPC’s scope of action to include the political and 
economic aspects of security. The declaration also focused on the 
development of common principles, and the possibility of joint actions in 
the field of foreign policy with the need for consistency between the EPC 
and the EC (Bindi, 2010: 24). As a result, on 29 June 1985, the European 
Council established an intergovernmental conference, which resulted in the 
adoption of the SEA (European Political Cooperation, 1988).
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2.1.2. The Single European Act (SEA) 1986 
Although the EC was formed in 1957, it had not yet achieved its main 
goal in establishing a common market. Thus, the main purpose of the SEA 
was to set a deadline for the creation of a European single market by 1992 
(Civitas, 2011). Thus, the SEA represented a significant step forward in the 
European integration process. This Act promoted an economic and 
monetary union as a key element in the integration process through the free 
movement of goods, people, services and capital between member states 
(Historiasiglo, 2012).  The significance of the SEA is also underlined by its 
impact on the decision-making process of the Council. Previously requiring 
all decisions to be reached through unanimous agreement, the SEA 
increased the areas - especially that of economics, trade and finance - that 
the Council could reach decisions through Qualified Majority Voting
(QMV) rather than unanimity. QMV refers to the votes required in the 
Council for a decision to be adopted when issues are being debated; these
votes are weighted in accordance with the size of the population of each 
member (Europa, n.d.; EUABC, n.d.). This facilitated an increased 
efficiency in decision-making, and avoided the frequent delays previously 
inherent in the search for a unanimous agreement among the twelve member 
states (Europa, 2012). In addition, the SEA was also an attempt to create 
deeper integration by strengthening the power of the European Parliament 
through its enhanced role in the EC legislative process (Murphy, 1989: 337). 
Furthermore, it gave the European Parliament the power to veto the 
admission of new member states (Civitas, 2011). 
In relation to foreign policy, the EC’s foreign ministers argued for the 
need to reform the structures and mechanisms of the EC’s foreign policy 
making process to increase efficiency (Hammel, 2009). The outcomes of 
their deliberations further informed the SEA’s development (Hammel, 
2009). The Act came into force on 1 July 1987 following the signatures of 
the twelve EC member states on 17 February 1986 (Belgium, Britain, 
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Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and West Germany). The SEA allowed the EC to act with 
consistency and solidarity, and hence, become a more effective international 
player. This development helped the EC to protect its member states’ 
common interests around the globe (Kaya, 2005), and, as Rhodes (1998: 2) 
states, passage of the SEA enabled increasing visibility of the EC in the 
international relations arena.
The EPC was institutionalised within the EC Treaty framework in 
1987 under the SEA. While the EPC remained separate from the institutions 
and policies of the EC, linking it to the EC treaty framework provided it 
with a legal basis for action (Hix, 2005).  Therefore, the SEA was crucial for 
closer interaction between the EC and the EPC (EC members). Although the 
SEA demonstrated an improvement in cooperation within the EC, some 
member states remained dissatisfied with the level of cooperation.
2.1.3. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 1992
Despite both the political and economic unions providing many 
advantages to the EC, its foreign policy had, since 1970, faced complex 
challenges in various forms: intergovernmental, trans-governmental, and 
supranational.  Together, these challenges affected the effectiveness of the 
EC’s foreign policy during this period. As an outcome of this, leaders of the 
member states realised that a more coherent approach to foreign policy 
decision-making than that of the EPC would be required in the near future. 
Consequently, the CFSP was established in 1992 under the Maastricht 
Treaty’s three pillars (Bronstone, 2000; Smith, 2004). 
A key part of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), Article B, was created to “assert its identity on the international 
scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and 
security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, 
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which might in time lead to a common defence” (TEU, 1992: Article B). In 
negotiating this agreement, member states established the replacement of 
the EPC by the CFSP.  
The twelve EC member states signed the TEU on 7 February 1992 and 
it became effective on 1 November 1993. Kaya (2005: 128-132) puts 
forward the following reasons as to why member states were encouraged to 
sign the TEU:
1. The EC achieved a high degree of economic integration and 
development, but still had low performance in the political field. 
Therefore, it was decided to develop this field through the 
establishment of the CFSP
2. The former Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 turned the EC focused 
to other areas for unity such as political and military 
considerations;   
3.  The Europeanisation of security policy was considered necessary 
due to the selective withdrawal of the United States from the 
European theatre; and 
4.  The Maastricht Treaty reformed the institutional framework within 
the EC, making the EC more effective internationally.
 
Following the signing of the TEU, the EC changed its name to the EU, 
and thereafter was constructed on three pillars: the EC, the CFSP, and 
Justice and Home Affairs. As a result, the CFSP replaced the EPC, and was 
established by Title V of the TEU (Kaya, 2005). The TEU established the 
system of cooperation between the member states in the conduct of policy, 
and gradually implemented joint action in areas in which it had key 
common interests (Allerkamp, 2004: 4). Furthermore, the TEU states that 
the Council should define “common positions” whenever it deems necessary, 
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to which member states should tailor their national policies. Accordingly,
the European Council should ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness 
of action by the EU (Allerkamp, 2004: 5).
According to the TEU, the Commission has the right to refer to the 
Council any question relating to the CFSP, and can submit proposals to the 
Council.  Furthermore, it has the right to call an extraordinary meeting on 
any matter relating to the CFSP; a right already afforded to the Council and 
the member states (Bronstone, 2000). In addition, Article J.9 of the TEU 
notes that the Commission shall be “fully associated with the work carried 
out in the common foreign and security policy field” (TEU, 1992).  
Therefore, the Commission not only has the right to initiate foreign policy,
but also the responsibility to implement some foreign policy decisions, and 
to manage these responsibilities (Hix, 2005). This led to the supranational 
level "Commission" having a role to play in terms of EU foreign policy 
alongside member states. 
In order to ameliorate the EU’s external activities, the TEU introduced 
two new CFSP instruments. The first, the Common Position, was adopted 
by consensus of the member states, meaning member states were to align 
their national foreign policy positions with those of EU foreign policies. 
However, no sanctions would be imposed on a member state if it failed to 
comply with the common position (Hix, 2005). The second instrument, Joint 
Action, stated that taking action in the foreign policy area was dependent on 
the common position adopted by the Council. This decision could be 
applied through QMV.  The TEU provided, for the first time, the use of 
QMV in relation to foreign policy. However, the TEU also stipulated that if 
the joint action was related to military action, the decision was to be adopted 
by consensus voting, not qualified majority voting (Hix, 2005). 
Although the TEU created a new structure for the EU, it left many 
areas ill-defined, particularly in the CFSP. This led member states to 
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introduce several organisational reforms to the CFSP, and to strengthen 
older structures, through the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (Hammel, 2009).
2.1.4. The Amsterdam Developments 1997
Fifteen member states signed the Amsterdam Treaty on 2 October 
1997, with the aim of improving and increasing EU foreign policy 
coherence and effectiveness (Kaya, 2005). The Treaty came into force on 1 
May 1999, and introduced many changes within the EU structure. The most 
important change was the creation of a new position, the High 
Representative (HR) for the CFSP, which was represented by the 
Secretariat-General of the Council of Ministers (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997: 
Article 26). The main reason for creating this new position was to 
strengthen cohesion in the EU’s external representation, and to give the EU 
a single, authoritative voice in the international arena (Kaya, 2005). 
Accordingly, the predominant role of the HR was to provide assistance to 
the Presidency of the EU council. The HR was to assist in formulating, 
preparing and implementing policy decisions made by the Council. In 
addition, the HR could conduct political dialogue with non-European 
countries on the Council’s behalf and at the request of the Presidency 
(Hammel, 2009). While the Presidency of the Council continued to 
represent the EU in CFSP matters, the HR could also represent the EU in the 
international arena. Alongside this new role, the Amsterdam Treaty also 
created a new troika, which included the HR, the Council President, and the 
Commission President (Hammel, 2009).  The troika brought together:
1. The Foreign Minister of the member state holding the Presidency 
of the Council of the EU;
2.  The Secretary-General/HR for the CFSP; and
3. The EU Commissioner in charge of external relations and 
European neighbourhood policy.
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In addition to these changes, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced 
common strategies as a new instrument in the foreign policy field. These 
strategies were to be implemented through a common position and joint 
actions in the CFSP (Hix, 2005). Some modifications to the voting 
procedures within the CFSP were also adopted under the Amsterdam Treaty. 
It upheld the principle of unanimity as the general rule, but specified that a 
qualified majority would be sufficient for “adopting joint actions, common 
positions or taking any other decisions on the basis of a common strategy” 
(Amsterdam Treaty, 1997: Article 23.2). It was also considered to be 
sufficient for “any decision implementing a joint action or a common 
position” (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997: Article 23.2), with the exception of 
decisions with security or defence implications. In addition, the Treaty 
encouraged member states to abstain rather than veto, and allowed the 
member states who abstained to elaborate by formal declaration (Hix, 2005; 
Allerkamp, 2004).  
Despite the changes implemented by the Amsterdam Treaty, and the 
EU’s efforts in trying to increase its effectiveness on the international stage, 
progress towards genuine EU foreign policy remained slow and inadequate.  
This encouraged EU leaders at the Laeken Summit in 2001 to develop a new 
and stronger role for the EU in the world (Hughes, 2003). 
2.1.5. The Nice Treaty 2001
The Nice Treaty was signed on 26 February 2001, and came into force 
on 1 February 2003 (Kaya, 2005). It focused predominantly on the 
extension of enhanced cooperation within the CFSP, and included several 
new principles on security matters. However, it also incorporated changes 
on issues such as Commission members. Previously, some countries, such 
as Germany, France and Britain, had more than one Commissioner, 
depending on the size of the member state. The new Treaty, however, 
determined one Commissioner for each country, totalling a final number of 
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27 Commissioners (Allerkamp, 2004). Furthermore, according to the Nice 
Treaty, the Political Committee was to be replaced by a Political and 
Security Committee (PSC). This new Committee was to be assisted by a 
politico-military working group, as well as a committee for civilian aspects 
of crisis management, a military committee (EUMC), and military staff 
(EUMS). The EUMC was to provide military advice to the PSC and the HR, 
while the EUMS was responsible for early-warning strategic planning and 
situation assessment (Hix, 2005). In addition to these changes, decisions, 
according to the Nice Treaty, would be made by QMV. However, each 
member state was able to request that any matter be referred to the European 
Council for the purposes of a unanimous decision (Allerkamp, 2004).
2.1.6. The Lisbon Treaty 2007
The Lisbon Treaty is the most recent revision of the CFSP to be 
agreed upon by the EU member states.  It was signed on 13 December 2007 
and came into force on 1 December 2009. It contained several institutional 
reforms (Wessels and Bopp, 2008), and accordingly, made EU foreign 
policy more effective by extending the HR’s responsibilities. The previous 
confusion around, and conflict between, the responsibilities of the HR and 
the European Commissioner for External Relations led to the member state 
governments to agree, in the proposed constitution and in the Lisbon Treaty, 
that the two posts be merged into a single EU Foreign Minister role for 
foreign affairs and security policy (Wessels and Bopp, 2008; Gaspers, 2009; 
Verola, 2010: 44). Although the original constitution was not ratified, its 
replacement retained the change, merging the previous HR role with the 
External Relations Commissioner role. The new HR position also assumed 
other foreign affairs roles, such as chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, and 
representing the EU in international forums. These roles had previously 
been exercised by the foreign minister of the country holding the presidency 
of the EU (Wessels and Bopp, 2008).  
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Another key change to the role of the HR was that he or she would no 
longer act as the Council Secretary-General, meaning the HR and the 
Secretary-General positions would no longer be held by the same person 
(Wessels and Bopp, 2008; Gaspers, 2009; Verola, 2010: 44).  Instead, in 
filling the newly-merged Commissioner post, the HR would also hold the 
position of the Vice-President of the European Commission. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the HR would preside over the newly 
established Foreign Affairs Council (TEU, 1992: Art. 18.3). The 
competencies conferred upon the HR in the intergovernmental dimension of 
EU foreign policy-making were complemented by the functions the HR 
would assume in the dual roles of Vice-President of the Commission and 
Commissioner for External Relations. The HR would be in charge of all 
responsibilities incumbent on the Commission with regards to external 
relations, therefore ensuring their consistency with one another (TEU, 1992: 
Art. 18.4). As such, in this coordinating role within the Commission, the HR 
would be in a position to increase the coherence of all policies conducted by 
the Commission in the area of external relations (Gaspers, 2009; Verola, 
2010: 44). 
Once the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the HR was predestined to 
play a key role in ensuring a more unitary representation of the EU in 
international affairs; there would no longer be a new personality 
representing the EU on the world stage every six months. As a result, the 
HR increased the horizontal and institutional coherence of EU foreign 
policy formulation and implementation. At the same time, the HR’s role as 
Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council also enabled increased harmony 
between member states’ foreign policies. It strengthened vertical coherence 
between national foreign policies and the external relations activities of the 
EU (Gaspers, 2009). The new HR and its administrative substructure, the 
External Action Service, became responsible for reducing incoherence by 
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introducing new mechanisms for coordination (Raube, 2009; Portela and 
Raube, 2009). 
2.2. Interaction and Coordination among EU Foreign Policy Actors 
during Policy Formulation and Implementation 
Coordination and interaction within the EU are “behaviours based on 
agreement among the Union and its member states, where comparable and 
compatible methods are used in pursuit of a single objective and result in a 
contradictory (foreign) policy” (Abellan, 2002: 4; Kaya, 2008: 1745).  Yet, 
as Oberthür and Gehring (2001: 2) argue, such institutional interaction 
refers to the existence of two or more institutions affecting each other’s 
development and performance. In order to understand the EU’s foreign 
policy, it is crucial to understand the interaction between levels (vertical 
interaction), as well as between pillars and institutions (horizontal 
interaction) (Keukeleire and Justaert, 2009). The relationship between 
horizontal and vertical interaction focuses on how the EU member states 
themselves coordinate their external relations with the EU and, in turn, how 
these external relations are coordinated within the EU bureaucracies in order 
that it may speak with a single voice (Duke, 2001). 
The aim of this study is to examine the interaction and coordination 
among the EU’s foreign policy actors, and how their actions have an impact 
on the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy. To this end, their interaction 
and coordination within the EU body will be examined both horizontally 
(across pillars and between the institutions), and vertically (between levels).
Horizontal interaction among institutions can lead to an increase or decrease 
in the external effectiveness of the EU (Oberthür and Gehring, 2001).  
Vertical interaction focuses on the coordination and bargaining between the 
EU, member states, interest groups, and lobbyists. More precisely, vertical 
interaction and coordination apply to relations between the member states
and the EU (Duke, 2001). Therefore, in order to be more effective in the 
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international arena, improved cooperation and coordination is required 
between the EU’s foreign policy and its member states’ foreign policies. In 
addition, the management of EU external relations by the Commission and 
the Council Secretariat is also needed (Christiansen, 2001a). The EC treaties 
refer specifically to horizontal and vertical coherencies. For example, 
Article C in the TEU refers to horizontal consistency by stating that the EU 
is to “ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations, security, economic, and development 
policies” (TEU, 1992). Article 130 of the TEU refers to vertical consistency, 
focusing on cooperation between the Community and member states, 
“which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the member 
states” (TEU, 1992).  Furthermore, Article 11 (2) of the TEU requires that 
“the member states shall support the Union’s external and security policy 
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” (TEU, 
1992).
The majority of the EU treaties have aimed for a high level of 
coordination and coherence among EU foreign policy actors, and this has 
influenced its foreign policy effectiveness in the international scene.  Article 
3 of the TEU states that the EU shall ensure consistency in its external 
activity, and that the Commission and the Council “shall cooperate’” to this 
end (Portela and Raube, 2009: 4). The Lisbon Treaty’s predominant 
innovation was to provide the HR with a new position within the structure 
of the EU; a new post that incorporated the roles of both the Vice-President 
of the Commission and the Chairman of the Council. It also assumed 
responsibility for the European External Action Service (EEAS), which 
included both the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) branches of the current Council Secretariat. These changes occurred 
in order to overcome problems of incoherence by introducing further 
mechanisms of coordination (Portela and Raube, 2009). Such incoherence, 
according to Vanhoonacker (2008), is viewed as a malign phenomenon 
which makes actors appear untrustworthy and unreliable.
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2.2.1. Inter-Institutional Relations (Horizontal Interaction) 
Inter-institutional relations focus on the coherence or lack of 
coherence, between the EU institutions (Christiansen, 2001b: 748). The 
policies between different pillars must be coordinated in order to create 
effective foreign policy (Portela and Raube, 2009). Thus, horizontal 
coherence requires knowledge of the goals and objectives of special policy 
initiatives, and an evaluation of whether these initiatives buttress the same 
goals or essentially pursue different goals and objectives (Olsen, 2008). 
Therefore, horizontal interaction means the policies pursued by different 
parts of the EU machine, in pursuit of varying objectives, should be 
coherent with one another (Nuttall, 2005). Accordingly, the formulation and 
implementation of EU foreign policy often encompasses a wide range of 
actors, competencies, and instruments which are spread between different 
pillars, levels and locations (Hill and Smith, 2005; Wallace, 2005; 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Nasra, 2009:20). Key horizontal 
interactions and their coordination are addressed in the areas outlined below. 
2.2.1.1. The Distribution of Power and Authority between EU 
Institutions 
Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, member states have increasingly 
demonstrated their willingness to provide the EU with the necessary 
capacity to act with determination in international affairs (Mette and 
Elisabeth, 2003: 392). Consequently, both the legislative and executive 
functions have become a shared responsibility between member states and 
EU institutions (Warleigh, 2008); member states have transferred some of 
their authority to the supranational level (EU level), as well as to domestic 
pressure groups who participate at the EU level (Duke, 2001). The aim of 
this development is to achieve consistency within the EU’s foreign policy 
activities, thereby ensuring that the EU is able to “assert its identity on the 
international scene” (TEU, 1992: Art. B.2). Furthermore, the success of 
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presenting EU foreign policy within a single framework reflects the EU 
entity as an independent actor in the international arena. 
The governance system in the EU is characterised by the dispersion of 
authoritative power and competencies between varying levels of governance, 
and also between different sets of political players within the EU (Mette and 
Elisabeth, 2003). Therefore, coordination among EU foreign policy actors is 
essential. The HR plays a proactive role in this regard. The HR participates 
in Troika meetings alongside the Commission President and the President of 
Council, providing the HR with an active role in promoting coherence 
among EU institutions. In addition, the Council Secretariat supports this 
coordination at all levels through encouragement, facilitation and 
participation, and by ensuring all tools are properly structured. For example, 
the Secretariat undertakes development of internal coordination activities in 
the areas of advice, identifying good practice and reporting.
The distribution of power among the EU's foreign policy actors is 
based on a "process of exchange, whereby an actor's power is strengthened 
by his/her ability to combine external, as well as internal, linkages and, 
therefore, access to multiple resources. The distribution of power within the 
network plays a key role in shaping the intra-regional interactions and [in] 
achieving collective action" (Paraskevopoulos, 2002: 15). Accordingly,
some member states and the Council Secretariat preferred to keep the 
institutionalisation of the CFSP outside Commission hands. This became 
apparent when the European Political Cooperation Secretariat was created 
outside the existing institutional structure, rather than being added to the 
portfolio of the Commission (Christiansen, 2001b: 755). Such unclear 
competencies between the Commission and the Council Secretariat 
ultimately led to competition for power and funding for their respective 
activities (Duke, 2006). This affected the dynamics in the meetings of 
Council working groups and impacted on the Council’s ability to achieve a 
unanimous agreement or majority consensus. Both institutions have 
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representatives, for example, in any meeting held under the Council’s rules 
of procedure, from working group meetings, or the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives, to the meetings of ministers (Christiansen, 2001a). As a 
result, the distribution of authority among actors is sometimes ill-defined 
and fluid, where power may shift between the Council and the Commission. 
These developments may result in the European Parliament becoming a 
more significant player (Auel and Rittberger, 2006: 124). 
2.2.1.2. Instruments of EU Foreign Policy
The effectiveness of any entity requires the political will to act and to 
use all available instruments in a strategic fashion (Olsen, 2008). Thus, in 
order to be a more effective power, actors in an international scene require 
control and the use of certain necessary instruments such as humanitarian 
assistance, aid, peacekeeping, economic sanctions and diplomacy. The EU, 
as with any political entity, needs such instruments to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives. 
Joint declarations were the only official foreign policy instruments 
available to the EU prior to the Maastricht Treaty. A new and distinct 
operational legal instrument was introduced under Title V of the Treaty in 
1992. This instrument requests “coordinated action by the Member States 
whereby resources of all kinds (human resources, know-how, financing, 
equipment, and so on) are mobilized to attain specific objectives fixed by 
the Council on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council” 
(TEU, 1992). Accordingly, the EU has made widespread use of economic 
instruments to obtain political support, becoming one of the largest donors 
of non-military aid, financial, and technical assistance to the United Nations 
(UN) and non-European Countries (Musu, 2008). In addition, the CFSP 
controls the following standard diplomatic instruments: declarations, high-
level meetings, participation in international conferences, the sending of 
election observers to third countries, and participation in negotiations to 
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resolve international conflicts (Keukeleire, 2003). Moreover, the EU now 
also has military instruments that have been used in limited cases such as 
peacekeeping and human rights interventions in third countries. 
The EU can apply these instruments in different ways through joint 
actions, common positions or common strategies. Joint actions address 
specific situations where action by the EU is considered necessary and 
bypasses the objectives of the CFSP. Common positions permit the 
alignment of policies without necessarily taking action or committing 
resources. The underlying logic of both instruments can be explained as 
follows: “Whereas joint actions were seen by the Council to enable the EU 
to act in selected high profile areas, common positions were seen as a means 
to respond to day-to-day matters.” (Keukeleire, 2003: 48).  Both are legally 
binding. Common strategies, on the other hand, are more recently created 
instruments which cover several areas of the EU’s external relations, and are 
intended to be an improved mechanism for ensuring coherence. 
In terms of EU institutions, the Commission’s control over these 
instruments led to a recognition by the Council Secretariat of the desire to 
involve the Commission in the future planning and deliberation of 
integrated crisis management responses (Christiansen, 2001b). Grant and 
Leonard (2006: 1) argue that the institutions and member states often fail to 
coordinate their various policies and instruments in the pursuit of common 
objectives, including the areas of trade, defense, aid, policing, and 
diplomacy.  Furthermore, they state that the main factor causing weaknesses 
in EU foreign policy is restrictive financial regulations.
2.2.1.3. The Nature of Competencies within EU Institutions
In 1970, foreign policy cooperation increased under the framework of 
the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Duke, 2001).  Since 1992, 
external activities have increased sharply, highlighting the need for 
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coherence among the EC’s external competencies. These activities are 
conducted within the first of the three pillars, while those at a governmental 
level are articulated within the second pillar (Duke, 2006).  Therefore, 
competencies relating to EU foreign policy are shared between the 
supranational level – Commission and intergovernmental – and the Council 
Secretariat (Duke, 2006; Portela and Raube, 2009). The Commission has 
competencies in external relations in two areas. The first is related to trade, 
environment and education agreements. The Treaty of the European 
Community (TEC), in Article 300, affords the Community the power to 
enter into international agreements. In the same Treaty, Article 310 deals 
with association agreements, while Article 133 addresses common 
commercial policy. The second source of the Commission’s competencies 
comes from its role in proposing policy legislation to the European 
Parliament and the Council. This role includes budget management, policy 
implementation and coordination of the 27 national policies.  It also 
includes responsibility for leading negotiations with non-European countries 
on behalf of the EU, and formulating a steady flow of development 
cooperation policies through communications (Sacchetti, 2008).  Through 
these roles, the Commission attempted to increase its control of the external 
activities of the EU through the Commission President at the time, Jacques 
Delors. In 1993, Mr Delors separated the Director-General 1 position, which 
was responsible for external economic relations, into two roles: the 
Director-General 1, and the Director-General 1A. The Director General 1 is 
responsible for economic relations, while the Director-General 1A role 
became responsible for external political relations, with a specific 
commissioner appointed to this position (White, 2001). 
The General Affairs and External Relations Council is responsible for 
passing most European laws, budget approvals, replenishing the European 
Development Fund and concluding international agreements. It also 
develops the CFSP (Sacchetti, 2008). Tallberg (2004: 999) argues that the 
President plays a crucial role in unlocking incompatible negotiation, and 
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thus preventing negotiation failure. The presidential responsibilities include 
determining the nature and frequency of meetings, and attending formal and 
informal negotiations and meetings with different working groups, 
committees, and ministerial configurations. These competencies allow 
further negotiation on various issues and aid governments in avoiding 
negotiation failure (Tallberg, 2004: 1004).
Although the Presidency of the Council provided leadership for EU 
foreign policy, prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, the nature of its rotation 
every six months amongst the member states impacted on its ability to 
ensure cohesion and efficiency;  hence, the HR post was needed (Kaya, 
2005). The creation of this post in 1997 (Amsterdam Treaty) meant that the 
HR, together with the Presidency, is responsible for present EU foreign 
policy in the international arena.  Furthermore, they both have the right to 
negotiate with non-European countries throughout the world.  The HR 
position also comprises other key responsibilities as mentioned in earlier 
parts of this chapter.  However, issues arose as EU treaties did not clearly 
define the division of competencies. This led to much debate about potential 
conflict and rivalry between the Commission, the External Economic and 
Relations Commissioner, and the HR, despite the strong relationships of the 
persons leading these institutions (Christiansen, 2001a). Furthermore, as the 
Commission was fully associated with external relations, it comprised more 
than four Director-Generals, leading to competition within the Commission 
itself, and therefore resulting in difficulty in defining EU external relations. 
Meanwhile, the Council, through the creation of many institutions to deal 
with foreign policy, such as the General Secretariat, the HR, the Policy Unit 
and others, affected EU foreign policy, and led to overlapping in agendas 
and competencies. This was evident in Javier Solana’s European Security 
Strategy 2008, when he observed that external relations instruments and 
capabilities were the responsibilities of different EU institutions, and 
subsequently led to conflicts within the EU (Duke, 2006: 4). Thus, even 
now, many issues continue to arise due to the lack of clarity between the EC 
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and the CFSP competencies, and furthermore between the EU and its 
member states (Duke, 2006).
The Lisbon Treaty attempted to overcome these problems through 
merging the European Commissioner for External Relations role with that 
of the HR for Foreign and Security Policy, into a single EU post. According 
to this Treaty, the HR has the necessary competencies to aid in increasing 
horizontal and institutional coherence of EU foreign policy formulation and 
implementation. At the same time, the HR’s role as Chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Council, also enables the post to further advance interstate 
harmonisation of member states’ foreign policies, and to strengthen vertical 
coherence between national foreign policies and the external relations 
activities of the EU (Gaspers, 2009).
The participation of a variety of actors in the formulation and 
implementation of EU foreign policy, as well as the spread of competencies 
and instruments across different pillars, levels, and locations, affected its 
foreign policy performance (Nasra, 2009). However, it was not only the 
competencies and instruments spread across those pillars and levels that 
affected the EU’s foreign policy performance, but also the coordination and 
cooperation between member states and EU institutions.
2.2.2. Interaction between EU Levels of Governance (Vertical 
Interaction) 
Inter-level interaction and coordination refers to the relations between 
the EU’s foreign policy actors at different levels within particular EU 
institutions (the Commission, the HR, and the Presidency), and the member 
states (Christiansen, 2001b: 748). These types of relationships clearly reflect 
the interaction between the intergovernmental level (CFSP) and the 
supranational level (the EC) (Kaya, 2005). Foreign policies of the member 
states should be complementary to EU foreign policy (Portela and Raube, 
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2009; Nuttall, 2005), and this can be achieved through interaction and 
coordination among the national foreign policies of the 27 member states, 
and, additionally, between the Community’s external relations and member 
states. This coordination is crucial to create the effective cohesion of EU 
foreign policy; if the EU lacks coherence, this negatively impacts on its 
foreign policy actions. For example, the incoherence of the member states 
during the Balkans crisis of 1990 prevented the EC from intervening 
effectively (Stahl, 2008).  
This part of the study focuses on the actors who have participated in 
preparation of the foreign policy agenda within the EU, and the actors who 
have had a strong influence on the decision-making process. In order to 
explore the nature of interaction and coordination between member states 
and the EU institutions through these stages, the thesis will examine the
roles of the EU’s foreign policy actors through the implementation process. 
2.2.2.1. Interaction between EU Foreign Policy Actors in Agenda-
Setting
Agendas are the sets of issues that are carefully considered in the 
formation of a policy (Kingdon, 1995: 3). No policy can be created without 
it being the active agenda of governmental institutions. Therefore, agenda-
setting processes are crucial in the development of policy and decision-
making. However, not all issues are considered equal in agenda-setting
processes. The political and social construction of an issue is significant in 
determining whether or not it is added to an agenda (Kingdon, 1995). 
Agenda-setting is “a highly political process: political actors seek actively to 
bring issues on to the agenda if they are looking for a change of policy, or to 
keep them off the agenda if they want to defend the status quo” (Princen, 
2007: 21). In times of crisis, for example, some issues can move on to an 
agenda and enter the policy process within days (Peters, 2001). 
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Agenda-setting within the EU is significantly different from the 
process practiced in most national political systems. The EU includes a 
large number of sovereign countries with conflicting national agendas and 
interests, and different pursuer groups and lobbies. Peters (2001: 82) claims 
that the complexity and fragmentation within the EU led to difficulties that 
impacted on the Commission’s role as a dominant agenda-setter. While the 
Commission is the only institution that can submit proposals under the EU’s 
first pillar, and therefore to the first pillar’s formal agenda-setter (Sacchetti, 
2008; Smith, 2004b; Warleigh, 2008), there are multiple avenues of 
potential influence, even within the Commission itself (Peters, 2001: 82). 
Accordingly, the Commission cannot submit these proposals without 
advanced discussions with representatives of the member states and other 
EU institutions (Princen, 2007). 
In terms of the CFSP, the national foreign policy actors must 
participate in highly institutionalised group decision-making forums at all 
stages of the foreign policy formulation process.  This includes broad 
agenda-setting at the EU Council level (Smith, 2004a, 2004b). Thus, the 
member states, through their Permanent Representatives in Brussels 
(COREPER) and other committees, also participate in shaping the issues 
that will be discussed and presented on the foreign policy agenda (Cram, 
1993). Moreover, both the Permanent Representatives of member states and 
the committees within the EU have an effective influence on the 
Commission’s proposals through their relationships with their Commission 
counterparts (Duke, 2001; Sacchetti, 2008).  In addition, member states that 
hold the Presidency of the EU council occasionally attempt to pursue their 
national interests through EU agendas, although this ability to push a 
national agenda is limited by the short-term nature of the Presidency 
(Tallberg, 2003). 
EU institutions have affected agenda-setting within EU foreign policy 
through several methods, including:
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a. The EU bureaucracy;
b. The European Parliament and the Commission;
c. The Commission which has the right to submit proposals to the 
Council for discussion;
d. The Parliament, which has the right to make amendments to 
policy proposals; and
e. EU institutions which can bring some issues to the attention of 
relevant parts of the Commission, although cannot force the 
Commission to actively consider them (Christiansen, 2001b; 
Peters, 2001; Peters, 1992; Pollack, 1995; Majone, 1993; 
Bulmer, 1994; Cram, 1993). 
As a result of the above, the common agenda clearly reflects a list of 
EU principles that have universal approval from member states and EU 
institutions. Therefore, the Commission is aware that the foreign policy 
formulation and implementation processes are dependent on cooperation 
between the member states and EU institutions. 
2.2.2.2. EU Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process 
The decision–making stage is sensitive in any institution because the 
outcome may affect some participants’ interests. Therefore, all participants 
deal with this stage carefully in order to ensure their interests are protected.  
EU foreign policy decision-making is complex because it involves many 
actors, such as “the President of the Commission, the various 
Commissioners, the Council of Ministers, the President of the Council, and 
in particular the inclusion of the ‘High Representative for CFSP’ and his 
special representatives” (Guraziu, 2008: 23). Moreover, because each 
member state has its own national foreign policy, national interests, national 
Parliament, national relations, along with their own style of decision-making, 
it is necessary that they clarify and agree on their position internally before 
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taking any position on the EU stage;this affects the EU’s foreign policy 
(Marcussen et al, 1999; Smith, 2004a, 2004b; Stahl, 2008). 
The Council of Ministers is the most direct expression of national 
interests and power (Lewis, 2000), and includes all member state ministers 
from different fields. The ministers of this Council present the views of their 
respective governments within the EU. The latter is often referred to as the 
General Affairs Council (GAC), to indicate its wider-ranging brief to 
address general policy questions, as well as external relations (White, 2004). 
The GAC is the main decision-making body of the CFSP. This Council 
includes the foreign ministers of the member states and normally meets once 
a month with the Commission also in attendance (Nugent, 1999).  The GAC, 
on the other hand, is the main forum for negotiating and bargaining among 
EU member states about final decisions regarding particular issues 
(Christiansen, 2006). The most important task of the GAC, according to the 
TEU (Article 13, 1 and 2), is defining the principles and general guidelines 
for the CFSP, and to decide on common strategies “where the member states 
have important interests in common”. 
The Council of Ministers incorporates three key levels:  the lower 
level consists of the working parties; the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives is positioned above them; and the Ministers assume the 
highest position. When the Commission submits a proposal to the Council, 
it is first considered by the relevant working groups (Hage, 2007). 
Following negotiations with other members, the working groups send both 
the agreement points and the problematic points to the relevant COREPER 
(Hage, 2007). COREPER plays a crucial role in the decision-making system 
of the EU because it represents and reflects the individual countries’ 
interests within the EU (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999).  As part of its role, it 
holds weekly meetings in order to discuss the agendas of upcoming 
ministerial meetings (Lewis, 2000). The COREPER Committee can make a 
decision in place of their government without returning to the Council, in 
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particular, regarding those decisions described as routine business, or upon 
which member states can more easily find agreement (Christiansen, 2001b).
Tallberg (2004: 999) argues that the President in Office (Presidency of 
the Council) has a role in unlocking incompatible negotiation, and thus 
preventing negotiation failure. One of the presidential responsibilities is to 
shape the number and frequency of formal and informal negotiation 
meetings for different working groups, committees, and ministerial 
configurations. This capability enables further negotiation on various issues, 
thereby helping governments avoid negotiation failure (Tallberg, 
2004:1004). The Council Secretariat introduces legal advice to the 
Presidency of the Council both during and after the meetings with national 
representatives. This advice has political significance in the context of any 
important decision taken in the Council (Christiansen and Jorgensen, 1998). 
On the other hand, the HR position for the CFSP was created in order to 
provide some assistance to the Presidency of the Council in matters relating 
to the CFSP scope, through the formulation, preparation and implementation 
stages of policy decisions. 
Regarding the voting system within the EU, member states agree that 
foreign policy decision-making should be reached by consensus, whereby if 
some member states do not agree with a decision, governments in the 
minority must abstain, rather than veto an agreement (Nugent, 1999; 
Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). This means that member states no longer 
have veto rights (Hix, 2005). According to the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
consensus voting system applies when votes are taken on the 
implementation of guidelines, and up to one-third of member states may 
abstain without blocking a decision. The second type of voting, which 
applies to most decisions, is majority voting. With each member state 
wielding one vote, this is used primarily for procedural questions (Bomberg, 
Cram and Martian, 2003). Qualified majority voting (QMV) applies when 
votes are taken on proposed action related to agreed strategies.  In this case, 
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any member state may indicate that, ‘for important and stated reasons of 
national policy’, it will oppose the adoption of a decision taken by QMV.  
Here, the Amsterdam Treaty states that a vote should not be taken, although 
foreign ministers may agree by QMV to return issues to the European 
Council for a decision by consensus. However, this does not mean the 
member states are equal within the EU: the voting system within the EU 
depends on the size of member states. Therefore, the large member states, 
such as France, Germany, Britain, Spain, and Italy, have both the majority 
of votes in the Council and the majority in the composition of the 
Parliament and the Commission (Bunse, 2009: 20).
In conclusion, the leadership within the EU is shared between a 
variety of actors; however the member states remain the key actors in 
formulating and articulating EU foreign policy positions in numerous 
settings (Smith, 2004a, 2004b). Member states have a crucial role in the 
decision-making process by selecting the final decision from the alternatives, 
and this has prompted a number of scholars (Hammel, 2009, Richardson, 
2006; Stubb, Wallace, and Peterson, 2003; Hughes, 2003; Wagner, 2003) to 
claim that the CFSP decision-making process remains organised by people 
at the intergovernmental level. However, the EU institutions also play an 
important role in this process, as they can coordinate with other actors in 
order to shape the nature of EU foreign policy (Cram, 1993).  For example, 
the Commission was designed as both a secretariat and executive in the 
EU’s institutional system (Wallace and Wallace, 2000). Thus, the 
Commission’s participation in the decision-making process, when proposals 
have formally left the Commission and are under deliberation in the Council 
and European Parliament, depends on the policy area and the decision-
making mechanism applicable in any given case (Christiansen, 2001a). 
42
2.2.2.3. Implementing foreign policy
Implementation, in this context, refers to the complex process of 
putting a policy into practice using a variety of mechanisms and procedures 
that involve a wide and diverse range of actors. In terms of the EU's foreign 
policy implementation, it is the shared responsibility of EU institutions and 
member states. That is, the implementation of EU foreign policy depends on 
the interplay between member states and EU institutions (Nykvist, 2008). 
The main actors in the implementation process are the Commission, 
the EU Presidency, and the HR, as well as member states (Smith, 2004b).
Gauttier (2004: 26) posits that “the Union shall in particular ensure the 
consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external 
relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the 
Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall 
ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its 
respective powers”. The Commission plays an important role in foreign 
policy implementation through its delegations. It has 127 delegations around 
the world to assist member states’ diplomatic representatives implement the 
EU’s foreign policy objectives. Accordingly, these delegations provide the 
Commission with an assessment on the EU foreign policy directly (Hammel, 
2009). On the other hand, one of the HR's responsibilities is providing 
assistance to the Presidency of the Council in the implementation of 
Common Strategies, designed to enable specific foreign policy actions to be 
taken by the majority vote (Allerkamp, 2004). Member states, however, also 
play a crucial role in the implementation process, as Title III of the TEU 
states “the high contracting parties [the member states], being members of 
the European Communities, shall endeavour jointly to formulate and 
implement a European foreign policy” (Nugent, 1999: 447). 
There are three types of implementation within EU foreign policy 
(Cini, 2003). The first type is indirect implementation which identifies 
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where national governments assume all or most responsibility for putting 
EU foreign policy into effect (Cini, 2003). The second form is direct 
implementation which arises when the responsibility rests with the 
European Commission. The third form of implementation is the rule-making 
form, which refers to the Commission’s executive role in addressing the gap 
in European legislation, which has been agreed to by the EU Council and 
the European Parliament (Cini, 2003). 
The division of power between different levels of the EU has an effect 
on the implementation process (Dimitrakopoulos and Richardson, 2001). 
Tensions exist within the Troika between the supranational and 
intergovernmental aspects, particularly in the EU’s external activities (Duke, 
2006). These tensions arise due to the conflicting interests of the actors 
involved in the implementation process (Dimitrakopoulos and Richardson, 
2001). Moreover, because the EU has 27 members, agreement in developing 
and implementing common foreign policy becomes more difficult (Hughes, 
2003).
In conclusion, the EU's foreign policy is a very complex process, 
where many actors from different levels can affect its formulation and 
implementation. This can, in turn, affect the EU's foreign policy coherence 
and, in some cases, can also prevent the EU from presenting itself as a 
unified power in the international arena. The Iraq crisis of 2001-2009 is an 
illustrative example of the disunity of the EU's foreign policy. The 
following chapter examines the EU's relations with Iraq since 1921, and 
focuses in more depth on EU foreign policy towards Iraq during the 2001-
2009 period.  
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Chapter 3:
Overview of the EU’s Foreign 
Policy towards Iraq
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The European Union (EU) came into being under this title after the 
signing of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in 1992. Prior to this, 
there had been some coordination among members of the European 
Community (EC) in terms of foreign policy issues, but no common foreign 
policy existed. Before the signing of the TEU, individual relationships 
between members of the EU and Iraq were based on bilateral relations and 
mutual interests. 
The relations between Iraq and EU member states have been 
developed over a number of decades. This chapter examines the historical 
relations between European countries and Iraq generally, and more 
specifically in the context of the EU’s involvement in Iraqi affairs. The EU 
consists of a large number of members with different interests, social 
conditions and international relations. Iraq’s recent history is beset by 
numerous conflicts with many countries over different issues, impacting on 
its internal stability. In order to position the EU-Iraq relationship in its 
proper historical context, this part of the study examines the development of 
the key encounters between Europe and Iraq in order to generate a 
systematic and clear understanding of their interactions. 
Accordingly, the first part of this chapter reviews the European 
countries’ relations with Iraq during the colonial era, 1921-58. Furthermore, 
it also examines the relationship between Iraq and European countries 
during different periods since the colonial era: 1958-79, the Iraq-Iran war of 
1980-88, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the economic sanctions 
implemented by the international community thereafter. The second part of 
this chapter focuses on the pre-war period (2001-03) in order to explore the 
attitudes of different EU member states leading up to the United States-led 
invasion of Iraq, and to explain the factors which led to the division between 
member states when addressing this foreign policy issue. The final part of 
this chapter concerns the EU’s involvement in Iraq during the post-war era 
from 2003 until 2009. 
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3.1. An Historical Overview of the Europe - Iraq Relationship from 
1921 until 2001
Iraq was formerly part of the Ottoman Empire which ruled three Iraqi 
provinces - Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul - from the sixteenth to the twentieth 
centuries by military force (Johnson, 2004: 6-7; Ucuzsatar, 2002; United 
Nations, 2006). The Ottoman Empire was established in 1326 following the 
Turkish forces defeat of the Byzantines. This Empire expanded into 
southeast Europe (Greece, the Balkans, Bulgaria, Rumania), almost all of 
the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. The centralised system of 
rule was adopted by the Empire’s leadership and the Sultan exercised 
complete personal power through a large bureaucracy (Johnson, 2004). 
Literature relating to the history of the Europe-Iraq relationship 
demonstrates a connection established over several decades. For example, 
Germany showed interest in Iraqi oil from as early as 1871 and, as a result, 
developed a strong relationship with the Ottomans in order to have a direct 
influence over, and access to, Iraqi oil (Hunt, 2005). This was demonstrated 
by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany appointing a consul to both Baghdad and 
Mosul in 1894. Furthermore, Germany succeeded in obtaining approval 
from the Ottomans in 1903 to establish a railway connecting the Turkish 
city of Konya to Baghdad. It extended it to reach the city of Basra in 
southern Iraq with the ultimate aim of continuing the railroad into Kuwait, 
thereby establishing a direct connection between Iraq and Germany (Hunt, 
2005).  
Britain also has a long-standing history of engagement with Iraq. 
British interests in Iraq began as seventeenth century trading posts, and later 
developed with the establishment of the diplomatic mission (residency) in 
1810 to supplement the British residency at Basra (Peretz, 1994: 434). 
Peretz (1994: 434) states that, due to Iraq’s location, it became the most 
important Anglo-Indian shipping centre, resulting in Lord Curzon - Viceroy 
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of India and Foreign Secretary - introducing a request to the House of Lords 
in 1911 for Baghdad to be included in the sphere of British supremacy. 
India was the centre of British trade at that time, and routes to India could 
be significantly reduced if made via Iraq. Furthermore, such a route would 
facilitate Britain’s ability to control air space around India to cover any 
threat to this important region (Hunt, 2005).  Aside from this, Iraq retained 
its importance to Britain in relation to trade and energy in the aftermath of 
the discovery of its oil fields (Hunt, 2005). 
World War I (1914-1918) comprised the Ottoman Empire’s alliance 
with Germany against Britain, France and Russia. After the Empire’s defeat 
in this war, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement, allowing 
the two colonial countries to share the territories of the Ottoman Empire.
Although Britain’s control of the region had commenced in 1914 with an 
army landing at Basra, south of Iraq, it was unable to control the three 
provinces of Basra, Mosul (northern Iraq) and Baghdad (situated in central 
Iraq) until 1918 (Johnson, 2004: 11; Ucuzsatar, 2002; United Nations 2006)
Sir Percy Cox was the first British high commissioner for Iraq. He 
served from April 1918 until October 1920 and was succeeded by his 
deputy, Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson (Johnson, 2004: 13). In May 1920, the 
great Iraqi revolution against British occupation began in Baghdad and 
spread to other provinces (Polk, 2006: 77). The objectives of this revolution 
were independence from British rule and the creation of an Arab 
government. As a result of the revolution, Britain established a 
constitutional monarchy in Iraq and at the Cairo Conference in March 1921, 
chose Prince Faisal bin Hussein to be Iraq’s first king. Their choice was one 
based on strategic significance: Prince Faisal was not an Iraqi but the son of 
Hussein bin Ali Sharif Mecca, and a member of an influential family in the 
Arab world who was one of Britain’s wartime Arabian allies (Johnson, 
2004: 7; Nissen and Heine, 2009: 152).  
48
Although formal British control of Iraq had ended with independence 
in 1932 following Iraq’s acceptance as a member of the League of Nations, 
the Hashemit monarchy maintained a strong relationship with Britain. This 
was due to the parameters of the Iraqi government as outlined in a 1925 
Organic Law, together with an Anglo-Iraqi Protectorate Treaty concluded in 
October 1922, which confirmed that for the next 20 years, Iraq would 
follow British advice in matters related to British interests (Johnson, 2004; 
Millen, 2003). Accordingly, Britain established Iraq’s formal institutions, 
including a new political system and constitutional law (Hunt, 2005). In 
addition, British managers managed Iraq’s oil fields, while British bombers 
were stationed at Iraq’s main military air bases. The young King Faisal 
became a figurehead only and deferred decision making to Britain. 
Consequently, Britain retained considerable control over Iraq until the 
popular nationalist revolution of 14 July 1958, led by a group of Iraqi army 
officers, known as the Free Officers (Rangwala, 2002). 
The Free Officers overthrew the monarchy and ended British control 
of the region. The Officers issued Proclamation No. 1, which stated that a 
republican regime had been established (Johnson, 2004: 20). Furthermore, a 
Baghdad Radio station announced that the army had liberated the Iraqi 
people from domination by a corrupt group put in power by "imperialism" 
(BBC, 2005). The Radio station also announced that King Faisal II, Crown 
Prince Abdul Illah and Nuri al-Said, prime minister of the Iraq-Jordan 
Federation, had been killed (BBC, 2005). The resulting new Iraqi Republic 
was ruled by General Abdel Karim Qasim who became Iraq's new prime 
minister, defence minister and commander-in-chief (BBC, 2005).
Qasim’s main priority was Iraq’s social and economic development, 
not its international role (Rangwala, 2002) demonstrated by the introduction 
of significant changes which affected the lives of Iraqis. For example, the 
law on land (Law 30 of 1958), created limits on the size of individual 
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holdings (though they remained relatively high) so that land could be 
distributed to landless peasants as small plots. In the cities, low-cost housing 
was built and housing associations were developed to help make it possible 
for civil servants, teachers, and others to afford to buy their own houses, 
through the provisions of low-interest loans (Johnson, 2004; Millen, 2003). 
In addition, on December 11, 1961, Public Law 80 was passed that 
reasserted national control of oil concession areas that had not yet been 
exploited but had been previously given to the Iraq Petroleum Company. 
This meant that over ninety-nine percent of the original concession was 
returned to government control and oil revenues for the state significantly 
increased (Johnson, 2004: 22).
Qasim’s relationships with neighbouring Arab countries deteriorated, 
especially after his stance against the independence of Kuwait, with which it 
shared a border. Kuwait was formerly a part of the Basra province during 
the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The amir of Kuwait, Ahmad al Subah, 
reached an agreement with Britain and Kuwait subsequently became a 
British protectorate in 1961; its newly conferred independent status allowing 
it to became member of the Arab League. Qasim opposed these 
developments, arguing that Kuwait was part of Iraq and that it had been 
unfairly separated from Iraq by Britain. Qasim threatened to instigate 
military action to retain Kuwait as part of Iraq. However, Qasim’s moves 
were countered by the other Arab League members who sent a peace-
keeping force to Kuwait. Qasim subsequently backed down from further 
military action (Johnson, 2004, Millen, 2003; United Nations, 2006). This 
issue created significant tension between Iraq and Britain.
The overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 created panic in Britain 
and other Western countries regarding the potential impact of the regional 
instability on their oil interests (Socialist Worker Online, 2008). 
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Iraq was the centre piece of the Baghdad Pact, which was established
in 1955, and its members also included Turkey, Persia and Pakistan. This 
Pact was a military cooperation arrangement which tied its signatories to 
United States (US) policy in the region (Rangwala, 2002).  The purpose of 
this Pact was an anti- former Soviet Union alliance of Middle Eastern states 
that was also designed to curb the rising influence of Gamal Abdul Nasser, 
Egypt’s radical nationalist leader (Socialist Worker Online, 2008). However, 
in 1959 Qasim withdrew Iraq from this Pact directly after his assumption of 
power which led to Britain and several European countries focusing on their 
political and economic interests in Iraq and the region. Each European 
country sought a stable political relationship with the Iraqi government in 
Baghdad with the collective aim of preventing the rise of communism 
within Iraq and to deny the former Soviet Union influence in the region 
(Hahn, 2012). At the same time, Qasim tried to establish new relationships 
with the former Soviet Union and some Western countries, including France, 
and the US. These countries played a significant role in developing the new 
oil fields and, through their oil companies, gained significant control over 
internal Iraqi political decisions (Simons, 1996a).
On 8 February 1963, Qasim was overthrown in a military coup led by 
General Abdul-Ssalam Arif and supported by the US’s Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) (Ritter and Pitt, 2002). The Arif brothers’ five-year rule was 
characterised by the dominance of the military in the government and by the 
participation of Arif’s relatives and close friends in key positions (Johnson, 
2004: 23). Accordingly, Arif lost support amongst the Iraqi public.  
In July 1968, a bloodless coup brought to power the Baathist general 
Ahamad Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr assumed the functions of president and 
chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, while Saddam Hussein 
was appointed his deputy (Ritter and Pitt, 2002). Although on 2 June 1972, 
al-Bakr nationalised Iraqi oil, the European countries, such as Britain and 
France, continued their relationships with Iraq in order to secure their 
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energy needs. Thus, strategic imperatives, trade and oil, can be considered 
to have played key roles in some European countries’ initial foreign policies 
towards Iraq. 
In 1979, Saddam Hussein used his increasing power to push al-Bakr 
aside and rule Iraq. The Iraq–Iran war of 1980-1988 provided an important 
opportunity for some European countries’ engagement with Iraq. Baylis et 
al. (2007), argue there were many reasons which led to this war. First, the 
Iranian Khuzestan province, which is rich in oil deposits, comprised a 
predominantly Arab population with strong cultural ties to Iraq. Iran 
rejected claims by the Iraqi regime that the province historically belonged to 
Iraq. A second contributing factor was the issue of the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway. Due to its vital strategic importance, control of the waterway and 
its use as a border had been a source of contention between various states 
since the Peace Treaty of 1639. The waterway provides Iraq’s only sea 
access and therefore represents an important transportation corridor for the 
supply of oil. Ambiguities in this agreement (between the Persians and the 
Ottoman Empire) led to continual disputes that have not been resolved to 
this day. The Algiers Agreement of March 1975, which established the 
border along the ‘thalweg’ principle (mid-river), was rejected by Iraq in 
1980 as it revived claims to complete control of the waterway (Baylis et al. 
2007). A third reason which led to the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 was Iraq’s 
ambition to become a key influential regional power. Iraq desired to 
establish itself as the leading state in the Persian Gulf region. The overthrow 
of the Shah regime in Iran in 1979 and the subsequent accession to power 
by Ayatollah Khomeini resulted in significant changes in the relationships 
between Iran and Western countries; Ayatollah Khomeini publicly 
expressed both strong anti-Western and anti-Communist views. This offered 
an important opportunity for Saddam Hussein’s regime to establish strong, 
friendly relationships with both blocs, capitalising on their respective 
concerns at Iranian expansion in the region that potentially threatened their 
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interests. This led to both blocs’ support of Iraq throughout the Iraq-Iran war 
(Johnson, 2004).
The Iraq-Iran war led to many humanitarian disasters with more than 
500,000 people killed, 1 million injured and more than 2 million becoming 
refugees (Razi, 1988). However, despite these humanitarian atrocities, the 
relationship between Iraq and the West actually improved during this war 
(Hunt, 2005).  Simons (1996a), Totman (2006) and Nissen and Heine (2009:
159) assert that Saddam Hussein’s regime benefited from considerable 
military support from Britain, France, West Germany, the US and the 
former Soviet Union. This support allowed Hussein’s regime to oppress 
internal dissent and to continue to wage war with its neighbours. 
Furthermore, this also allowed Hussein to accumulate key components of 
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program. Similarly, 
Hinnebusch (2003: 197) states that, at the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war, 
Iraq’s weaponry was supplied by the former Soviet Union, and some 
Western countries such as the US and France. In addition, France “supplied 
high-tech arms while US intelligence allowed Iraq to pinpoint and counter 
Iranian offensive build ups”. Moreover, in addition to the US being a key 
supplier to the Iraq regime during the Iraq-Iran war, it also provided 
intelligence assistance at various times of peace (Baylis et al., 2007). 
France’s relationship with Hussein’s regime also remained strong 
during Iraq’s war with Iran, supplying equipment such as bombers, fighter 
jets, and helicopters, and agreeing to build an experimental nuclear power 
plant outside Baghdad (Simons, 1996a). French support for Iraq was clear 
with French President Mitterrand’s statement on 26 November 1982: “we 
do not wish Iraq to be defeated in this war” (Hunt, 2005: 235). In addition, 
Britain supplied Hussein’s regime with vital items for chemical warfare 
weaponry until December 1990. Evidence of this was uncovered by United 
Nations (UN) inspectors in Iraq in 1995, indicating that British companies 
were at the centre of Hussein’s chemical weapons program (Simons, 1996a). 
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Moreover, this had continued despite evidence that Iraq had violated 
international law by using chemical weapons against both its own civilians 
and Iranian troops during the 1980-1988 war. However, the international 
community did not address this issue as a majority of western leaders, and 
all Arab-Gulf countries, were unwilling to accept an Iranian victory (Baylis 
et al., 2007). As further evidence of this, some French newspapers described 
Iranian chemical casualties as a result of factory workers being injured in an 
industrial accident, rather than being caused by Iraq’s use of chemical 
weapons (Ali, 2001: 48). This lack of international criticism encouraged 
Hussein and other Iraqi decision-makers to use these types of weapons more 
and more frequently during the war (Ali, 2001: 49). Thus, key western 
countries became more unwilling to punish or openly criticize Iraq for its 
chemical weapons activities against Iran. This reflects how the attitudes of 
European countries towards Iraq often depended on their national interests, 
particularly the trade benefits as a result of exporting weapons equipment to 
Iraq.   
The CIA issued an intelligence assessment report in December 1988 
regarding Iraq. The CIA report stated that Iraq had become a very powerful 
country in the Middle East and would continue to increase its possession of 
nuclear weapons and its development of chemical and biological weapons. 
The report also confirmed that it was the most radical regime in the Arab 
region and would continue to use its military power against its foreign and 
domestic opponents (CIA, 1988; Saikaly, 2009: 32). In early 1991, the CIA 
issued another report assessing Iraq’s WMD program. This report stated that 
Iraq possessed the largest number of WMD amongst developing countries 
and predicted that these weapons may be used against US and Western 
countries’ interests in the Gulf region (CIA, 1991; Saikaly, 2009: 32). 
On 2 August 1990, Iraqi troops invaded neighbouring country Kuwait 
and proclaimed it to be the nineteenth province of Iraq (Pirnie and Edward, 
2008: 4). The Iraqi regime justified its invasion on several grounds, arguing
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that, historically, Kuwait was a part of Iraq and that it had taken advantage 
of its shared border and oil fields by extracting more oil than it was entitled 
to during the Iraq-Iran War. Iraq also claimed Kuwait had exported oil in 
excess of its Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
quota, leading to oil prices remaining low and subsequently costing Iraq 
significant oil revenues (Totman, 2006; Khadduri and Ghareeb, 1997; 
Parasiliti, 2003). Ninety percent of Iraq’s revenue depended on the sale of 
oil, resulting in insufficient revenue to repay its debts and contribute to its 
reconstruction following the war with Iran. As a result, Iraq felt that Kuwait 
was waging an economic war with the aim of destroying Iraq economically. 
This was exacerbated by Kuwait being the only Arab country not to waive 
Iraq’s repayments of loans to fund its war with Iran (Parasiliti, 2003). 
Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the US froze $US30 billion 
worth of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the US; Britain, France, Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Japan followed suit. In addition, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 660, which 
condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded an immediate 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraq’s forces (Simons, 1996b; Sjoberg, 2007: 2). 
Following Iraq’s refusal to withdraw from Kuwait, US President George 
H.W. Bush declared Iraq a danger to world peace and security, and began 
formulating a Western-Arab coalition to defeat Hussein’s forces (Hunt, 
2005).  On 16 January 1991, this coalition, comprising 28 members under 
US leadership, began a military campaign to liberate Kuwait. This war 
lasted only 43 days with the alliance successfully driving Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait. On 28 February 1991, Iraq and the US coalition forces reached a 
cease-fire agreement. As a condition of this agreement, and to enable the 
lifting of sanctions against Iraq, the Iraqi regime was required to end its 
WMD programs and surrender all ballistic missiles except those with a very 
short range. Iraq was also required to allow UN inspectors free access to 
Iraqi facilities, thus permitting them to document accurately the dismantling 
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of WMD capabilities and to uncover any covert efforts to maintain WMD 
stockpiles (Baylis et al., 2007: 1).
Although the US and its alliance defeated Iraqi troops and liberated 
Kuwait, Hussein’s regime remained in power. This was partly due to the 
alliance’s assumption that Hussein’s regime would be overthrown by the 
Iraqi people, led by the Shiite (in southern Iraq) and Kurdish populations (in 
northern Iraq). In March 1991, both Shiites and Kurds instigated a rebellion 
against Hussein’s regime, but the Iraqi Republic Guard defeated this 
rebellion and assumed control over all areas in the south and central of Iraq; 
however, the three provinces of north Iraq (Arbil, As-Sulaymaniyyah, and 
Duhok) became independent (Saikaly, 2009: 33). These events coincided 
with Britain and France joining the US in 1991 to impose ‘no fly-zones’ 
over both the northern and southern regions of Iraq to protect the Kurdish 
and Shiite populations (Kuzmicheva, 2008). A no-fly zone is “airspace over 
a country or region through which other aircraft (ones not involved in 
policing the zone) are disallowed travel. Usually a security measure, 
whether during a time of crisis or war - or following one. It can, and often 
does, function as a demilitarized zone - at least for aircraft, though an 
additional function can be as a means to protect the area (population and 
property) from ground assaults of one kind or another” (Everything, 2003).
Following Iraq’s defeat by the US-led alliance in 1991, the UNSC 
issued several resolutions that placed Iraq under international sanctions. 
These sanctions continued until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Nissen and 
Heine, 2009: 159). Regarding the EU’s role during this period of economic 
sanctions, Degerfelt (2008) claims that the relationship between the EU and 
Iraq was two-fold: while the EU demanded that Iraq respect the UNSC 
resolutions on WMD, it nevertheless provided humanitarian aid to the Iraqi 
people who suffered as a result of the economic sanctions.  On 15 April 
1995, the UN issued resolution 986, which established an oil-for-food 
program.;however, it did not begin operating until December 1996 (Saikaly, 
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2009: 36). France took a significant lead in the program, through the 
provision of food and medications to Iraq.    
On 16-19 December 1998, Britain joined the US in bombing Iraq in a 
military operation called Operation Desert Fox (Wrange, 1998: 491). This 
bombing followed Iraq’s unwillingness to cooperate with UN inspection 
teams. The war against Iraq in 1991 demonstrated that the key members of 
the EC - France and Britain - were in agreement in liberating Kuwait by 
military means. Furthermore, they both supported the US and UN actions 
during the 1990-2000 period. However, it could be argued strongly that the 
main reason for their support was not necessarily a desire to protect peace 
and security, but to protect their fundamental interests in the region and their 
access to, and control of, Iraq’s vital oil reserves (Cooper, 2004; Rynhold, 
2006; Simons, 1996a). Accordingly, the Western countries maintained that 
their national interests in the Gulf region continued to be threatened by 
Hussein’s. Thus, before 11 September 2001, the George Bush 
administration adopted the policy of supporting regime change in Iraq 
(Saikaly, 2009: 41). 
3.2. Pre-War of 2003: Divergent Perspectives Regarding the EU’s 
Internal Divisions
Following the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, the 
US altered its foreign policy approach to deal with what it perceived as its 
most critical issue: the threat of further terrorist attacks against western 
countries.  A few weeks after the attack, the US announced that it would 
confront the terrorist groups and regimes of the world (Allawi, 2007). Later, 
on 29 January 2002, President George W. Bush stated that Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea comprised an “axis of evil” (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004; Fawn, 
2006; Hunt, 2005) and claimed “the United States will not permit the 
world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most 
destructive weapons” (Hunt, 2005: 285). 
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Regarding Iraq specifically, President Bush and his closest advisers 
preferred military action to deal with the Iraqi regime. In November 2001, 
President Bush instructed US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to begin 
planning for war with Iraq. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and the 
US State Department were required to adhere to a pre-scripted agenda set by 
US neo-conservatives and their supporters both inside and outside the US 
government. Accordingly, the war on Iraq was justified as a war against 
international terrorism (Allawi, 2007). 
The US argued that Iraq possessed WMD and that it had a relationship 
with the Al-Qaeda terrorist network (Davies, 2008; Peterson, 2004: 12). The 
Bush administration thought that Al-Qaeda and Iraq had a common interest 
in wanting to hurt the US as much as possible.  Despite the lack of evidence 
that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had collaborated with Al-Qaeda, the US 
administration feared that he may provide WMD to the Al-Qaeda network 
and therefore Saddam Hussein should be deposed quickly (Grant, 2002: 
152). Accordingly, America invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003. The US 
leadership expected that if Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown, it 
would lead to the creation of a democratic and peaceful country that would 
serve as an example for the region (Pirnie and Edward, 2008). However, the 
effect of this war on Iraq meant that the Middle East, and the rest of world, 
came under threat from Al-Qaeda more than ever before (Arnove, 2006). 
The majority of EU members supported President Bush’s call for 
military intervention in Iraq, including France and Germany, provided all 
actions were under the supervision of the UN (Kallberg, 2007). The UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, opened a dialogue with Iraq in order to 
reactivate the weapons inspectors’ mission. However, the US Vice President, 
Dick Cheney, claimed that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and 
that no resolution from the UN would be effective. He argued that a US 
attack on Iraq was unavoidable. This statement revealed the US’s intentions 
regarding Iraq and left the European states confused (Kallberg, 2007).
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The EU member states divided into two groups in the build-up to the 
Iraq war of 2003. The first group supported a US invasion of Iraq. On 30 
January 2003, the leaders of eight European countries (Italy, Spain, Britain, 
Denmark, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Portugal) signed a 
letter expressing solidarity with the US (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004; 
Goldthau, 2008). In addition, on 7 February 2003, a group of Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries, some of whom were candidates for EU 
membership, comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (the Vilnius 10), 
issued a joint letter in support of the US’s position on Iraq (Dittrich, 2003). 
These two letters were seen as direct retaliation against the anti-war position 
being adopted by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg (Dittrich, 
2003; Kallberg, 2007).  
European supporters of US objectives towards Iraq were primarily 
concerned with the disarmament of Iraq’s WMD, followed by the removal 
of Saddam Hussein and transition to a democracy. Britain and other member 
states considered Hussein’s regime as one of the most dangerous in the 
world as it threatened both its neighbours and its own population with use of 
chemical and biological weapons (Bluth, 2004; Hollis, 2006).  Therefore, 
Britain and the other European countries supporting the US believed that a 
complete disarmament of Iraq would improve security for the region and 
remove the threat to the Iraqi people (Stuchlik, 2005; Bluth, 2004). These 
supporters ultimately wanted to bring freedom to the Iraqi people by 
confronting Hussein’s regime and contributing to greater global peace and 
security (Hollis, 2006). Accordingly, liberation, reintegration into the 
international community, reconstruction, and the establishment of a stable 
democracy in Iraq were all central to the US and its allies’ objectives. 
However, these justifications for the invasion of Iraq were not borne by the 
actions that followed. The Bush administration failed to give sufficient 
priority to the protection of the Iraqi population in its post-war planning, 
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thus, increasing the magnitude of human suffering as a result of the war 
(Bluth, 2004).
Prior to its commencement, and on the 40th anniversary of the Elysée 
Friendship Treaty on 22 January 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac deepened their cooperation in 
opposing a US-led invasion of Iraq. President Chirac stated that “Germany 
and France have the same judgment on this crisis that war is not inevitable” 
(Kaya, 2008: 1754). Chancellor Schröder agreed with President Chirac and 
declared that Germany would not vote for war against Iraq in the UN 
Security Council, stating, “we agree completely to harmonize our positions 
as closely as possible to find a peaceful solution” (Kaya, 2008: 1754).
France and Germany aimed to prevent the war with Iraq because they 
believed its outcome would be even bad for the Iraqis. They also considered 
the timing of the invasion wrong, believing that a peaceful disarmament of 
Iraq by UN and International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors 
could be strengthened and enforced, and that a diplomatic settlement could 
be reached without a regime change (Gardner, 2003; Stuchlik, 2005: 17; 
Forsberg, 2005). Furthermore, due to a lack of evidence, France and 
Germany doubted Hussein’s regime had links with al-Qaeda (Keegan, 2004). 
Their positions became clear when the German Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer stated on 22 February 2002 that Germany doubted any contact 
existed between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda (Keegan, 2004).
Germany and France anticipated more negative than positive 
consequences of a military intervention in Iraq, with a Western occupation 
of Iraq contributing to greater regional instability and an increase in anti-
western perceptions. This intervention would lead to more, not less, terrorist 
attacks against western nations (Gardner, 2003). An invasion was also 
expected to affect the unity and stability of Iraq (Stuchlik, 2005). French 
President Chirac stated "war is always the worst solution" (BBC, 
17/02/2003). From this perspective, France and Germany asserted that the 
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UN should be the main actor to resolve the crisis, not the US. They asserted 
that military operation decision-making should be made by the UN Security 
Council to prevent the US from taking unilateral measures against Iraq 
(Stuchlik, 2005; Stuchlik, 2005: 17; Gordon and Shapiro, 2004). Therefore, 
France tried to be a counter-voice to the US and Britain within the UN 
Security Council. Later, during the post–war period, France rejected any 
deployment of its troops to Iraq after the US refused France’s suggestion for 
stronger involvement by the UN (Coicaud et al., 2006: 234).
The Iraq war of 2003 demonstrated that the foreign policies of the EU 
member states were ultimately determined by national interests (Wood, 
2003). For example, Britain supported the US because their strong 
relationship provided Britain with economic and political benefits (Wheeler 
and Morris, 2006: 444). Poland’s involvement in the Iraq war was also 
informed by the opportunity to obtain long term benefits resulting from its 
relationship with the US. As a result of its participation in the war and its 
relationship with the US, Poland perceived itself as a stronger member of 
the EU. The President of Poland, Kwas´niewski, asserted that "even though 
not everyone in Europe approves of our engagement in Iraq, at least they 
look at us with respect.  As a result, today everyone in Europe has to take 
Poland into account" (Kavalski and Zolkos, 2007: 384).
Economic benefits were an important motivating force for the CEE 
countries to support the US invasion of Iraq. The CEE countries hoped to 
share in lucrative contracts connected to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq; 
an ambitious set of projects involving tens of billions of dollars. 
Furthermore, many CEE officials hoped their support of the invasion in Iraq 
would eventually lead to expanded US military assistance to their own 
countries.  In addition, these CEE countries were motivated in part by their 
desire to leverage US power to balance their immediate geographical 
concerns. These concerns included a residual fear of Russia’s military 
influence, which CEE countries did not consider European capability alone 
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could address without relying on US assistance (Rhodes, 2004; Grigorescu, 
2008). As a result, the US played an active role in creating EU division on 
foreign policy issues. US diplomats worked hard throughout the CEE 
countries to ensure that the former Communist states would remain aligned 
with the US (Fakiolas, 2006).
National interests might also be seen as key elements of France and 
Germany’s positions against the Iraq war (Gardner, 2003; Coicaud et al., 
2006). According to Youngs (2006), during 1995 – 2003, French companies 
were supplying US$ 3 billion dollars’ worth of food to Iraq via the UN and 
its oil-for-food program, making France the largest beneficiary of the 
program. France also held a large debt accrued by Hussein’s regime since 
the 1980s and several oil contracts with Iraq (Howorth, 2006; Styan, 2004).
However, Gordon and Shapiro (2004) argue that French companies did not 
receive huge benefits from Iraq, particularly during the UN oil-for-food 
program. Evidence for this is indicated by exports from France to Iraq 
between 1997 and 2002, which comprised less than 0.3% of total French 
exports. Imports were approximately US$850 million - equal to 0.2% of 
total French imports (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004).  A further reason for the 
French Government’s lack of support for the US invasion of Iraq was 
possibly a fear of upsetting the large Muslim community in France, which 
made up approximately 10 per cent of its total population at the time. In 
opposing the invasion of Iraq, the French government was also 
demonstrating that it was not opposed to Islam (Coicaud et al., 2006: 234; 
Martinez, 2006).
Two factors may explain Germany’s opposition to the Iraq war: the 
2002 national electoral campaign and the culture of restraint that had 
informed German security policy for decades (Harnisch 2004: 1; Timmins, 
2006). Erickson (2006) argues that on some occasions, the timing of 
military force deployment and foreign policy decisions are determined by 
the timing of national government elections. Government responses to 
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public opinion can be dependent on which stage of the electoral cycle a 
government is in. Thus, the German governing party’s public opposition to 
the invasion of Iraq was partly informed by the imminence of national 
elections and a desire to increase their re-election chances. On the other 
hand, other governments who were not facing imminent elections supported 
the invasion (Erickson, 2006).  
Mistrust among EU member states led to weaknesses in cooperation 
and this was a key obstacle in the development of meaningful foreign policy 
during the time of the Iraq war of 2003 (Hammel, 2009; Schweiger, 2004; 
Dagici, 2007; Jorgensen; 2004). In order to create common foreign policy, 
unanimity and close coordination among EU members is required; however, 
this can only occur when all member states have similar interests. In terms 
of the Iraq war, the EU’s role appeared less consistent than ever. This was 
due to the weaknesses in its coordinated common policy because EU 
member states were in conflict with each other regarding an appropriate 
policy response in a time of enhanced external crises (Puetter and Wiener, 
2007). As a result, the differences in national interests and the lack of 
cooperation among member states affected the EU’s foreign policy both in 
terms of the Iraq war and relationships with each other (Stahl, 2005). 
EU institutions did not play a key role in the Iraq war due to their 
failure to develop a common policy response to the US invasion (Crowe, 
2003). The fragmentation of the EU's foreign policy that emerged, affected 
its coherence, demonstrated by the European Parliament’s failure to reach 
any kind of agreement on the Iraq war (Keegan, 2004). Both Javier Solana, 
the EU High Representative at the time, and Christopher Patten, the EU 
Commissioner for External Relations, adopted a low-key approach during 
the conflict. Solana and other EU officials recognised the rifts between the 
EU members but were unable to play any mediation roles (Keegan, 2004; 
Cameron, 2007). Therefore, the lack of an effective EU foreign policy 
towards Iraq could be explained by the weak institutionalisation of the 
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supra-national decision-making structure within the EU. Because of its 
institutional structure, the EU appears to have had its hands tied when 
seeking a unified voice regarding foreign policy. Thus, the Iraq war and its 
lead-up showed the fragility of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP).
In terms of the relationship between the public and policy-makers, a 
gap existed between the pro-war position of some European political leaders 
and the anti-war sentiments of the majority of the European public. France, 
in assuming a key oppositional role to an invasion of Iraq, tried to focus 
public attention on its negative consequences rather than the humanitarian 
and political situation in Iraq at the time in order to convince the public that 
there was no benefit from a war (Stuchlik, 2005). Meanwhile, Britain, as the 
leading European country supporting an invasion, attempted to explain to its 
public the range of current threats from Iraq, and provide evidence that 
confirmed Iraq had WMD and links to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network 
(Stuchlik, 2005). For example, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair defended 
his advocacy of Britain’s participation in a US-led military action against 
Iraq by claiming he had seen military intelligence indicating Saddam 
Hussein’s regime was capable of launching WMD with 45 minutes’ notice 
(Clarke, 2008: 3). 
However, public opinion in Europe largely supported France’s 
position which led to widespread opposition to the US war on Iraq in 2003, 
and the British Government faced a loss of public support for its position 
(Stuchlik, 2005). As evidence of this, massive protests were held across 
Europe, in particular in London, Rome, and Madrid (Fakiolas, 2006) where 
protestors opposed their national leaders’ support for a US invasion of Iraq. 
Nearly three quarters of the citizens of these countries declared themselves 
opposed to the US war plans, as did a similar percentage in the rest of 
Europe (Fakiolas, 2006). This reflects the idea that public opinion in Europe 
does influence foreign policy to a certain extent, but in some cases this 
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influence is limited (Stuchlik, 2005). For example, Britain proceeded to 
participate in the invasion even though approximately 60 per cent of British 
citizens did not support the Government’s position (Wilga, 2004). This 
reflects the importance of the war in terms of British foreign policy 
priorities at the time. Dyson (2006: 289) asserts that Britain’s position on 
supporting an invasion of Iraq was due to the personality of British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair. British decisions regarding Iraq reflected Blair’s 
perspectives, preferences and behaviour based on his personality profile 
(Dyson, 2006). Furthermore, Blair had a strong influence on Britain’s 
foreign policy making process and his views regarding Iraq were supported 
by other British policy making leaders at the time (Dyson, 2006).
3.3. EU Post-War of 2003 Involvement  
The UNSC adopted resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002, requesting 
Iraq to comply and cooperate with UN inspection teams. This resolution 
gave Iraq a final opportunity to destroy its WMD and facilitate the work of 
the weapons inspections teams. It stated that, by December 2002, Iraq “shall 
provide… a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects 
of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, 
ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems”. It also added that “false 
statements or omissions in the declarations submitted”, and “failure by Iraq 
at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, 
this resolution shall constitute a further material breach” and “will be 
reported to the Council for assessment” (Sjoberg, 2007: 4). The UNSC 
requested that Iraq “shall provide… immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, 
and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, 
facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they 
wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private 
access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA 
wish to interview...” (Sjoberg, 2007: 4). The UNSC directed the United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 
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and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to “report immediately 
to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as 
any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations” (Sjoberg, 
2007: 4).
The US and Britain encountered difficulties in obtaining permission 
from the UN to invade Iraq because of the opposing stance of the other 
UNSC members: Germany, France, Russia and China. These countries were 
unwilling to support a military invasion of Iraq, preferring to focus on 
strengthening the UN’s weapons inspection role. This was despite US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell giving a public presentation to the UN in 
February 2003 confirming that Iraq had WMD. This issue led to the 
establishment of two opposing camps within the UN:  those who opposed 
the war, led by France, Russia, Germany and China, and those supporting a 
US invasion, led by Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland (Baylis et al., 2007: 4).
Regardless of the division, the US proceeded with its decision to invade Iraq 
without the approval of the UN (Kashmeri, 2007). On 17 March 2003, US 
President Bush requested Saddam Hussein and his sons leave Iraq within 
forty-eight hours or face a military invasion by coalition forces (Kallberg, 
2007).  
On 19 March 2003, President Bush announced that “the American and 
coalition forces are going to disarm Iraq and no more time will be given to 
diplomacy” (Kallberg 2007: 25). After Hussein's regime was overthrown on 
9 April 2003, the American administration did not grant Iraq immediate 
sovereignty. This was because Americans thought that may be will affected 
product right democracy in Iraq. Thus, the US administration nominated 
General Jay Garner as head of the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in April 2003. Garner focused on 
deploying US experts as partners to the Iraqi ministers in order to make 
direct reconstruction for these ministries. However, President Bush, 
reportedly seeking strong leadership in Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul 
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Bremer to replace Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” 
(Katzman, 2009: 9). Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May 2003 with a 
broad mandate and plenary powers. Bremer became the governor of Iraq, 
possessing full executive, legislative, and judicial authority (Dobbins et al., 
2009: xiii). Members of the Iraqi Governing Council were chosen by 
Bremer, with the help of the UN and a team of American and British 
regional experts. This Council largely played an advisory role with main 
decisions made by Bremer without reference back to the Council (Dobbins 
et al., 2009). On 30 June 2004, partial governmental authority was 
transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government especially in relation to the
running of domestic affairs. This is because Iraq was still considered under 
occupation. Accordingly, the Coalition Provisional Authority ceased to exist 
and Iraqis began to govern some of its own affairs (Katzman, 2009).
The Interim Prime Minister of Iraq, Ayad Allawi, invited EU members 
to become involved in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, including those 
that had opposed the US invasion, particularly France and Germany. Allawi 
participated in the EU Summit of November 2004. He asked EU leaders to 
commence a new chapter in European-Iraq relations and to establish new 
agreements to develop and extend cooperation in different sectors. In 
addition, Allawi requested EU member states’ assistance in re-building 
Iraq’s security capabilities and infrastructure to support a stable national 
electoral process with elections to be held in 2005 (Council of the European 
Union, 2004).  
On 22 June 2005, the elected Iraqi Transitional Government, led by its
Prime Minister, Ibrahim Al-Jafferi, participated in an international 
conference to support Iraq’s reconstruction. At the conference, held in 
Brussels, Al-Jafferi called on the EU Commission and EU members to help 
Iraq to build a new democratic system through the provision of training 
programs to the officers responsible for the election process and support for 
civil society organisations. Al-Jafferi encouraged the EU to invest in Iraq 
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and to engage in Iraq’s economic, trade and energy sectors (Iraq 
International Conference Statement, 2005).  
Iraqi Prime Minister Nori Al-Maliki visited Brussels on 16 April 2008 
and met with the President of the EU Commission, Mr. Jose Manuel 
Barroso. At this meeting, Al-Maliki proposed further cooperation between 
Iraq and the EU. He requested that the EU extend areas of cooperation to 
include many important sectors such as energy cooperation, support for 
Iraqi governmental efforts in fighting terrorism, the establishment of 
democratic institutions, enforcing the rule of law and upgrading the 
capabilities of Iraqi state institutions. Al-Maliki also requested the provision 
of additional aid to support Iraqi refugees and internally displaced people. 
At the same meeting, he appealed to the Commission to prioritise 
negotiations to establish trade agreements between Iraq and the EU which 
had commenced in 2006 but had not yet been finalised (European 
Commission, 16/04/2008). 
In the post-2003 war era, the US confronted the reality that it was 
unable to meet the costs of the invasion alone. It appealed to the EU for 
support, in particular for humanitarian aid and funds for reconstruction 
(Telo, 2006). As a result, the EU became involved in Iraq through the EU 
Council‘s decision on 21 February 2005 to launch an integrated rule of law 
mission for Iraq (code named EUJUST LEX) (Kuzmicheva, 2008). The 
mission consisted of the provision of integrated training in management and 
criminal investigation to senior officials and staff from Iraq’s judiciary, 
police, and penal systems. In addition, the EU provided support to the 
International Compact process. This was an initiative introduced formally 
by the Iraqi government at the UN on 16 March 2007 to provide broad 
financial support to Iraq over a five year period as it attempted to reintegrate 
into the international community. 
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In summary, the EU participated in supporting the new Iraq through 
humanitarian aid, assistance for civil society development, its national 
election processes, reconstruction, and police training (Ishigaki, 2008; Chow, 
2006). However, the EU had limited direct involvement in Iraq’s post-war 
political process (particularly its election process), the original drafting of its 
constitutional law, and was absent in negotiating a peaceful settlement 
between Iraq’s warring factions during 2005-2008 (Dodge, 2006; Youngs, 
2004). This was due to several reasons. First, the major split within the EU 
caused by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. This led to the different 
views among EU members regarding the shape of Iraq’s political system 
(Dodge, 2006; Youngs, 2004). Second, due to the nascent democratic 
process in Iraq, the EU wanted a strong presence from the UN during the 
Iraqi elections. The EU demanded the UN assume full control of the whole 
political process, rather than the US (Youngs, 2004). Third, the unsettled 
security situation did not give the EU an opportunity to work effectively in 
Iraq (Dodge, 2006).  Lastly, the EU’s role in rebuilding security institutions 
in Iraq was also limited, with France and Germany participating at a modest 
level through the development of external training programs for Iraqi police 
(Martinez, 2006). 
In conclusion, the EU and its member states’ foreign policies 
throughout the Iraqi war were driven by factors such as conflicting national 
interests, respective relationships with the US, the influence of public 
opinion, and weak cooperation among member states. However, the aim of 
this thesis is to examine another factor which has affected EU foreign policy 
towards Iraq: the coordination among EU institutions, as well as the 
coordination between these institutions and the EU’s key member states. In 
order to examine this point further, this study will apply a multi-level 
governance approach which is detailed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4:
Theoretical Approach: Multi-Level 
Governance and the EU's Foreign Policy
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The EU’s foreign policy formulation and implementation is a 
multidimensional process. Theoretical scholarship on EU foreign policy 
making has developed in two main phases. The first phase was dominated 
by studies from the field of international relations, while in the second phase, 
insights from other fields, such as public policy, were incorporated. The 
theory of multi-level governance stems from this second phase. Multi-level 
governance is a public administration theory that originated from studies on 
EU integration. Key theorists, Gray Marks and Liesbet Hooghe (1993, 1996, 
2001, 2003), were amongst the first to develop the concept of multi-level 
governance in the early 1990s. This chapter illustrates that the multi-level 
governance approach is useful for examining the interaction and 
coordination processes among EU foreign policy actors. The theory 
emphasises the frequent and complex interactions between governmental 
actors and the increasingly important dimension of non-state actors. Such a 
theoretical framework accounts for the variety of political actors involved in 
the EU foreign policy formulation and implementation processes 
(Hurrelmann and DeBardeleben, 2009; Bomberg and Stubb, 2004).
The first part of this chapter examines the connections between EU 
foreign policy and various international relations and integration theories 
including realism and neo-realism, liberalism and neo-liberalism, English 
school, constructivism, functionalism and neo-functionalism, 
intergovernmentalism and federalism. The second part of this chapter 
outlines the multi-level governance approach (MLG) as a relevant 
framework for this study. 
4.1. Overview: International Relations and Integration Theories
Realism and liberalism, the classic theories of the international 
relations discipline, posit different approaches to the study of international 
politics. A commonality of these approaches is that they are premised on the
notion that states are the central actors in international affairs. The EU, 
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however, is a unique, transnational political actor in the international arena. 
As such, attempts to examine the EU using classic international relations 
approaches have been largely unsuccessful, failing to accommodate many of 
the EU’s politico-institutional anomalies (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Hill 
and Smith, 2005).  Despite this, some scholars such as Moravcsik (1993; 
1994), Santos (2008) and Sweeney (2005) have effectively applied 
integration theories, such as intergovernmentalism and functionalism, to 
their analyses of the EU system. Thus, theories of integration developed to 
explain European integration (Laursen, 2008). This part of the chapter will 
examine international relations theories and integration theories in the 
context of the EU’s foreign policy.
4.1.1. Realism and Neo-Realism
Realism is one of the oldest and most frequently adopted theories of 
international relations. It became popular among international relations 
theorists from Europe and the United States in the early to mid-twentieth 
century. The eminent contributors to realist theory have been Frederick 
Shuman (1933), Reinhold Niebuhr (1940), George Schwarzenberger (1941), 
Edward Hallett Carr (1946), Hans Morganthau (1948), and George Kennan 
(1951). Their approaches refuted the claims of the dominant liberal 
approach during the same era (Amin et al., 2011: 2; Donnelly, 2009: 31). 
Realism claims that states are the central actors in international politics. It 
asserts that there is no authority above the state, and that political affairs are 
dominated by military power (Andreatta, 2005; Beyer, 2006; Burchill et al, 
2009). While realism is not a unified theory, those who advance a realist 
interpretation of international relations share common assumptions. First, it 
posits that a structure of anarchy dominates international relations and that 
there is no power above the state. Realists argue that states possess ultimate 
authority over societies. Secondly, realist theorists argue that international 
authority will remain decentralized (Telo, 2009), and that the idea of a 
"world government" is unattainable. They posit that all states, despite their 
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size and power, are equal, sovereign, and have absolute independence in
their internal and external affairs (Amin et al., 2011: 2). Thirdly, according 
to realism, power is a primary objective of the state; states are always 
seeking to maximize their power in order to self-legitimate, protect national 
interests and ensure their own survival. In light of this, security is of central 
importance to realist theory (Telo, 2009).
The absolute centrality of the nation-state in realist theory renders 
other actors, whether they are cultural, social or economic, largely 
unaccounted for. Non-state actors are considered to have influence only at 
the sub-state level, or through state mechanisms. As such, they are not 
viewed as autonomous actors in international relations. Carr and 
Morgenthau claim that each state has different national objectives and adopt 
policies in order to achieve their national goals. They also claim that there is 
no harmony of interests among states, as particular national interests cannot 
be compromised at any cost (Amin et al., 2011: 2). Despite these claims, 
realist theorists recognise that states operate within a network of states and 
therefore some level of cooperation must exist between them in order to 
minimize insecurity and conflict. Accordingly, states cooperate with others 
and create alliances in order to curtail enemies (Wikison, 2007: 2). 
Borne of realist theory, neo-realist theory focuses on the nature of the 
international system to understand what influences state behaviours. 
Kenneth Waltz, one of the key thinkers of neo-realism, highlights the 
international system’s lack of order. He characterizes the international 
system as anarchic and argues that states require a strong military capacity 
in order to survive (Waltz, 1990; Keizer, 2008). According to neo-realists, 
the international system emerges from the interaction between states; this 
same system then acts to constrain the actions of states. Such a view 
conceptualises the international structure as being primarily ordered by the 
principle of “anarchy”, and secondary to this, the distribution of capabilities 
across states. 
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Another element of neo-realist theory is the notion that regional or 
international institutions allow states to maximise protection of their 
national interests. Waltz distinguishes between three types of engagement 
with these institutions. First, some states engage in one or more of these 
institutions, even if they do not strictly follow a set of institutional rules. 
Secondly, some states try to maximise their power and influence as much as 
they can by leveraging these institutions. Thirdly, when joining any of these 
institutions, the state’s national security must not be put at risk (Keizer, 
2008). 
Security, power and state interests are the main principles informing 
realist and neo-realist theories. Classic realists posit that war among states is 
always imminent due to issues of security; however, on the other hand, neo-
realists argue that this is not always the case. Moreover, realists argue that 
national leaders can, and do, make errors by allowing morality and ideology 
to influence their foreign policy decisions. Neo-realists pay little attention to 
the internal factors affecting countries’ policy-making as they consider 
countries to be "rational actors" that react similarly and predictably to power 
realities in any given situation, irrespective of the political ideologies of the 
governing party (Rourke, 2008: 21). 
Realism could be used to analyse the effect of the leaderships of 
Britain’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair, France’s President, Jacques Chirac, 
and Italy’s Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, on their respective countries’ 
foreign policies towards Iraq. Furthermore, this theory could be used to 
examine the nature of EU member states’ engagement within the EU and 
how it has affected the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq since 2001.
However, this theory does not account for vertical and horizontal relations 
in the EU and how they have affected the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq 
(Keizer, 2008). The EU represents the partial integration of several nation 
states, and its members agreed to transfer some of their authority to 
supranational institutions in order to manage coordinated policies. Such a 
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political system remains unaccounted for by the realist perspective. 
Furthermore, realism presumes that the political arena is dominated by 
military considerations, whereas the EU was initially established to achieve 
economic cooperation and benefits. 
The EU’s international role, according to a realist perspective, is 
“nothing more than the sum of member-state diplomacies” (Guraziu, 2008: 
26). Contrary to such a notion, however, is the fact that the EU does not 
prioritise military issues as economic and trade considerations tend to 
dominate its agenda (Andreatta, 2005). Furthermore, the realist perspective 
argues that the key motivation of nation states is to maintain their 
sovereignty. The realist perspective claims that since foreign policies and 
national security and defense policies lie at the heart of national sovereignty, 
states will not integrate in these fields and an international organisation 
cannot create and implement its own foreign policy (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 328-329). Thus, realists consider supranational 
institutions as driven primarily by the leaders of national governments in 
response to demands from national constituencies, as well as imperatives 
from the global economy (Puchala, 1999: 327). In addition, realists also see 
supranational institutions as temporary and that states cooperate only to 
achieve relative gains (as opposed to absolute gains); states will cease 
cooperation if they determine they are no longer achieving relative gains 
vis-à-vis those they are cooperating with. Accordingly, the realist approach 
fails to facilitate a thorough examination of the EU as it considers only the 
sovereign states as actors while the role of international institutions, 
religious organisations, political parties and other supranational and sub-
national entities remain unaccounted for in international politics (Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan, 2008: 328-329).
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4.1.2. Liberalism
Liberal theorists such as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, 
John Stuart Mill, John Hobson, Woodrow Wilson, John Maynard Keynes 
and Charles Kegley helped to shape the theory of liberalism in the realm of 
international relations (Keizer, 2008). Liberalism posits different 
assumptions to realist theory, allowing more flexibility and a more positive 
view of the world (Hersberger, 2004). Like realists, liberals concede that the 
state plays a key role in the international order. However, liberalists’ 
rationale limits state powers through an additional focus on free trade and 
diplomacy (Hersberger, 2004). Accordingly, liberalism focuses on mutual 
interests and the monetary and economic aspects of international relations. 
Liberalism claims that states cooperate with one another and relinquish a 
degree of their sovereignty in order to gain benefits through interstate 
relations (Keizer, 2008). Liberal thinkers do not view international politics 
as being wholly determined by the distribution of military power; other 
issues, such as economic factors, are also considered to have a crucial role. 
For liberals, the key to the establishment of peaceful relations in the 
international arena is to ensure economic growth and prosperity and to 
create competition that will advance the most effective use of money and 
resources (Hersberger, 2004).
Liberals contend that foreign policy can be created through 
cooperation and an agreed standard of ethics. The national interest is 
defined as having a broader outlook of the future, acknowledging the global 
pattern of human relations and commerce (Hersberger, 2004). According to 
this, “the national states interact between each other in order to develop 
international norms with domestic politics of the states in an international 
system. In this case, national states have to work to define their interests” 
(Nye, 1988: 238). 
Liberalist theory takes into account a range of actors in international 
politics including nation states, international organisations, multinational 
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corporations, religious organisations, political interest groups, and political 
parties. The liberal perspective focuses on the role of international law and 
international organisations in the provision of collective security. It also 
focuses on the commercial gain that may overcome conflict and issues of 
security (Nye, 1988: 238). Collective security involves the collaboration of 
international actors to address potential security threats to the global order.  
According to this perspective, the international community is the ultimate 
powerbroker responsible for ensuring peace (Hersberger, 2004). 
Liberal institutionalism argues that through institutional cooperation, 
states can negotiate common interests, mutual goals and interstate harmony. 
Accordingly, trade and economic cooperation are considered key elements 
that assist in ensuring peace and prosperity (Keohane et al., 1993: 13; 
Keizer, 2008). Institutionalists argue that the lack of trust between sovereign 
states has adversely affected peace and security in the world, claiming that 
cooperation among international players leads to an increase in realising 
common interests. In order to create stable interaction and cooperation 
among these players, international institutions need to be established. These 
institutions can help to reduce uncertainty and mistrust in interstate relations 
(Andreatta, 2005). Accordingly, successful cooperation among nation states 
depends on the number of players that participate in negotiations, as well as 
a greater focus on long-term rather than short-term benefits. This theory 
focuses on the idea that the state has to develop strategies in all areas in 
order to gain the maximum benefits and avoid negative costs (Steans, and 
Pettiford, 2005: 40).  
The governance system in world politics, according to a liberal 
institutionalist approach, is not controlled by nation states alone but is also 
influenced by levels above and below nation states including non-
governmental and informal organisations. The decision-making process and 
policy implementation operates at all of these levels (Steans, and Pettiford, 
2005: 41; Slaughter, 1995). As a result, according to the institutionalists, the 
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policy-making process shifts from intergovernmental modes toward 
supranational ones (Puchala, 1999: 323). Thus, the EU foreign policy 
making process is driven primarily by the influences of supranational agents 
responding to demands from transnational society (Puchala, 1999: 327).
Liberalism adopts a more flexible approach than realism on the 
question of influential actors in international relations. It also posits a more 
optimistic approach to the prospects of inter-state cooperation. According to 
liberalism, the EU is a peaceful institution that has highly developed trade 
and monetary cooperation policies, though it is still developing its foreign 
and security policies. However, while liberalists recognise that other actors, 
such as the EU, have a crucial role to play in the international arena, the Iraq 
war in 2003 reflects the weakness of this assumption (Andreatta, 2005). For 
example, some EU member states, such as Britain, Italy and Spain, chose to 
use their military capabilities against Iraq in 2003 without seeking any 
consensus from European supranational institutions. While liberal theory 
may be useful to examine the effects of divergent national interests on the 
EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq in 2003, it fails to consider how the 
interactions between EU supranational institutions affected its foreign 
policy.
4.1.3. The English School 
The English School is considered one of the most important 
approaches to international politics although its influence is probably greater 
in Britain than in most other countries where international relations is taught 
(Linklater, 2005: 84). Thus, this school is best described as a group of 
mainly British theorists (Brown, 2005: 50; Stanescu, n.d.), the key theorists 
of which are Hedley Bull (1977), Martin Wight (1977, 1991), John Vincent 
(1986), Adam Watson (1982), Timothy Dunne (1998), Nicholas Wheeler 
(2000), Barry Buzan (2001) and Richard Little (2000). This theory emerged 
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in the 1970s as a theory concerned with analysing the international society 
as a primary focus (Stanescu, n.d.).  
Bull, one of the key thinkers of this theoretical school, made a 
distinction between an international system (a realist concept) and an 
international society (a liberal concept). Bull considered that an  
international system is formed when two or more states have sufficient 
mutual contact, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to 
make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculation of the 
other (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 143). However, according to Bull, an 
international society (liberal concept) is formed when a group of states have 
certain common interests and common values and, therefore, conceive of 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations, enabling 
them to share in the operation of common institutions (Stanescu, n.d.). 
The realist’s claim that states, unlike individuals in civil society, are 
forced to provide for their own security in anarchic conditions is valuable as 
it emphasises how adversaries seek to outmanoeuvre, control and overpower 
one another. However, this perspective captures only part of the substance 
of world politics (Bull, 2002). The international system is not a state of war. 
Instead, a common interest in placing restraints on the use of force requires 
states to develop the art of accommodation and compromise which makes 
an international society possible (Linklater, 2005: 87).
The English School is viewed as a middle way in classical 
international relations theories as “it sees itself providing a via media that 
runs between two more polarized positions” (Little, 2000: 396). To a certain 
degree, the international society approach (English School) rejects both the 
over-optimistic idealist forecasts of international cooperation and eternal 
peace in world politics, and the realist tradition which “describes 
international relations as a state of war of all against all, an arena of struggle 
in which each state is pitted against every other”  (Bull, 2002: 23). Hence, 
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for international society scholars, the study of international relations 
requires a twofold analysis of both war and peace, inasmuch as they have 
alternated throughout history. Adherents of the via media approach have 
been labelled as rationalists and proponents of an international society who 
seek to avoid the stark choice between “state egotism and conflict and 
human goodwill and cooperation presented by the debate between realism 
and liberalism” (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 141).
It can be concluded that the English School does not accept the 
realists’ pessimistic belief that the state of nature is a state of war, as they 
recognise that states can form an international society governed by common 
rules and institutions leading to a more peaceful coexistence within 
international politics. Conversely, members of the English School are highly 
sceptical of the global political reform advocated by cosmopolitan thinkers, 
who envisage a new world order and a universal community of humankind. 
As a consequence, the English School is attracted by elements of both 
realism and idealism, since it emphasises  the “diplomatic dialogue between 
states, while recognizing that states are often tempted to use force to realize 
their objectives or to resolve major differences” (Linklater, 2005: 108). 
Given this, it has become commonplace to regard the English School as the 
via media between two opposite extremes, attempting to reconcile realism 
with idealism as it gravitates towards the middle ground. Therefore, “the 
English School can claim to have passed the test of a good international 
theory, by having managed to avoid ‘the sterility of realism and the naivety 
of idealism” (Linklater, 2005: 108). 
The English School looks to sovereign states as the key actors in 
international relations (Stanescu, n.d.; Slaughter, 2011). Furthermore, it 
argues that there exists “a surprisingly high level of order and a surprisingly 
low level of violence between states given that their condition is one of 
anarchy” (Linklater, 2005: 84). This is not the case in the EU as it comprises 
actors from different levels of governance who all, to a certain degree, 
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participate in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Furthermore, 
the English School claims that the collapse of sovereign authority, even in 
the most stable of civil societies, will lead to increased levels of violence, 
unfairness, insecurity and distrust (Linklater, 2005: 84). However, multi-
national design of the EU was conceived explicitly in order to avoid and 
prevent the type of violent conflict among nation-states (Jordan, 2001). 
Thus, the English School may be not appropriate to examine EU foreign 
policy because the member states relinquish some of their sovereignty and 
power, in terms of economic and monetary policy and some aspects of 
foreign policy, upwards to the supranational level, and downwards to the 
sub-national level. Furthermore, the EU seeks to unite the sovereignty of all 
member states under the control of the EU supranational institutions to 
ensure member states do not engage in military conflict with each other.    
4.1.4. Constructivism
In recent years, international relations scholars have taken an 
increasing interest in constructivism (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2007; Kartal, 
2006). Constructivism "was born out of the idea that the dominant 
institutionalism in studies of integration needed to be supplemented by a 
more sociological understanding of institutions that would stress their 
interest-forming roles" (Kartal, 2006: 15). This theory shows that the nature 
of norms, identity and social interaction can provide powerful insights into 
world politics (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2007). Constructivism emphasises 
the importance of normative as well as material structures, the role of 
identity in shaping political action, and the mutually constitutive 
relationship between agents and structures (Smith, 2003; Hix, 2005). 
Dosenrode (2010: III) stated that: 
“Constructivists reject such a one-sided material focus. They 
argue that the most important aspect of international relations 
is social, not material. Furthermore, they argue that this 
social reality is not objective, or external, to the observer of 
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international affairs. The social and political world, including 
the world of international relations, is not a physical entity or 
material object that is outside human consciousness. 
Consequently, the study of international relations must focus 
on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the 
international scene as well as the shared understandings 
between them.”
Constructivist theory is interested in how actors define their national 
interests, threats to those interests, and their relationships to one another 
(Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2007). One prominent tenet of the theory 
examines how states’ interests and identities are intertwined and how those 
identities are shaped by interaction with other states (Goldstein and 
Pevehouse, 2007: 35). Constructivism offers an alternative understanding to 
a number of the central themes in international relations theory including the 
meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state 
and interest, an elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world 
politics (Hopf, 1998).
In the case of the EU, constructivism posits that the development of 
EU foreign policy does not depend solely on the creation of an effective 
institutional framework, nor on acquiring foreign policy instruments, nor 
even on defining common interests. Instead, it depends on non-material 
dimensions such as ideas, values, norms and identity (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan 2008: 332).  These factors, according to constructivist theory, 
are constitutive elements of the EU’s foreign policy.  Constructivist theorists 
argue ‘states’ preferences and interests are shaped by the EU institutions 
(EU norms, values, identity et cetera) once those states become members of 
the Union. In this social process, constructivist theorists highlight the 
importance of the EU’s supranational bodies, such as the European 
Commission or the Parliament, in policy formulation (Kartal, 2006: 15). 
Thus, a constructivist conception of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) is that it has a Europeanised character where the interests of 
82
actors develop over time to shape the direction of policy rather than being 
bargained on the EU table (Kartal, 2006: 18). According to this, member 
states should listen to other members before taking a foreign policy position. 
However, although these elements - ideas, identity and norms - are 
important in the formulation of EU foreign policy, the differences in power 
and interests remain crucial variables in determining member states’ foreign 
policies and whether a common EU foreign policy is achievable (Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan, 2008: 332). For example, the EU’s members held 
different positions towards the Iraq war in 2003, and consequently, the EU 
supranational institutions could not reach a common position in response. 
Furthermore, constructivist theory may fail to consider the impact of 
external factors on EU foreign policy. 
4.1.5. Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism
Functionalism is an integration theory that has been developed to 
explain phenomena such as European integration (Sweeney, 2005). It refers 
to the gradual undermining of state sovereignty because of technical 
cooperation across state boundaries in particular policy areas (Sweeney, 
2005: 151). Classic functionalism, developed by David Mitrany (1966), 
argues that a human being is rational and will value an opportunity of 
cooperation if it brings benefit. Furthermore, Mitrany (1966) believes that 
cooperation in economics and social needs will ultimately expand to 
achieving political unification through the chief dynamic mechanism –
‘spillover’. This political unification will cause a new international society 
that is based upon function rather than territory. Therefore, regional 
cooperation is an intermediate stage that will end by coagulating into 
universal union (Mitrany, 1971: 534-535).
As the name suggests, neo-functionalism is derived from a 
functionalist approach. It was developed by Earnst Haas in 1958 as a 
systematic critique of functionalism (Cini, 2003: 83). Haas’s aims were to 
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explain the regional integration of Europe after World War II in 1945. The 
theory also aimed to explain economic cooperation in Latin America (Cini, 
2003: 83).
Functionalists view integration as an inevitable outcome of 
development that imposes more functions on states and obliges them to 
cooperate with international institutions. Neo-functionalists argue that 
institutions are created to enable the integration process (Rosamond, 2000; 
Cini, 2003). According to neo-functionalism, the importance of nationalism 
and the national state will decline as a central supranational state is created 
(Cini, 2005; Wiener and Diez, 2004).
Neo-functionalism claims that cooperation among states occurs across 
a number of policy areas with integration in one policy area leading to 
integration in another policy area (Ujupaan, 2009; Rosamond, 2000; Cini, 
2005).  For example, integration in the economic, monetary and trade areas 
will lead to integration in the area of politics. Furthermore, neo-
functionalism considers that economic cooperation among states prevents 
military conflict (Burchill, 2009: 66). Thus, the main tenet of neo-
functionalism is that cooperation among actors (states and institutions) 
begins with ‘low’ political cooperation, such as economics, and then 
transfers to another field until political integration is achieved (Ujupaan, 
2009). Such a process is named ‘spillover’ and may lead to the creation of 
supranational institutions that facilitate transparency and legitimacy 
(Sweeney, 2005: 152). As a result, neo-functionalism suggests that states are 
increasingly losing control in a “web of interdependence” that provides a 
role for supranational actors and organised interests in shaping the direction 
of integration (Bache and Flinders 2004: 2).
According to a neo-functionalist perspective, integration is a necessity 
for some countries. The first step of integration is for member states to 
transfer some of their authority to supranational entities, such as EU 
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institutions. Thus, the power of EU supranational institutions, such as the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, 
constantly increases parallel to greater sector integration at the expense of 
inter-governmental institutions such as the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers (Risse, 2004: 9). 
Neo-functionalist theory views national governments as only one actor 
among many others. According to this theory, increasing integration leads to 
a growing significance of both transnationally organised interest groups and 
supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the European 
Court of Justice, and the European Parliament (Risse, 1996: 55). Thus, neo-
functionalist theory focuses on the supranational level in the integration 
process. According to this theory, difficult national issues can be solved at 
the supranational level and can, at this level, promote a strategy for further 
integration (Hammel, 2009: 22). However, many scholars such as Hansen 
(1969) and Rosamond (2000) do not agree with this perspective. They argue 
that cooperation in ‘low politics’ does not always lead to integration, 
arguing that mutual economic gains can exist without supranational 
authority. Similarly, Risse (2004: 12) states that the "distinction between 
“high” and “low” politics does not help in explaining the puzzle why 
foreign and defense [sic] affairs remain the odd one out in European 
integration. European integration has affected too many questions of “high 
politics” in the meantime, including core features of the modern nation-state 
such as monetary sovereignty and internal security". Thus, national states 
are extremely unlikely to relinquish sovereignty and in particular, decisions 
concerning military conflict (Risse, 2004: 9). Furthermore, this study is not 
solely focused on the supranational level in the EU but also investigates the 
nature of the interaction between all levels and pillars within the EU in order 
to gain a better understanding of the EU foreign policy position towards Iraq.
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4.1.6. Intergovernmentalism
Intergovernmentalism is a regionalist theory that attempts to explain 
EU integration (Ujupaan, 2009; Risse, 1996; Bache and Flinders 2004). The 
inter-governmental paradigm has been predominant since the 1980s when 
the limits of functionalism became clear and alternative explanations for the 
European Community's unexpected revival in the mid-1980s were required 
(Gordon, 1997-1998: 77). Guraziu (2008: 30) states 
“[i]ntergovernmentalists emphasise national interests, bargaining, lowest 
common-denominator deals, and the unwillingness of states to compromise 
their core national interests”. Thus, intergovernmentalists view European 
integration as the result of interstate bargains (Risse, 1996). 
Intergovernmentalism highlights the central role of national 
governments in the process of integration (Bache and Flinders 2004: 2). 
National governments, according to intergovernmentalism, are the principal 
agents driving or preventing progress in European cooperation (Risse, 1996). 
European politics is conceptualised as a ‘two-level’ game in which national 
governments serve as the crucial link between the domestic and the 
international levels. Thus, intergovernmentalism posits that European 
integration does not represent the end of the nation state but, in fact, 
strengthens it (Risse, 1996). The theory claims that national states have a 
key role within the EU, highlighting that all major decisions and EU policies 
have to be approved by member states’ governments. 
National governments have the means to control access and 
communication between the sub-national agencies and the EU’s main 
supranational decision-making bodies (Moravcsik, 1993). 
Intergovernmentalists argue that the “gatekeeping” role of national 
governments prevents significant diffusion of power to sub-national 
authorities (Moravcsik, 1994: 53). Transki (2008: 24) states that 
intergovernmentalism opposes the claim made by multi-level governance 
theory. He argues that intergovernmental perspectives assert that central 
86
governments are able to act as ‘gatekeepers’, controlling sub-national 
participation in EU policy-making. In other words, sub-national agencies 
have negligible influence over EU policy decisions. According to this theory, 
EU member states have full control over the decision-making process, 
including foreign policy (Transki, 2008).  Some scholars, such as Simon 
(2004: 97), claim that EU foreign policy is created by inter-governmental 
bargaining among member states, while both supranational institutions and 
sub-national agencies have no role in the process. 
Intergovernmentalism posits that two main levels of political influence 
exist in the EU – the national and European levels. The theory pays no 
attention to the sub-national level. Intergovernmentalists think in terms of a 
zero-sum game (Andreatta, 2005). In the context of the EU, if the 
supranational level gains an advantage, that implies a loss for the member 
states. Accordingly, the EU member states represent their national interests, 
not EU interests (Sweeney, 2005: 154-156). Moreover, the veto right and 
consensus voting within the EU are significant tools used by member states 
to protect their interests. However, theorists who were opposed to
intergovernmentalism claim that EU institutions have links with member 
states’ interests through bargaining at the Community level. This line of 
thought argues that compromised solutions reached between states at the 
regional level, to some extent, will reflect states’ interests while also being 
shaped by EU institutions. 
Intergovernmentalism has a different view from the neo-functionalist 
perspective, claiming that national governments are in control of the 
integration process (Hammel, 2009: 23). Intergovernmentalists claim that 
integration can occur when national governments cooperate, but that 
cooperation only occurs when it is in their national interest to do so. 
According to this perspective, EU member states integrate depending on 
their national interests (Hammel, 2009: 23). Therefore, national 
governments play a crucial role in integration while the supranational 
institutions are left to follow intergovernmental decisions. Awesti (2007: 6) 
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states that the two level game theories such as intergovernmentalism, which 
focuses on the role of the nation states, and neo-functionalism, which 
focuses on the role of the supranational institutions, cannot provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of the EU foreign policy. 
Intergovernmentalism argues that nation states play the central role in 
the integration process as they are responsible for all decisions, policies and 
strategies. However, this theory ignores the day-to-day processes of policy-
making that is always conducted within institutions (Ujupaan, 2009: 1). 
Furthermore, it has little to say about whether member states’ interests and 
preferences are shaped by the EU institutions and the integration process 
itself (Risse, 1996). Intergovernmentalism also fails to acknowledge the 
significant role of supranational institutions in EU foreign policy making in 
particular. The historical practices of these institutions demonstrate that they 
have a role in formulating EU policies. For example, the European 
Parliament ultimately decides by election which countries will become 
members of the EU. The Commission also plays a significant role in 
preparing and arranging the EU agenda, implementing EU foreign policies 
and ensuring coherence and interaction among EU actors and policies 
(Awesti, 2006: 17). Intergovernmentalism theory is an inadequate 
framework to analyse the EU because the supranational institutions do have 
a role in shaping the member states’ interests and EU policies in general 
(Awesti, 2006: 16).
4.1.7. Federalism 
Federalism refers to the integration of states into a particular union 
under a strong constitutional and institutional framework (Sweeney, 2005). 
In order to form a federation, some basic elements have to exist; the key one 
being voluntary membership. That is, states enter into a union based on their 
own decision and without any coercion. Furthermore, the establishment of a 
federal union has to be based on a legal agreement and a set of common 
88
values and beliefs that reflect the identity of the union in world politics 
(Sweeney, 2005: 143). The federal system’s structure focuses on the 
supranational level because this level controls powers and authorities. Under 
federalism, the authority is dispersed between two or more levels of 
government, although the lowest levels possess limited powers and 
authorities (Sweeney, 2005: 144). Accordingly, federalism invests ultimate 
legal responsibility in governmental decision-making to only one level of 
authority. This is reflected in legal discourse by the use of the term 
‘primacy’ to describe the legal supremacy of one sovereign authority over 
another in a sector of federal-provincial policy-making (Sweeney, 2005: 
144).
It is difficult to apply the notion of federalism to a study on the EU for 
a number of reasons.  First, until recently, the EU has been structured very 
differently from that of a federal state. In order for a federal system to exist, 
the sovereignty of member states must be pooled. Other entities of the 
member states also have to be pooled under a federal union identity. In the 
EU, however, member states are expected to maintain, rather than pool, 
their sovereignty, and each member retains and protects its own national 
identity. The second difficulty in applying the concept of federalism to the 
EU is encountered at the level of authority in decision-making. According to 
the federalist perspective, authority and power are dispersed across two or 
more levels. Central governments at the “supranational level” play a crucial 
role in driving the foreign and security policies of the federal country. Until 
now, the EU has had a weak centre, with no central governing authority; the 
member states assume the most crucial role in the final decisions of the EU, 
with many issues, including external relations and security, remaining under 
the control of the member states’ governments. Thirdly, the federal system 
is established according to a constitutional and institutional framework. A 
number of treaties and agreements have bound member states in the absence 
of a constitutional framework. Although there is an institutional framework, 
competencies and authority in these institutions is unclear. Additionally, in 
federal states there are many institutions, such as a parliament, president, 
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and cabinet of ministers, with centralised competencies. All of the nation 
state authorities assume power through national election. At the level of the 
EU however, there is no election process except the parliamentary election. 
The majority of leaders at the EU level are nominated and appointed by 
member states, not through parliamentary approval (Scharpf, 2000: 14). 
Lastly, federalism refers to power sharing arrangements between a limited 
number of governments operating across two or three levels. In a federal 
system, interaction only occurs between central governments and sub-
national governments, while the EU refers to power sharing arrangements 
between 27 sovereign national governments, European supranational 
institutions, and sub-national agencies. Thus, in the EU system, interaction 
occurs among different actors across different levels. 
Unlike a federal system, governance within the EU is orchestrated 
across multiple levels; local, regional, national, and international levels 
participate in shaping the nature of its policies (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 
237). Therefore, until recently, the EU did not possess the characteristics of 
a federal system because each member state maintained its own foreign 
policy, sovereignty, military, cultural identity, and control over its own 
territory (Hammel, 2009: 20). The EU is largely unable to develop common 
action in the political field and is not always a unified entity when 
participating in international politics. This reflects the political weaknesses 
of the EU. Alves and Afonso (2008: 6) conclude that there is still a large 
gap between the present system of the EU and the federalist approach.
Selecting an adequate theoretical approach for this study of EU foreign 
policy faced many challenges. For example, both EU institutions and 
member states influence the EU’s foreign policy indicating that EU foreign 
policy formulation and implementation is a complex process to which no 
single theory may be applied comprehensively. It is almost impossible to 
evaluate the EU’s foreign policy using the criteria usually applied in the 
context of nation states, and categorising the EU as an intergovernmental 
organisation has failed to capture its multi-dimensional character (Kallberg, 
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2007). Therefore, international relations theories on their own cannot fully 
account for the EU’s foreign policy (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007).
Integration theories also fail to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of 
the EU’s foreign policy. Functionalism, for example, tends to focus on the 
emergence of the supranational level, arguing that the importance of the 
nation state is in decline. This theory ignores the ongoing influence that the 
EU member states have over the EU’s foreign policy formulation and 
decisions. By contrast, intergovernmentalism posits that nation states are the 
main actors in the integration process as they are responsible for all 
decisions, policies, and strategies. However, this theory ignores the day-to-
day processes of policy-making that is always conducted within institutions. 
The multi-level governance approach is the most relevant framework 
for this study. Developed on the basis that the EU polity is multi-level, this 
approach seeks the middle ground of international relations and integration 
theories. The scholars who espouse a multi-level governance approach 
claim that many actors participate in this polity including sovereign states, 
supranational institutions, and sub-national actors. Each of these actors is 
considered to have responsibilities and competencies that can have an effect 
on EU policies (Scharpf, 2000: 5). Therefore, this study will use a multi-
level governance approach to investigate EU foreign policy toward Iraq 
from 2001-2009.
4.2. The Study’s Approach: Multi-Level Governance (MLG)
The notion of governance has received a lot of attention recently 
(Paraskevopoulos, 2002). Some companies and institutions have begun to 
think beyond the national perspective, such as the World Bank and the 
European Commission which function at the transnational level 
(Paraskevopoulos, 2002). The basic logic behind the concept of governance 
is that an “effective society requires some set of mechanisms for identifying 
common problems, deciding upon goals, and then designing and 
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implementing the means to achieve those purposes” (Peters and Borrás, 
2009: 1). Effective governance, therefore, requires creating greater 
coherence and coordination across the public sector and the capacity to 
govern horizontally as well as vertically (Peters, 1992; Peters and Borrás, 
2009: 8). In that sense, governance has become an umbrella concept for a 
wide variety of empirical phenomena. In structural terms, these include 
governance by hierarchies, by markets, by networks, and by (policy) 
communities; while in procedural terms, governance is conceptualised as 
steering and coordinating (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). 
Governance is a system of rules, norms and institutions that govern 
public and private behaviours across national boundaries, occurring at 
different levels within the international system (Mamudu and Studlar, 2009). 
Governance refers to the structured ways in which the divergent preferences 
of interdependent actors are transformed into policy choices. As a result, the 
multiple interests of citizens become coordinated actions that are obeyed by 
these actors (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 2002). Accordingly, there are 
different kinds of governance; however, governance as a conceptualised 
term, refers to a steering and coordinating point to the specific contexts in 
exploring both the demise of hierarchical regulatory policies, and the 
opportunities and risks associated with the generalisation of a more diffused 
governance mode (Paraskevopoulos, 2002: 3). 
Multi-level governance is a public administration theory that 
originated from studies on EU integration. Multi-level governance has 
developed in an effort to understand the EU as an unprecedented political 
system that is not adequately explained by traditional theories such as liberal 
intergovernmentalism (Bjorn, 2008: 4). It was first applied in 1988 to 
explain the reform of the EU’s structures, and since then, different scholars 
have used this concept in order to explain the evolution of the EU’s 
decision-making process (Bache and Flinders, 2004).   
92
Although Hooghe and Marks (2003: 236) claim that there is no 
consensus on how multi-level governance should be structured, there is an 
early definition that refers to multi-level governance as a system of 
continuous negotiations among nested governments at several territorial 
tiers. This definition describes how supra-national, national, regional, and 
local governments are enmeshed in territorially-overarching policy networks 
(Marks 1993). Thus, Marks (1993) suggests that intergovernmental and neo-
functional theories of the EU were inadequate because they were too narrow. 
Marks argues that these theories conceived the institutional building of the 
EU in a unique dimension, moving from national state domination to 
supranational domination. He also argues that the debate between these 
theories was sterile because it did not take into account the mobilisation and 
empowerment of sub-national governments. Consequently, Marks states that 
multi-level governance was emerging in the EU, characterised by decision-
making across several tiers of nested government. He emphasises that the 
devolution of authority not only shifted to the supranational level but also to 
the sub-national level. Accordingly, this theory emphasises both the 
increasingly frequent and complex interactions between governmental 
actors, and the increasingly important dimension of non-state actors that are 
mobilised in EU policy making. Peters and Pierre (2004: 77-81) provide the 
following description of the multi-level governance approach: it is 
“governance” as opposed to “government”; “refers to a particular kind of 
relationship between several institutions levels”; “denotes a negotiated order 
rather than an order defined by formalised legal framework”; and “is 
frequently conceived of as a political game”.
Multi-level governance “remains a contested concept, its broad appeal 
reflects a shared concern with increased complexity, proliferating 
jurisdictions, the rise of non-state actors, and the related challenges to state 
power” (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 4-5).  According to Bache (2008: 25), 
Bache & Flinders (2004) and Transki (2008) the main dimensions of the 
multi-level governance approach are:
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a. Increased participation of non-state actors in EU foreign policy; 
b. Provision of an understanding of the transformation in the role of 
nation states in new strategies of coordination, steering, and 
networking; 
c. The sharing of decision-making competencies by actors at different 
levels rather than monopolized by state executives. Supranational 
institutions have independent influence over policy-making and their 
role must be taken into account in order to explain European policy-
making; 
d. Nation states’ loss of control of their respective individual state’s 
executives because they become involved in collective decision-
making; and 
e. The operation of sub-national actors in both national and 
supranational arenas, creating transnational associations in the 
decision-making process.
Multi-level governance is used to describe contexts in which 
government and policy-making is best understood as a process that is not 
necessarily dominated by state actors. Instead, this approach posits that 
policy formation and political authority are significantly influenced by, or 
even transferred to, other levels or networks of actors (Bjorn, 2008: 4). The 
nation states become one among a variety of actors influencing policy-
making at a variety of levels (Transki, 2008: 23; Aalberts, 2004: 28; Awesti, 
2007: 3). According to this perspective, EU institutions, such as the 
Commission and Parliament, and sub-national institutions, such as interest 
groups and lobbyists, have an effect on the EU policy-making process.  As a 
result, Marks et al. (1996: 356) argue that multi-level governance is 
validated when: 
1. The European Council (heads of states or governments) and the 
Council of Ministers share power with supranational actors; 
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2.  Individual state executives cannot deliver the policy outcomes they 
wish through European policy making; and
3. Sub-national interests use the EU to pressure state executives into 
particular actions. 
Multi-level governance is a useful framework for examining the 
variety of political actors involved in the EU’s foreign policy formulation 
and implementation processes (Hurrelmann and DeBardeleben, 2008; 
Bomberg and Stubb, 2004; Filtenborg, Ganzle and Johansson, 2002).
The multi-level governance approach moves beyond 
intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and supranationalism by creating 
a new approach. It focuses on providing a better description of ‘the nature of 
the beast’ (Jordan, 2001: 7).  Attention is moved away from the process of 
integration to the subject itself: the EU as a complex and dynamic institution 
(Jordan, 2001; Aalberts, 2004). Jordan (2001: 199) states that the 
governance system within the EU is neither exclusively state-centric nor 
supranational. The EU Council and EU Council of Ministers might appear 
to be intergovernmental but the activities of the Commission, EU Parliament, 
and Court are supranational. The decision-making processes of the EU 
across all its pillars and levels disperse decision-making authority. 
The multi-level governance approach does not completely reject all of 
the assumptions of integration theories. On the one hand, multi-level 
governance shares with neo-functionalism the view that supranational actors 
and interest groups influence decisions at the EU-level (Bache and Flinders, 
2004: 3). On the other hand, Hooghe and Marks (2001) state that the multi-
level governance approach does not reject the liberal intergovernmentalist 
view that national governments or national arenas are important. 
The multi-level governance approach is further explained by 
Jachtenfuchs (2001) who argues that neo-functionalism and 
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intergovernmentalism are useful as they identify the causes of European 
integration, but they are not so adept at explaining the ways the EU 
influences domestic policies and the interconnectedness of institutions at all 
levels of government. It is in these areas that the governance approach fills 
the gap. As Jachtenfuchs (2001: 347) notes, “the state is increasingly faced 
with largely autonomous functional sub-systems and corporate actors. As a 
result, negotiating systems proliferate. This implies that the clear-cut 
distinction between the international system and domestic systems is 
increasingly blurred’’. By examining the EU using a governance approach, 
one can observe how Europeanisation occurs.
The multi-level governance approach facilitates an analysis of all the 
actors who play a crucial role in the governance process. This approach 
perceives traditional theories as inadequate in describing the EU political 
system due to a central focus on nation state interactions (Nykvist, 2008: 4).  
Therefore, multi-level governance theory steps away from a state-centric 
analysis and focuses on domestic issues. Its primary contention, similar to 
neo-functionalism, is that member states in the EU have lost individual and 
collective control over the European decision-making processes. However, 
what is different about this approach is that the emphasis is not placed solely 
on state-centric decision-making but also on an interconnected web of 
institutions at the supra-national, national, and sub-national levels. 
Accordingly, multi-level scholars argue that European politics have not 
been characterised by a hierarchical system but by negotiations between 
independent actors and institutions at a variety of levels (Jachtenfuchs and 
Kohler-Koch, 2004: 1).
The EU is a political system with a European layer (European 
Commission, European Council and European Parliament), a national layer, 
and a sub-national layer. These layers interact with each other in two ways: 
horizontally (across the pillars and between the institutions) and vertically 
(in terms of sharing the competencies between the national and EU levels).
In this sense, the vertical notion of multi-level governance operates 
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alongside the horizontal notion of complex governance to address 
relationships between state and non-state actors and new forms of public-
private partnership (Stubbs, 2005). Therefore, the main value of multi-level 
governance is that it allows for an understanding of complexity at and 
between levels, and allows us to focus on how the EU’s governance system 
affects its capacity to act towards the outside (Bache, 2008). Thus, multi-
level governance is able to explore how the whole system works, and how 
multiple levels are structured in this system (Portela and Raube, 2009: 2; 
Sweeney, 2005: 160-161).  
The multi-level governance approach has recently been expanded to 
emphasise the role of all actors involved in EU foreign policy, and the way 
in which they interact with each other (Penone, 2009). EU foreign policy is 
therefore considered part of an evolving multi-actor global system resulting 
from complex interactions produced at different levels of national, 
transnational, and supranational (Rosamond, 2000: 175-176; Hill and Smith, 
2005: 9). Although multi-level governance is more descriptive than 
theoretical, it can help explain foreign policy outcomes through a domestic 
outlook, and allows a focus on how the EU’s governance system affects its 
capacity to act (Mette et al. 2003: 389; Bache, 2008).
To develop coherent frames of reference for the discussion and 
conclusion of this thesis, a number of qualitative themes have been selected:
a. The nature of power and authority of the EU's foreign policy 
actors;
b. The nature of the competencies of each actor;
c. Available foreign policy instruments;
d. Participation in agenda preparation for the Council meeting;
e. The decision-making process; and
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f. Mechanisms of foreign policy implementation
The interactions and coordination among foreign policy actors were 
not the only factors that affected the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq from 
2001 to 2009.  It was found that external factors, such as the United States’ 
presence in Iraq, the unstable internal situation in Iraq, and the role of the 
United Nations also affected the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq during 
this period. As such, certain modifications need to be made to formulate a 
comprehensive conceptual framework for this study.
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Figure 2: Conceptual Framework of Study
The multilevel governance approach is applied to the case study in 
order to ascertain whether the EU had a clear and effectively coordinated 
foreign policy position towards Iraq during 2001-2009. Initially, the nature 
of coordination and interaction among key foreign policy actors in the EU 
are examined independently of the multi-level governance approach. These 
interactions are then placed within the historical context of EU-Iraq 
relations in order to highlight the historically entrenched, dynamic and 
complex set of relations that exist. The nature of coordination and 
interaction among EU foreign policy actors that influenced its policy 
towards Iraq will be addressed in the analysis and discussion chapters. In 
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order to apply this approach, an appropriate methodology must be employed. 
The next chapter will discuss the data resources and analysis methods used 
in this study. 
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Chapter 5:
Methodology
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This chapter outlines the research techniques employed to examine the 
impact of coordination activities between EU foreign policy actors on the 
EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq. Multi-level governance theory (Marks 
1993, 1996) informs the conceptual framework for this study. This 
framework has allowed the researcher to examine the EU, which is a 
political and organizational anomaly in international politics, as a multi-
level governance system with supranational, inter-governmental and sub-
national dimensions. A qualitative approach has been employed in order to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the coordination and interaction between 
EU foreign policy actors and its effect on the EU’s overall foreign policy 
towards Iraq. Qualitative interviews were carried out with EU officials and 
academic experts. The data collected was subjected to thematic content 
analysis.
5.1. Research Design 
In order to explore the nature of vertical and horizontal coordination 
and interaction among the EU’s foreign policy actors and how that affected 
the EU’s foreign policy performance, this study uses Iraq during 2001-2009 
as a case study. This case study allows an examination of the interactions 
and debates between EU institutions in relation to a particular foreign policy 
issue. A careful examination of these interactions facilitates an exploration 
of the reality of the EU’s foreign policy-making in general, and its foreign 
policy towards Iraq more specifically. Furthermore, this case study allows 
an examination of the external factors that influenced the EU’s foreign 
policy towards Iraq during the period of 2001-2009.
Meaningful exploration of this case study required the collection of 
qualitative data. Primary and a range of secondary data were collected. 
Semi-structured interviews with EU officials and experts were the key 
primary resource. The purpose of these interviews was to ascertain official 
viewpoints, as well as the personal perceptions and opinions of these 
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officials, regarding the EU’s foreign policy in general, and towards Iraq 
from 2001 to 2009. Face-to-face interviews elicited discussions about the 
opportunities and barriers facing the EU’s foreign policy efforts in Iraq. 
Such interviews provided the researcher with specific information about the 
nature of the EU’s foreign policy formulation and implementation. Analysis 
of the collected data elucidates the nature of interaction and coordination 
procedures among the EU’s foreign policy actors. The secondary data used 
in this study includes meeting records, government documents, EU 
declarations, debates, EU treaties, Council statements, newspaper articles, 
and previous interviews with EU officials. These sources allow an analysis 
of the many themes that are dealt with throughout this research. 
5.2. Data Collection
Data collection took place from October 7 to November 5, 2010. The 
data consists of individual interviews with officials employed in the area of 
EU foreign policy towards Iraq. A total of thirteen interviews were 
conducted, including nine with officials within EU institutions -
Commission, Council and Parliament - and the remaining four with experts 
working in academic institutions in Brussels. All of the interviews, 
conducted in English and lasting one hour, were held in the respondents’ 
offices during working hours. Recording equipment was used to record the 
conversations.  
The structure of the interviews remained unchanged for all 
respondents. The interview questions related to the aforementioned research 
questions. As such, many themes were discussed during the interviews. 
These themes included:
a. The distribution of power and authority in the EU;
b. The competencies of each EU actor;
c. The available instruments;
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d. The agenda-setting process;
e. The decision-making procedures; and
f. The implementation of the EU’s foreign policy.
The interviews focused on how EU foreign policy actors interact and 
coordinate their attitudes during all stages of the foreign policy making 
process in order to create effective policy. Given that the respondents were 
employed within the EU, they were well positioned to provide significant 
information about the nature of EU foreign policy formulation and 
implementation through an account of their own practices, understandings 
and ideas. The respondents’ insights assisted in identifying the balance of 
control that exists between EU member states and the supranational 
institutions. The respondents’ positions and experience within the EU 
provided an informed understanding of the nature of the EU’s foreign policy 
debates, involvement and performance as they related to Iraq from 2001 to 
2009. The respondents were fully informed about the aims of this research 
and their participation was fully voluntary.
Secondary data sources are a crucial component of this study as they 
allow an examination of the nature and effectiveness of the EU’s foreign 
policy approach to Iraq. EU treaties and official websites were used to 
explore the competencies, authority and available instruments of the EU 
institutions that are involved in shaping the EU’s foreign policy. These 
sources helped to identify the range of interaction between EU institutions 
and determine the level of coordination amongst them. Relevant 
government documents of EU member states, EU statements, records from 
meetings, declarations found in databases, and decisions throughout the 
Iraqi crisis from 2001-2009 also provided significant information for this 
case study. These sources are referred to extensively in the discussion 
chapter of this study. Newspaper articles were drawn on to provide 
examples of daily attitudes and events related to the topic of the study.  
Reference has been made throughout the case study to the United States 
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(US) and United Nations (UN), given their pivotal roles in events in Iraq 
from 2001-2009.  UN resolutions related to Iraq are also used. Following 
the US war in 2003, Iraq remained under UN supervision according to 
Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. This study draws on the many resolutions 
that were issued by the UN Security Council from 1990-2009 in relation to 
Iraq. In addition, books and academic journal articles were necessary to 
clarify key themes, concepts and theories in order to shape the research 
questions of this study.  
5.3. Data Analysis
The data collected for this study was analysed in order to evaluate the 
nature of coordination and interaction amongst the EU’s foreign policy 
actors. Content analysis was selected as the most meaningful approach to 
address the research questions of this case study. Data that is relevant to 
such a method of analysis includes:
a. Written documents including conversation or speech transcripts,
original documents, and discussion;     
b. Oral answers to interview questions;
c. A verbal description of visual information including films, video     
and photographs.
Documents include newspaper articles, governmental meeting records, 
judicial decisions and interview responses (United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO), 1996). 
Holsti (1969: 3, 14) posits that three factors are fundamentally 
important in content analysis: objectivity, systematic implementation and 
generality.  First, the ‘objectivity’ in content analysis refers to a need on 
behalf of the researcher to remain impartial to the subject matter and open to 
all possible conclusions. The researcher must remain objective so as to 
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minimize misrepresentation of the primary and secondary source data and 
the various contexts from which such data is collected. The best strategy to 
circumvent this problematic area is “careful reading and re-reading of the 
data” (Rice and Ezzy, 1999: 258). Such a strategy increases the credibility 
of the data analysis.  
Second, the analysis must be systematic so that the criteria used for the 
selection and analysis of content remains consistent. Content analysis 
methods facilitate a clear and systematic study of a large number of textual 
materials, rather than an interpretive examination of a smaller number of 
texts. In this study, a systematic examination of texts, such as interview 
transcripts, EU treaties, declarations and statements, is utilized to reflect the 
nature of competencies, authority and instruments of each actor involved 
with EU foreign policy decisions. These texts are analysed to assess whether 
they directly or indirectly reflect the horizontal interactions amongst foreign 
policy institutions. In addition, a systematic examination of member states’ 
attendance within the EU framework and their participation in the 
formulation and implementation of the EU’s foreign policy was undertaken 
to assess the extent to which they reflect the ideal in vertical coordination 
between EU institutions and member states. 
Finally, content analysis must exhibit elements of generality to afford 
a broader range of theoretical relevance. The analysis aims to generate 
findings that have the potential to create generalisations. In this study, the 
analysis focuses, at times, on the manifest meaning of texts. At other times, 
it focuses on the latent meaning. Latent readings of the texts are possible 
and potentially more valuable in fulfilling the requirement of generality as 
demanded by content analysis. Latent readings of the interview transcripts, 
EU statements, documentation of meetings, conversations and speeches by 
EU officials, as well as EU member states’ declarations, decisions and 
positions, are a reflection of the range of interactions and coordination 
amongst EU actors. 
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Content analysis was used to highlight the presence of certain words, 
concepts, themes, phrases, charters, or sentences within texts or sets of texts.  
Books, journal articles, interviews, speeches, historical documents, 
conversations, and newspaper articles are all considered as ‘texts’ (United 
States General Accounting Office (GAO), 1996).  In order to employ 
content analysis in this study, the texts have been divided into manageable, 
thematic categories. The theme of each category is in line with the research 
questions put forward in this study. As such, these categories are useful in 
articulating a coherent argument. Accordingly, the researcher has examined 
the relationship among concepts in a text and how each concept is related to 
others. This method, known as ‘thematic content analysis’, is “a method for 
identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006: 79). Thus, thematic content analysis deals with broader 
phenomena by searching for themes that have the ability to describe these 
phenomena. 
Thematic content analysis, as a methodology, requires an ability to 
manage and categorise the qualitative data into themes so as to effectively 
summarise their meaning as it relates to the research aims (Gonzaga et al., 
2009: 3).  As such, thematic content analysis involves careful reading and 
re-reading of the data to identify the relevant themes. The themes that 
emerge from this process become the categories for analysis (Fereday and 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 3-4).  Holsti (1969: 116) describes a ‘theme’ as “a 
single assertion about some subject”. In terms of this study, several themes 
exist:
1. Historical interaction and coordination among EU foreign policy     
actors.
2. Distribution of power, authority, competencies and instruments 
among supranational, inter-governmental and sub-national levels.
3. Foreign policy agenda, decision-making and implementation 
procedures.              
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4. The impact of these elements on the EU's foreign policy 
performance.
5. The EU foreign policy response to Iraq during 2001-2009.
6. The influence of external factors such as the US and UN and the 
political, security, social and economy environment in Iraq.  
7. The impact of these elements on EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq. 
A variety of thematic content analysis techniques exist in the literature. 
This study adopts the analytical technique that breaks the process down into 
phases, as espoused by Braun and Clarke (2006: 87-93). This particular 
adaptation of thematic content analysis requires the researcher to first 
transcribe, read and re-read the data, noting down initial ideas. The 
researcher is then required to establish links between sections of the 
collected data and relevant research themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82). In 
the second phase, the researcher codes interesting features of the data in a 
systematic way and collates the data that is relevant to each code. Thirdly, 
all the interviews’ transcripts are coded according to broad themes based on 
the research objectives and interview questions. Each broad theme is to be 
deconstructed along detailed lines of analysis by the researcher, leading to 
more specific categories within each theme (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 
2006: 3-4). In the fourth phase, the researcher is required to confirm the 
relevance of the themes to the coded extracts in order to generate a thematic 
map of the analysis. Clear definitions and names for each theme must be 
developed to ensure a sound analytic process throughout the study. In the 
final phase, the researcher selects extracts from the interview transcripts that 
are related to the research questions. These extracts have to meet certain 
criteria such as comprehensiveness, content, length, and variety. Overall, 
this method of data analysis attempts to extract relevant and consistent 
themes through careful analytical reading. The texts should be read several 
times in order to extract the valuable material. In the case of this study, the 
data extracted as a result of thematic content analysis is used as strong 
108
indicators of the nature of coordination and interaction among key actors in 
the formulation and implementation of the EU’s foreign policy.
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Chapter 6:
Analysing Interaction and 
Coordination between the EU's 
Foreign Policy Actors and EU's 
Foreign Policy towards Iraq
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This chapter presents the thematic content analysis of the data 
collected in this study. The analysis involves an examination of the key 
themes abstracted from the semi-structured interviews and EU documents. 
Key phrases have been extracted from these sources and their meanings 
have been deconstructed. Furthermore, the perspectives of EU officials and 
academic experts regarding the nature of interaction and coordination 
between various actors in EU foreign policy formulation and 
implementation have been examined. These perspectives are then compared 
with the content of EU documents (secondary data) in order to ensure an 
integrated and coherent analysis. 
The face-to-face interviews were conducted with nine EU officials and 
four academic experts. The officials were from a range of EU institutions, 
including the European Parliament, European Commission and the Council 
of the EU. They were directly involved with EU foreign policy towards Iraq 
and provided information about its political, economic and social 
considerations. Such information shed light on the attitudes, perspectives, 
positions and future strategies of various actors in the EU. Two of the 
academic experts interviewed are former employees of EU institutions. The 
other two experts work in academic institutions in Brussels that deal with 
EU foreign policy. Due to the sensitive nature of the information that the 
respondents provided, pseudonyms have been adopted to ensure their 
anonymity. 
The secondary data comes from various sources, including meeting 
records, government documents, EU declarations, debates, EU treaties, 
Council statements, newspaper articles and previous interviews with EU 
officials. Analysis of this data helps to understand the nature of foreign 
policy formulation and implementation in the EU. Furthermore, it helps to 
examine discussions, attitudes and decisions made by the EU in relation to 
Iraq from 2001 to 2009. This data also highlights the range of EU activities 
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in Iraq, which assists in developing a further understanding of the nature of 
interactions among foreign policy actors. 
6.1. Distribution of Power, Authority, Competencies, and Instruments 
Across Supranational, Intergovernmental and Sub-national Levels 
Thematic content analysis allows the researcher to identify themes in a 
given data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Moreover, it allows a detailed and 
nuanced account of one particular theme, or group of themes, within the 
data. First, a careful reading and re-reading of the data is required to identify 
the relevant themes. The themes that emerge from this process become the 
categories for analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 11).  The data extracted in 
this study as a result of thematic content analysis is used to reflect on the 
nature of coordination and interaction among key actors in the EU’s foreign 
policy.
The interviewees’ responses and the information from the secondary 
data highlighted that EU foreign policy formulation and implementation is a 
complex process. According to the respondents, three main EU institutions 
play roles in foreign policy: the European Commission is responsible for 
economic and development issues; the Council of Ministers plays a major 
role in shaping the foreign policy; and the European Parliament’s role 
remains limited despite being enhanced in accordance with the 2007 Lisbon 
Treaty. The data collected in this study highlights that the Council of 
Ministers is the key institution in the EU’s foreign policy formulation.
The EU Council of Ministers’ main responsibility is to deal with 
foreign policy. As Mathew, an official in the German Permanent 
Representation, states, the Council decides the nature and extent of the EU’s 
involvement in foreign policy events and issues, and these decisions inform 
the activities of the other supranational institutions. Joseph, a research 
fellow in the Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, concurred 
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with this view and added that the EU institutions’ responsibility is to act in 
accordance with the member states’ points of view. Therefore, it would 
appear that the member states are the key players in shaping EU foreign 
policy, not the EU institutions. Christopher Patten, the Commissioner for 
external affairs within the EU, also confirmed the view that the 
supranational institutions – the Commission and Parliament – do not have a 
proactive role in EU foreign policy (European Parliament, 12 March 2003: 
7). As such, the EU's foreign policy remains an inter-governmental process 
and the major and most sensitive decisions must be approved and issued by 
the Council of Ministers, and not by other EU institutions. 
Most of the interviewees highlighted that the influence of individual 
states over EU foreign policy is variable. The large member states such as 
Britain, France, and Germany have more impact on the EU's foreign policy 
direction compared to smaller member states (Michel, an official in the 
European Parliament’s Mediterranean and Middle East Unit; Nicole, 
European Parliament Member and Member of the EU Parliament delegation 
for Iraq). The key member states’ influence on EU foreign policy is at its
strongest when responding to specific and sensitive “high politics” issues 
such as international conflicts. Sarah confirmed this when she stated, “to be 
frank when it comes to international affairs, when it comes to conflict, war 
and peace such as the Iraq crisis, the Council has the main role because it is 
not EU policy, it is still intergovernmental”. In other words, the national 
interests, sovereignty and perspectives of the member states influence EU 
foreign policy. The evidence to this, Javier Solana (former HR of CFSP) 
states that the EU would not have a single foreign policy in the near future 
because the national considerations of the member states dominate 
European considerations (Solana, Interview, 20/04/2003). Thus, national 
sovereignty and preferences have affected the creation of a strong and 
united EU foreign policy (David, a researcher in the Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels).
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The reasons for the dominance of key member states over EU 
institutions in relation to EU foreign policy formulation and implementation 
are twofold: the member states’ national interests and the lack of political 
integration in the EU. Although the aim of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was 
to create political and economic integration, these efforts are curtailed and 
superseded by the national interests of the member states (European 
Parliament, 14/05/2003: 122). Key member states appear unwilling to create 
a unified foreign policy which exacerbates the lack of political integration 
(European Parliament, 20/03/2003: 7). These states are reticent to pursue 
integrated EU foreign policy due to a belief that such a collective position 
will impact each state’s individual role on the global political stage: 
"Personally, I would say first of all, the EU still lacks the political will to 
come up with a common position on foreign policy. There is not enough 
political will. The member states simply do not want the EU to be a strong 
foreign policy actor" (Michel).
Some of the respondents indicated that the supranational intuitions, 
such as the European Parliament and Commission, have a role to play, but 
that this role remains limited. These institutions may express an opinion but 
have no practical leverage in negotiations (European Parliament, 
18/02/2003). The Commission does have limited capacity to participate in 
developing common foreign and security policy. However, on many issues 
the Commission does not have the power to take decisive action due to the 
dominance of the member states as these issues relate to concerns about 
national sovereign state principles (European Parliament, 29/01/2003: 7-8).
Therefore, the Commission cannot submit a proposal without discussing it 
with the member states in advance. The member states did not agree to give 
the Commission sole right of initiative, nor to reduce their freedom of action, 
which effectively places the EU’s foreign policy under the authority of 
member states and their national concerns (European Parliament, 
12/03/2003: 7). Furthermore, the people employed in the Commission 
represent their respective member state’s position, rather than contributing 
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to and representing an EU position, therefore impacting on the 
Commission’s effectiveness and efficiency (Joseph, the Director of Europe 
in the world program, the Royal Institute for International Relations, 
Brussels). The European Parliament does have an indirect influence on EU 
foreign policy-making due to its role in budget negotiations as part of the 
EU’s financial policy processes. Moreover, 90 per cent of all EU decisions 
are made by the Council and have to be approved by the Parliament, 
although the Parliament’s role has remained limited due to the overlapping 
of competencies between EU institutions themselves on one hand, and 
between these institutions and member states on the other (Richard, Head of 
Research at the European Studies Centre in Brussels).
Key issues of concern for EU officials and experts revolved around the 
theme of distribution of power and authority across supranational, inter-
governmental, and sub-national levels. Most of the respondents indicated 
that while the member states transfer some power and authority to the 
supranational level in terms of trade and development, this is not yet the 
case in terms of foreign policy, which has remained under the control of
member states’ national authorities. This is because some member states see 
foreign policy as a sensitive and national issue that should remain under 
their authority: “the transfer of power and authority from member states 
towards EU institutions has been happening in some areas such as trade and 
development, but in foreign policy affairs, it  has not transferred until now 
because these aspects are “high politics” and some member states see these 
issues as national ones, so, the member states’ governments and national 
parliaments have authority and power over them, not Brussels” (Michel). 
This view was echoed by other respondents who felt that the Lisbon 
Treaty’s provisions for the transfer of certain powers and authority to the 
EU has pushed some member states to reject it which has created tensions 
between member states and EU institutions. For example, Britain’s position 
is that it is the sovereign responsibility of the member states to develop their 
own policies regarding defense and foreign affairs, and these policy areas 
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should not be the responsibility of the EU (Smith, President of the European 
Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with Iraq). 
The incomplete institutional structure is another factor impacting on 
the EU’s foreign policy performance. The Lisbon Treaty required the 
creation of a new institution, the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
which was to operate under the supervision of the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security. To date, this institution has not yet been fully 
established. In relation to this, Michel did not think High Representative 
(HR) Lady Ashton would have any strong role in EU foreign policy in the 
near future because of the failure to fully establish the EEAS. 
The key instruments used in implementing the EU's foreign policy 
towards non-European countries are mainly economic, development and 
technical instruments (Joseph). The respondents clarified that the EU 
examines and considers specific contexts and then decides which 
instruments should be employed. The use of multiple instruments can enable 
greater foreign policy efficiency with more effective contributions to, and 
interactions with, the world community. In order for the EU to be more 
active in the international arena, it should possess and leverage diplomatic, 
economic, trade, crisis management, and military instruments in its foreign 
policy (Solana, interview, 24/02/2003). However, the EU lacks in suffiecent 
military capabilities. The EU Parliament (20/03/2003: 20) highlighted that 
the EU is lacking in defense and security capacity and accordingly, it has a 
weakness in applying military instruments.
There is insufficient coordination between foreign policy actors in the 
EU. Although there is coordination among the heads of the EU institutions 
and secondary level staff, the range of this coordination is insufficient to 
create effective foreign policy (Sarah). This insufficient level of 
coordination is a result of political rivalries for visibility in EU foreign 
policy affairs between heads of the institutions involved : “I see there is a 
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big competition between the permanent President of the Council, Mr. 
Rompuy, and Lady Ashton, and also there is competition between Mr. 
Barroso, the Commission President, and Lady Ashton regarding visibility” 
(Michel). The findings of this study suggest that these political rivalries do 
not exist because of the lack of clearly defined competencies ascribed to 
each role, but because of the personalities of the people carrying out these 
roles: “the competencies are clear: we should share responsibility. But the 
human relationships are fundamental… so, we have clear texts, but the 
problem is with implementing the process" (Simon).
Political rivalries that exist between the heads of the institutions 
decrease the efficiency of the EU as a whole. The operation of the 
Commission’s former Director-General for External Relations (DG 
RELEX) is evidence of this. This directorate has direct involvement in 
many aspects of EU foreign policy formulation and implementation. 
Consequently, this created direct competition between DG RELEX in the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat in the development of foreign 
policy strategies, where the Council Secretariat was much more effective 
because it had professional diplomats (Richard). Thus, in order to overcome 
this problem and make EU foreign policy more effective, the EU merged 
both institutions into one and established what is now called the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), led by Lady Ashton.
6.2. Foreign Policy Agenda Preparations, Decision-Making and 
Implementation Procedures
There are three stages integral to the functioning of the EU’s foreign 
policy: agenda setting, decision-making and implementation. There are 
specific procedures that need to be carried out by a range of actors in order 
to produce each stage. The nature of interaction and coordination among 
these actors at each stage may have an influence on the EU's foreign policy 
effectiveness. 
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In the agenda-setting stage, the Presidency is required to prepare an 
agenda for the Council of Ministers’ meetings. However, the Presidency 
must consult with the member states before preparing the agendas (Sarah). 
As such, the member states are strongly involved in this stage. The impact 
of the Presidency on agenda priorities depends on which member state is 
holding the presidency as not all member states have the same level of 
influence. For example, if key member states such as France, Britain or 
Germany hold the Presidency of the Council, they will have greater 
influence on the agenda of the EU's foreign policy and on the priorities of 
the Council. The same is not true for the smaller states such as Slovenia: 
“The key players in the agenda setting stage are the biggest member states”
(Sally, a researcher in the European Union Studies Institute in Brussels). 
Michel, Richard and Joseph indicated that the Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Ministers of the member states are the key players in agenda setting. In 
addition, the HR shares power with the member states at this stage, as David
stated, “the HR and big member states are responsible for it”. The role of 
the HR at the agenda-setting stage has been increased in accordance with 
the Lisbon Treaty. Mathew claimed, “prior to the Lisbon Treaty it was the 
rotating Presidency who decided the priorities of the Council agenda. Now 
the agenda setting is made by the HR, and the member states can make 
proposals”. As a result, the member state holding the Presidency, the 
member states through their EU representatives and the HR all have an 
influence at the agenda setting stage.  
The decision-making stage of EU foreign policy formulation is an 
inter-governmental process. A majority of the respondents stated two main 
reasons for this. First, the requirement of unanimous voting ensures an inter-
governmental discussion. Sarah said, “In the area of security and foreign 
policy, the decisions are still taken on the unanimity basis”. The second 
reason is the dominant role of the member states. Richard argued “the 
member states are directly involved in almost all stages of EU foreign 
policy process”, thus affording them the role of final arbiter in decisions 
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relating to foreign policy. Member states have the final say, as part of the 
inter-governmental process, on EU governance structures and EU foreign 
policy decisions (David). 
The Commission has the right to submit proposals to the Council and 
the Council then has the power to discuss these proposals before adopting or 
rejecting them. The respondents noted however, that in practice, the 
European Council, and on occasion the European Parliament, might submit 
proposals to the Commission. According to this procedure, when the 
Commission endorses a legal initiative, it does not write a draft proposal 
immediately but will consult with experts over a period of time, ranging 
from a month up to a year, before introducing the first draft. Richard pointed 
out that the member states have influence over this first phase - not directly 
as member state governments, but through people who are working at the 
Commission and are influenced by their member states’ national interests.
Furthermore, the Commission conducts informal consultations with member 
states’ representatives regarding these proposals in order to develop a final 
submission that is satisfactory to all: “the Commission is always negotiating 
with member states in order to know what they want and coordinate with 
them, but informally” (Simon). Three of the respondents asserted that 
although the Commission is mandated to draft proposals, these proposals are 
invariably influenced by the member states (Tony, official in the European 
Union Commission, Iraq desk; Josephine, official in the European Union 
Commission, Iraq desk official; Amanda, official in the Council of the 
European Union, General Secretariat). Therefore, the Commission has to be 
informed of the member states’ priorities and take these into account when 
drafting any final proposal that will ultimately be accepted by all member 
states. As a result the Commission cannot take any action without the 
approval of the EU’s 27 member states.
Personal contact and discussions between staff members of various 
EU institutions effect the directions outlined in proposals to the EU Council. 
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Staff who are working on the same project across all these institutions 
(Commission, Council, and Parliament) hold regular meetings in order to 
reach a common position before the proposal is introduced to the Council 
and Parliament (Sarah). Likewise, David noted, regular informal contact 
across all of the EU institutions occurs before the Commission puts forward 
any proposal to the Council. It may be concluded that the informal 
relationships between EU officials, and informal contact between the 
Commission and member states have an influence on the proposals drafted 
by the Commission and the final decisions reached by the Council. 
The EU Commission deals with “low politics,” which encompasses 
issues including human rights, development aid, and justice and police 
programs. The Commission is not involved in “high politics”, which 
includes actions such as the deployment of armed forces during 
international conflicts. Because of this, Richard distinguished between five 
stages of the EU’s foreign policy-making:
1. The Council Secretariat;
2. Working Groups (CFSP working groups), introduced in 1993;
3. The Political and Security Committee of the Council (PSC) 
(comprising ambassadors of the member states in Brussels);
4. The General Affairs Council (member states’ Foreign Ministers); and
5. The European Council (Head of the Governments and States).
Richard claimed that the member states are involved in four out of 
these five stages. It is only in the first stage that member states are not 
directly involved due to the role of the Council Secretariat. Even in this 
stage, however, the member states do have some influence. He explained his 
position by saying, “the Council Secretariat is much more directly linked to 
the member states through its people who are working in it, and almost all 
of them are delegated diplomats from member states. So, in that sense the 
influence, even in the first stage, is much more direct by member states”.
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This involvement stems from the member states’ reluctance to transfer their 
sovereign powers over foreign policy to the EU institutions (Joseph). Joseph 
stated, “Legally speaking, transfer of sovereignty is very limited in foreign 
policy". Thus, everything related to EU foreign policy has to be decided by 
member states and, furthermore, all 27 members should agree to any EU 
policy regarding any country (Tony, Josephine and Amanda). As a result, 
the member states have control, and dominate EU decisions and policies, 
and this will not change in the near future (Simon).
The respondents tended to agree that both intergovernmental and 
supranational levels participate in the implementation stage of EU foreign 
policy. The institutions responsible for implementing the EU's foreign 
policy include the Commission, the Council Secretariat and HR, as well as 
the member states. There are different levels of responsibility in the 
implementation process. Nicole notes the role played by the HR in this 
process, especially in its communications with EU delegations. In addition, 
since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, there has been heightened debate 
over the EU member states’ contribution to the implementation process. The 
roles of the Commission, Council, and Parliament in regards to the 
management and organisation of this process has also been debated. Nicole 
stated, “the Commission provides the external action service many things
such as staff, and the member states also provide diplomats. While the 
directors goes under Lady Ashton’s leadership”. 
The member states have played an influential role in the 
implementation stage of EU foreign policy. When the Commission intends 
to implement a certain policy towards a specific country, it needs the 
support of the member states financially, politically, economically and 
militarily. Thus, if the member states do not support EU action, the 
Commission cannot proceed. Sally confirmed that, if the EU Commission 
wants to send a delegation to a country, it has to receive member states’ 
approval first. Furthermore, the member states are responsible for the 
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funding and support of the delegations. So, the Commission cannot do 
anything without member states’ approval. As a result, foreign policy 
implementation has to be enacted by both the member states themselves and 
the EU delegations (Joseph).
Regarding the level and nature of coordination between the 
Commission and the member states throughout the implementation process, 
Mathew claimed that there is coordination in place between EU delegations 
and member states’ embassies, as well as coordination in Brussels. He stated, 
“They sit together with member states. The EU delegation explains its 
activities and the member states explain their activities, then they try to 
coordinate as much as possible on the local assistance”. Thus, there are 
regular meetings between member states’ ambassadors and EU delegations 
that culminate in reports being sent back to member states’ capital cities. 
Nicole said, “I was ambassador of my country in Indonesia, and I was 
having meetings every week”. It may appear that each country can propose 
action, and then how to proceed is subsequently discussed with the 
Commission. This informs a system for foreign action where the member 
states discuss and plan how to act towards a particular country regarding a 
particular incident or event. As such, the EU is represented by its 
delegations, while the member states represent their own positions. 
6.3. The Impact of Vertical and Horizontal Interaction on the EU's 
Foreign Policy 
According to the analysis of the primary and secondary data collected 
in this study, a range of issues influence the EU's foreign policy formulation 
and implementation. The most influential among these are the core tensions 
that exist at two levels: between member states and the EU institutions, and 
within the EU institutions involved in developing EU foreign policy. Such 
political rivalry is considered typical of authorities endowed with different 
powers and capabilities. This may also be considered a reflection of inherent 
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tensions between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, as noted by 
Richard: “the Commission is the institution that is constructed along the 
idea of the supranational, and the Council Secretariat is the institution that is 
constructed along the lines of intergovernmentalism, so there are two 
institutions with different philosophies, not having one common post. So, 
there are rivalries and it is quite natural”. While the competitive 
environment that exists between EU foreign policy actors may be seen as 
normal and inherent to every institution, Sarah claimed that the rivalries in 
this case, has rendered EU foreign policy ineffective. She argued, “there 
were some rivalries between them [foreign policy actors] and the rivalries 
and conflicts between these posts has had an negative effect on the 
efficiency of EU foreign policy”. Likewise, Michel argued that these 
rivalries have impacted the EU's foreign policy effectiveness, as the 
institutions are rendered impotent without the approval of the member states. 
As such, EU foreign policy tends to present the views of member states, not 
a joint European perspective.
Securing the unanimous vote of all 27 Member States presents a 
significant challenge to the EU’s articulation of foreign policy regarding 
major global issues, as Smith stated, “we would not find a coherent point of 
view among 27 members regarding a major global issue”. There have been 
several instances where dissension between member states has impacted on 
the EU’s ability to agree and implement a common foreign policy position, 
rendering it ineffective as an actor in the international arena. Simon 
elaborated on this point by stating, “when we are around the table and 
discuss the situation with China and Obama, well, it is not the EU talking, 
but Sarkozy and Cameron talking”. This means that when the EU is in 
dialogue with external international actors, member states represent their 
own national interests ahead of a united EU foreign policy position.
The respondents communicated various ideas when discussing the 
themes of power, authority and competencies within the EU. Some 
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respondents indicated that the EU institutions, prior to the enactment of the 
Lisbon Treaty, had limited power and authority, and their responsibilities 
and competencies often overlapped. The Lisbon Treaty provided a number 
of solutions to address some of the EU’s institutional problems. First, the 
treaty provided for the creation of a new position, the HR for External 
Action Service, which was to act as both the representative of the Council 
(governments) and as Vice-President of the Commission. This position has 
unprecedented access to the financial resources of the Commission as well 
as the power to propose initiatives and actions to the member states 
(political, diplomatic and military proposals). Nicole stated that in 2002 the 
situation was different from what it is now: “Mr. Solana was the HR, but not 
with the powers and not with the money that Lady Ashton now has available, 
and without the right to propose anything”. Secondly, the competencies of 
each institution have become clearer since 2009. According to Mathew, EU 
foreign policy may be classified into three parts. The first part is the aspect 
of foreign policy that encompasses bilateral dialogue; the HR plays a 
leading role in this area. The second part concerns the participation of both 
the President of the European Council and the heads of member states’ 
governments when a summit with other world partners such as the US, 
China or Russia is held. The third part of EU foreign policy, according to 
Mathew, comes under the control of the Commission. The Commission 
conducts its own bilateral discussions with strategic partners in many fields 
such as trade, development, aid, and energy. As a result, there are several 
actors involved in EU foreign policy despite the intention of the Lisbon 
treaty to integrate these institutions in order to develop and implement a 
common EU policy (Mathew). Given the multitude of actors involved with 
foreign affairs, the respondents referred to a type of anarchy within EU 
foreign policy-making processes. The respondents argued that this exists 
because of the Lisbon Treaty, which has failed to introduce any real 
solutions to the problems of the EU and has, instead, inculcated existing 
inefficiencies (Michel).
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6.4. The EU Foreign Policy Response to Iraq during 2001-2009
The European Parliament (04/02/2003) and General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (27/01/2003) declared in 2003, "we fully support 
Dr Blix and Dr El-Baradei in their mission in accordance with UNSCR 
1441. The Iraqi authorities must, as an imperative, provide the inspectors, 
immediately, with all additional and complete information on questions 
raised by the international community, including the issues raised by the 
inspectors themselves in their report to the Security Council on 27 January, 
and cooperate proactively”. Furthermore, the Conclusions of the European 
Council of 17 February 2003 declared that Baghdad must disarm and co-
operate immediately and fully; that the Union's objective for Iraq remains 
full and effective disarmament in accordance with the relevant UNSC 
resolutions, in particular resolution 1441; and that the Council pledges its 
full support to the UN Security Council in discharging its responsibilities 
(Council of the EU, 17/02/2003). While the member states had different 
views regarding how much time should be given to the weapons inspectors, 
the EU expressed its full support for the UN inspectors (Solana, interview: 
11/07/2003). Furthermore, the EU indicated that these inspectors must be 
given the time and resources that the UN Security Council believed they 
needed (Press Release, 17/02/2003).
The EU rejected any military action that was not covered by UN 
resolutions (European Parliament, 26/04/2002:7). The Council of the EU, in 
its conclusion, stated, "We are committed to the United Nations remaining 
at the centre of the international order. We recognise that the primary 
responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the Security 
Council. We pledge our full support to the Council in discharging its 
responsibilities" (Press Release, 17/02/2003). The Council indicated that 
war was not inevitable, and force should be used only as a last resort. It 
indicated it was in support of the Iraqi regime ending the crisis by 
complying with the demands of the Security Council (Press Release, 
125
17/02/2003). Similarly, Paul Nielson, European Commissioner for
Development and Humanitarian Aid stated "I believe that we have to stick 
to the inspectors’ assessment, bearing in mind that war must remain the very 
last resort" (Press Release, 12/02/2003).
The EU was divided over the Iraq invasion in 2003. Paul Nielson said, 
"as confirmed by the recent events, we all know that our Member States 
have quite diverging views on this issue, and that achieving a common 
position on this issue is a huge challenge for the EU. In fact the EU looks 
weaker and more divided than ever” (Press Release, 12/02/2003).  Similarly, 
Mario Prodi, the President of the European Council stated in his letter to the 
heads of the member states that, "today the world is divided and the divide 
also runs through the Union. The situation is grim and we need to study the 
root causes if we are to bridge the divide and turn this crisis into a 
springboard for the Union"; "We are divided but on the means, not the ends 
and not even on the EU's strategic alliances. At all events, the Union must 
re-build its unity quickly so it can look to the future" (Press Release, 
19/03/2003). Solana expressed the same view, saying that the member states 
were divided about how the EU would approach the disarmament process: 
"some divergences undeniably surfaced between Member States prior to the 
military conflict. But paradoxically, the European Union was, in fact, 
divided on the ways and means to reach an objective shared by all, that is, 
disarming Iraq" (Solana, interview, 06/05/2003). As a result, Solana 
indicated that the EU member states and institutions would do as much as 
they could in order to prevent the war and ensure that Saddam Hussein's 
Iraqi regime would fully cooperate with UN inspectors and destroy its 
weapons of mass destruction: "Therefore, the countries of the European 
Union and all of us who serve the European Union will work with all our 
might, day and night, to try to prevent a conflict and to ensure that Saddam 
Hussein abandons weapons of mass destruction without our turning to 
military force" (European Parliament, 29/01/2003:6).
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The interviews explored the different foreign policy positions held by 
member states towards Iraq in 2003, and how this variation precluded a 
clear and united EU policy. A major point elicited in the interviews is the 
geopolitical significance of Europe in international politics. A second point 
that came out of the interviews is that a lack of political integration among 
member states leads to each country pursuing their own, nationally framed 
policy positions; Sarah states, "The member states and the EU institutions 
are not able to come up with one position because we are not integrated 
politically”. The third major observation, about a rift between member states, 
was the fact that the EU did not have an institution that clearly articulated a 
foreign policy position on the international stage. Fourth, the national 
interests of member states were a major reason contributing to this rift. For 
example, the Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU 
primarily to guarantee their economic development and prosperity. With 
regards to security, the respondents pointed to the lead role played by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the US. Member states 
expect that security issues will be led and managed by the US and NATO, 
and not by the EU. Similarly, Solana said that "[Eastern European countries] 
were members of the Warsaw Pact until only a few years ago; they are 
concerned by security needs far more than either Italy or France, which 
were liberated back in 1945, are. It is only natural that NATO is more 
important for them right now” (Solana, interview, 11/07/2003). However, 
Pasqua, European Parliament member, argued that claims that Iraq divided 
the EU were not true and that the EU’s ability to provide a united policy 
position was impacted on by those member states who prioritise their 
national alliance with the United States above the need to contribute to an 
independent Europe (European Parliament, 20 /03/2003, p.14). Conversely,
Solana argued "that is not how I would define our differences. Europe has 
the same connotations and the same objectives. What we were split over 
was not the disarming of Saddam, but how to achieve it" (Solana, Interview, 
11/07/ 2003). 
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In a press release in May 2007, the European Commission said that the 
objective of the EU’s policy was to contribute towards a safe, stable, unified, 
prosperous and democratic Iraq that upholds human rights and protects its 
minorities (Press Release, 03/05/2007). Despite this broad intention, almost 
all of the EU officials and academic experts interviewed in this study 
mentioned the limitations of EU foreign policy towards Iraq. According to 
some respondents, the EU had a limited role in Iraq from 2001 to 2009 for 
five reasons. First, this period represented a complex time in the history of 
the EU owing to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty’s objectives, 
which resulted in a major reorganisation of the EEAS. Secondly, the EU had 
no clear strategy to deal with Iraq from 2001-2009, as Sarah commented, 
“what was missing was a concerted strategy towards Iraq”. She added, “it is 
not a strong role, because there is a lack of an overall strategic approach for 
Iraq. The EU does not have a clear strategy to deal with the Iraq situation”. 
This is because the EU’s lack of understanding of the overall regional 
picture. Furthermore, there was a deficit in the EU’s knowledge of the 
relationships between Iraq and its regional neighbours (Michel). Thirdly, 
there are problems associated with the rotating presidency arrangement of
the Council of Ministers. Each president brings to the role a set of different 
priorities, and each president attempts to implement these priorities during 
the six months in which they hold power: “each presidency presents 
regional, political and economic priorities for six months and then nothing” 
(Sarah). A fourth reason is that many of the member states viewed Iraq as a 
problem for the US to solve. There was a belief at the time that the EU did 
not need to become more closely involved and to contribute to a resolution.
Sally supported this idea that some of the member states viewed the Iraq 
war in 2003 as the United States’ and not the EU’s war. She added that 
member states also held the position that if the EU was to get involved in 
Iraq, it should be under the auspices of the UN and not as a member of the 
US alliance. Sally also argued that some of the member states did not want 
to get involved in Iraq at all, even under the direction of the UN. Finally, the 
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function and institutional weaknesses within the EU was considered to have 
impacted on the effectiveness of the EU’s policies towards Iraq. 
The theme of security featured as a major issue of concern for some of 
the respondents. These respondents asserted that the EU did not become 
entirely involved in Iraq from 2001-2009 because it was a military operation 
and an insecure environment. Michel argued that the EU viewed the Iraq 
situation as beyond its military capabilities, and thus more suitably 
addressed by the militarily superior US. This shows that the nature of the 
EU’s relations with Iraq was heavily influenced by security concerns: “the 
unstable security situation in Iraq affected the relationship between it and 
the EU” (David). Similarly, Mathew indicated that for the first three years 
after 2003, the EU did not play a very strong role because the security 
situation in Iraq had become increasingly unstable. He claimed that the EU 
tends not to engage with countries that do not have a suitable infrastructure 
to support financial investment and development programs. Such a 
perspective resonates with the Council of the European Union statement, 
which argued that the security situation in Iraq was the main issue affecting 
the EU’s engagement in Iraq (21/04/2008). As such, although the EU was 
willing to establish good relations with Iraq, security concerns remained a 
major obstacle to achieving this goal. External Relations Commissioner, 
Christopher Francis Patten stated: “the security climate and progress in the 
political transition will determine the extent to which the ideas contained in 
today’s Communication can be taken forward, but this proposal for a 
medium-term strategy makes clear our commitment to build a partnership 
that will grow as the situation in Iraq evolves” (Press Release, 09/06/2004). 
Instability was a major deterrent for some member states, such as 
Germany, from becoming involved in Iraq. Mathew noted that the security 
situation in Iraq was not ideal and was the key factor that dissuaded the 
German government and private companies from investing in the country. 
Additionally, Mathew asserted that the institutional structure in Iraq was not 
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yet sufficiently developed to encourage private companies to invest. Until 
recently, the Iraqi government had not implemented clear regulations, rules 
and laws for investment. This issue directly influenced German companies’ 
decisions not to invest in Iraq: "A lot of private companies decided that they 
probably would not start [to] invest because the investment situation, rule[s] 
and regulations were not in place. Thus, the money of investment goes to 
the stable countries rather than [an] unstable country like Iraq” (Mathew). 
This reflects the failure of the Iraqi Government to establish suitable 
infrastructure for investment including legislation to enact investment rules 
and regulations. 
The respondents raised the issue of the key member states, such as 
France and Germany, who did not get involved in Iraq even after the 2003 
war era. The interview respondents had varied perspectives on this point. 
Some respondents indicated that France’s relationship with US President 
Bush’s administration (2001-2009) was strained in comparison to that of 
other member states such as Britain. They argue that France has since 
changed its position towards Iraq and has increased its engagement  since 
Barack Obama came to power as President in the US in 2009: "when 
President Obama[’s] administration comes, the France position changed 
slightly and they announced that we [France] should get involved in Iraq" 
(David). According to Richard, France and Germany are changing their 
positions towards Iraq as a result,, of new governments coming to power: 
"that change would never have been made if Schröder and Chirac had 
remained in power". Also, their changing positions follow a reduction in 
military activity across Iraq. 
The EU did not have a political relationship with Iraq during the 
Saddam Hussein era. Therefore, it has been argued that there were no 
relationships upon which the EU could build in order to engage effectively 
in Iraq from 2003 (Sarah). Similarly, the European Commission indicated 
that it never had any contractual relations with Iraq; there was no official 
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dialogue between the Commission and the Iraqi Government; and the 
Commission did not have a delegation in Baghdad (Press Release,
19/02/2001). However, since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the EU has 
been the major donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq. It was expected that with 
the full implementation of the UN oil-for-food program, humanitarian aid 
would, in principle, be provided without recourse to outside assistance 
(Press Release, 19/02/2001). In providing assistance to Iraq, the Council 
indicated that the EU attempted to develop contractual relations with Iraq, 
particularly through its negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. This Agreement was intended to be of mutual benefit to Iraq 
and the EU, providing a solid platform for the development of further ties 
between the two parties. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
on energy cooperation is significant, as this aimed to enhance the 
relationship between the EU and Iraq (Council conclusion, 15-16/06/2009; 
Press Release, 13/11/2009). With better relations in place, the European 
Commission and Iraq successfully finalised negotiations on the text of a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in November 2009 (Press Release,
13/11/2009). External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
indicated that she was “looking forward to a speedy approval process by the 
EU Member States and Iraqi government so this agreement can enter into 
force and the full potential of this agreement can be implemented soon"
(Press Release, 13/11/2009). 
The size of an EU delegation is considered to reflect the extent of EU 
involvement with a particular country. Patten, Commissioner for External 
Relations announced in September 2004 “in the longer term, we will need to 
consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. 
Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive, and 
potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is 
clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people”
(Press Release, 15/09/2004). Accordingly, the European Commission 
appointed Mr. Ilkka Uusitalo to lead its newly established European 
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Commission Delegation in Iraq. This decision increased the Commission’s 
presence in the country and contributed to the strengthening of EU-Iraq 
relations. Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated that “this 
appointment marks a major milestone in the development of EU relations 
with Iraq. It is a powerful signal of our commitment to support the Iraqi 
government and the Iraqi people in their efforts to build the stable country 
they deserve” (Press Release, 17/07/2006). The EU’s delegation in Iraq was 
established in Baghdad in 2006: "since mid-2006, the European 
Commission has been represented in Iraq through a small and active 
Delegation, headed by Ambassador Ilkka Uusitalo" (European Commission, 
31/05/2008).
The EU delegation in Iraq was small and limited in its activities due to 
its restricted capacity, funding and programs. According to Nicole “the 
delegation that we have [had] in Iraq since 2006 is obviously very limited 
and has a very limited capacity of action” (Nicole). Some of the respondents 
argued that these limitations in the EU delegation’s activities are the result 
of concerns about the security situation in Iraq, in addition to the positions 
of member states. Nicole argued, “first of all because the security action and 
also, as I told you, the member states were very divided regarding [the] Iraq 
war in 2003” (Nicole). Similarly, the EU Commission stated that "working 
in Iraq remains a difficult challenge, however, the high level of commitment 
and dedication of these few EC representatives has been key to the good 
EU-Iraq dialogue and to the strong willingness of Iraq institutions to work 
and cooperate with the EU in the development of Iraq" (European 
Commission, 31/05/2008). The European Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, argued similarly, “conditions on the ground in Iraq remain 
extremely difficult. But the EU remains committed to working alongside the 
Iraqis to build a prosperous and peaceful future for the country (Press 
Release, 07/06/2006).
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When discussing the issue of the instruments that have been used by 
the EU in Iraq, all the respondents indicated that various instruments have 
been, and continue to be, used by the EU delegation. Joseph claimed that the 
EU did not use military instruments in Iraq, but is instead using some 
economic instruments in the areas of civil society, trade and development: 
“The instruments which are used in Iraq are more likely to be economic 
instruments”. The Commission indicated in 2004 that EU foreign policy 
activities in Iraq were almost entirely focused on humanitarian aid and some 
development programs (European Commission, 2004). Moreover, Solana 
confirmed that the EU’s plans to get involved in Iraq in the post-war era 
were focused on humanitarian assistance in the initial stage, and on political 
reconstruction in the second stage (interview, 26/03/2003). The EU was also 
deeply concerned about the increasing humanitarian and refugee situation 
that threatened both Iraq and its neighbouring countries, notably Syria and 
Jordan. The EU actively participated in the Geneva United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) International Conference (17-18 April 
2007), and expressed its support for Iraqi refugees and the efforts of Iraq’s 
neighbours. Expressing a similar view, Smith claimed that financial 
instruments were the most powerful and effective: “in the case of Iraq, the 
EU has given billions of Euros in aid to help rebuilding,  but, sadly, the 
people of Iraq do not know about this”. The Commission was the main 
donor to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility of Iraq (IRFFI) with 
donations from EU countries representing 58 per cent of total donor deposits 
(Press Release, 03/05/2007).
In terms of the political process in Iraq, the EU strongly encouraged 
the government of Iraq to make further progress in its political development 
and national reconciliation (Press Release, 29/05/2008). The EU held an 
international conference about Iraq in 2005. More than 80 countries and 
organisations gathered in Brussels on 22 June 2005 at the invitation of the 
EU and the US, with aims of: building a renewed international partnership 
with Iraq, supporting Iraq's political transition process, encouraging its 
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economic recovery and reconstruction, and helping establish the rule of law 
and public order in the country (Iraq International Conference Statement, 
22/06/2005). In addition, the EU emphasized the importance of an enhanced 
dialogue with Iraq’s neighbours and expressed its support for initiatives that 
strengthened regional co-operation (Press Release, 03/05/2007). The 
Commission participated in the “Iraq Neighbours” meeting that took place 
in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, on 4 May 2004, and the International Compact 
for Iraq Conference on 3 May 2007. Furthermore, the EU supported election 
activities in Iraq; the Commissioner for External Relations, Patten, stated: 
“elections are crucial to the development of a democratic and stable Iraq. 
The substantial election assistance that we will be presenting to Prime 
Minister Allawi is part of a wider package that demonstrates once again, the 
EU’s commitment to helping Iraq build for a more peaceful and prosperous 
future” (Press Release, 04/11/2004). Lord Bach, the President in Office, 
claimed that the EU Commission played a significant role in the referendum 
concerning Iraq’s constitutional law and political transition: "I am very 
grateful for what the Commissioner had to say and for the excellent work of 
the Commission. It is right to point out that the EU has contributed to the 
UN Office of Constitutional Support both financially and through the 
provision of experts" (European Parliament, 16/11/2005:5). Commissioner 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated: “It’s crucial that preparations for the new 
Constitution should be transparent and inclusive, the EU package is 
designed to reach out to all communities. In addition, funding will be 
available to support not only the constitutional process but also preparations 
for the referendum that will follow.” (Press Release, 18/07/2005). However, 
some respondents indicated that the EU played a limited role in the Iraqi 
political arena. They claim that the EU did not contribute to resolving some 
of Iraq’s political problems, such as improving relations between the central 
government and the Kurdish territorial government, addressing the division
among Iraqi political leaders, and contributing to the resolution of Iraqi 
factional conflicts (Mathew; Michel; Sarah; and Richard). 
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The EU consistently underlined its strong support for the UN to 
assume a central role in Iraq, as set out in the UNSCR 1770 (Press Release, 
29/05/2008). Thus, the EU Council, in September 2003, called upon the UN 
to play a significant role in Iraq, pledging EU support: "the Council recalled 
that the UN should play a vital role in Iraq and expressed its support to the 
UN Secretary General's efforts in this regard" (External Relations, 
29/09/2003). Solana stated that the UN was the best-equipped institution to 
deal with issues in Iraq such as the rebuilding and rehabilitation of the 
political, economic, and social and security systems: “The UN must be 
involved in the Iraqi settlement, playing an important role in both 
humanitarian and political terms in the future of that country… It's better if 
the international community recognizes the new political structures, and the 
main role in this process belongs to the UN” (interview, 05/05/2003). Patten 
concurred, “the EU has made a priority of helping the UN to play its part in 
the political transition, because without these crucial steps and an inclusive 
political process, there can be no stable future in Iraq, and no meaningful 
reconstruction” (Press Release, 21/10/2005). However, Mathew argued that 
because the UN has been the main actor in Iraq, the EU’s contribution has 
not been highly visible. All EU funds were channelled through the IRFFI 
and the World Bank, and were not allocated by the EU directly. Although 
the EU used economic instruments through the UN to deal with Iraq in the 
period after the 2003 war, it contributed minimally compared with its actual 
capabilities in these first three years. Richard stated, “although any 
engagement by the EU in Iraq would help Iraq, and people there want that, 
the EU did nothing or did little”. The respondents indicated that this
situation has changed to a certain extent since 2008: "I think in the past 
there is nothing to be proud of in Iraq, and I think the Commission is 
responsible for this weak performance. However, the Parliament decided to 
have a formal delegation in Iraq because we spent a lot of money there and 
we want see where the money is going" (Smith). Furthermore, Michel 
asserted that the EU did not lack foreign policy instruments, but that it 
lacked the support and political will of some member states, in particular the 
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large member states: “the EU has all foreign policy instruments, but we 
need political will and the agreement of 27 member states - especially the 
key members have to agree”; “the EU in my point of view did not use all the 
instruments it had available, and furthermore, the EU had no political 
approach for Iraq”.
In terms of the effect of the sub-national level on the EU’s foreign 
policy towards Iraq, at the first stage, the majority of the European public 
were opposed to a military invasion. At a European Parliament meeting, 
Solana referred to the need to consider public opinion. He claimed that "the 
Europeans do not want war and at the same time they do not want [a] 
dictator" (European Parliament, 29/01/2003: 6). Furthermore, the President 
holding the Office of the Council at the time, Mr. Simitis, stated, "the 
demonstrations held all over the world, attended by millions of citizens, 
illustrated peoples’ immense unease and it would have been strange had we, 
the European Union, the leaders of the European Union, failed to respond to 
or address that unease" (European Parliament, 18/02/2003). Although 
military engagement in Iraq commenced in 2003, EU citizens continued to 
oppose any strong involvement by Europe in Iraq, particularly military 
involvement. The respondents expressed different points of view on this 
issue. The European media had an effect on public opinion and attitudes 
regarding Iraq, especially through its depictions of Iraq as a war zone on the 
brink of being under terrorist control. The news media continually depicted 
an unstable security situation and complete internal disorder in Iraq and this 
contributed to the public’s opposition to European involvement (Sarah; 
David; Smith; Richard; and Michel). Richard indicated that some member 
state governments had been willing to engage more strongly with Iraq, but 
remained concerned with the level of domestic public opposition to such 
engagement. Furthermore, as a result of internal turmoil in Iraq, conflict had 
almost become the normal state for the country (Richard). As such, 
European politicians shied away from this issue, especially as Iraq’s 
stability deteriorated and effective, long term solutions seemed increasingly 
elusive (David; Richard). Thus, public opinion in Europe affected the 
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attitudes of the member states’ governments towards Iraq. This ultimately
led to the Iraq issue being given less and less attention in EU foreign policy 
agenda-setting from 2001-2009: “Iraq become an unpopular thing in the EU 
population and in the public opinion of the member states. Furthermore, 
some member states did not want to touch this issue. Thus, there is no 
willingness in Iraq even in civilian projects and so on, because it is too 
dangerous and too risky for the Europeans” (Richard). 
6.5. Interaction and Coordination of EU Foreign Policy towards Iraq
Thematic content analysis attempts to extract relevant consistent 
themes through careful analytical reading (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 11).  
Latent readings of the interviews, EU statements, documentation of 
meetings, conversations and speeches by EU officials, as well as EU 
member states declarations, decisions and positions towards Iraq from 2001-
2009, are a reflection of the range of interactions and coordination amongst 
EU foreign policy actors.
When discussing the roles of the EU institutions in relation to the Iraq 
issue in 2003, all respondents indicated that EU officials, were unable to 
devise a clear position and appropriate action on behalf of the EU at that 
time. This was due to the division of EU member states over the issue. 
Some respondents asserted that, despite being an official person within the 
EU, Mr. Solana was unable to play a strong role, as he could not present a 
unified view on behalf of the member states. Richard said, “Solana could 
not announce something on behalf of an entity of disunity. This reflects that 
the EU foreign policy, at least until today and possibly in the future, will be 
largely inter-governmental”. Sarah added similarly, “Solana was just an 
official within the EU and had not had any strong role; he could not do any 
action on behalf of the EU without getting the member states’ approval in 
advance”. It may be concluded that the member states have dominated the 
EU’s foreign policy decisions and, in turn, this has prevented the EU 
137
institutions from initiating any decisive action in relation to Iraq. Joseph 
said, “The EU institutions did not introduce any clear position regarding 
Iraq because the EU was working according to the inter-governmental 
system. Thus, because the member states were divided regarding Iraq, the 
EU actors such as the HR, Presidency, and the Commission could not take 
any action”. In this case, the EU institutions had limited power and authority, 
thus rendering them somewhat impotent and redundant relative to the power 
wielded by the member states. Nicole argued, “Mr. Solana had no real 
power to take action on behalf of the EU, and also he had no power to 
prevent this division”. In addition, some member states did not like to 
discuss the Iraq situation because they thought this topic was divisive within 
the EU and among the EU member states (Joseph). Therefore, the issue of 
Iraq became a low priority on the EU agenda from 2001-2009.
In terms of rivalries among the EU institutions, Richard stated that 
political rivalry had not affected the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq
because the decisions in this realm were driven and made by member states. 
Thus, it may be argued that the EU played a weak role in Iraq because of the 
policies of the member states, and not because of the EU’s institutions: "if 
you look at the situation in 2003 the Commission agreed totally on the 
Germany and France stance towards Iraq. The Commission was totally 
against the US invasion, was totally against regime change, and was totally 
against helping the US. That was the Commission’s view at least at the 
working level" (Richard). However, the EU institutions could not act 
because of the level of division among member states. Similarly, Sally 
claimed the EU foreign policy towards Iraq hardly existed, and the member 
states were responsible for the EU’s weak performance there. The member 
states can drive the decision making to launch different missions, and they 
can drive greater focus on issues such as security, investment, politics and 
trade. However, another respondent indicated that both EU institutions and 
member states were responsible for the EU’s weak performance. Mathew 
claimed, the EU institutions and member states share a balance of 
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responsibilities with EU institutions responsible for facilitating assistance 
and cooperation, and the member states influencing policy and shaping 
decisions.
The foreign policy actors in the EU treated the Iraq issue of 2003 as an 
inter-governmental issue. Simon argued that the EU’s role in Iraq has been 
insufficient as a result of the leading role taken by member states in 
decision-making in this policy area. In light of such an argument it may be 
concluded that the EU institutions had limited power and authority, and the 
governments of the member states were more dominant than these 
institutions in responding to the Iraq issue in 2003. Nicole noted that there 
was a CFSP, but it was policy created for the member states, not for the EU. 
Sarah concluded that “the EU made a big mistake when it had no clear 
position towards Iraq, and now it is paying for this big mistake”. In order to 
avoid a similar situation in the future, the EU, since 2003, has started to 
rebuild the structure of its foreign policy. Mathew claimed that the Iraq 
issue offered an opportunity for the member states to re-evaluate many 
aspects of EU foreign policy. He indicated that this led to the creation of the 
Lisbon Treaty: “the creation of the Lisbon treaty: that was probably because 
the member states realized that it is not good if the EU loses its influence in 
the international arena”. Thus, the Iraq issue in 2003 led to a reassessment, 
and subsequent development, of the EU’s security and foreign policies.
The EU can release well-meaning statements, but it is not always 
effective in acting upon or implementing its written intentions. Simon 
suggested that this may be due to the divergent opinions and agendas of the 
member states, or simply that some member states prevent EU policy 
implementation. The member states have their own foreign policies, 
embassies, bilateral relations, and finance for projects in Iraq;  these exist in 
addition to the EU’s own engagements and activities. There is close 
coordination and interaction on the ground between the EU delegations and 
member states’ embassies, but the member states’ actions continue to be 
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influenced by their national priorities, thus retarding the overall 
effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Similarly, some respondents argued that 
the member states have their own programs in Iraq because of their 
established bilateral relations. While the EU’s programs are supported by 
the member states, these programs are ultimately weakened by a lack of 
effective coordinated action (Tony and Josephine). Another respondent 
indicated that there is low coordination and much disagreement among 
member states’ foreign policy actors about how to deal with the Iraq issue. 
This may have had an effect on the EU’s foreign policy as a whole towards 
Iraq: "the main obstacle to the efficiency of the EU regarding Iraq was a 
deep disagreement among member states" (Richard, interview: 15/10/2010). 
This deep disagreement is the result of the different values, goals and 
instruments of member states’ foreign policy towards Iraq. 
6.6. The EU Strategies for Future Engagement with Iraq
From 2001-2009, the EU did not play a very strong role in Iraq due to 
a number of factors. The respondents indicated that the predominant factor 
behind this limited role was the issue of security. Iraq was seen as an 
increasingly unstable country, and the EU’s policy was not to engage in any 
country that did not have a suitable investment environment and did not 
provide a stable platform to enable implementation of its programs 
(Mathew). Mathew argued, however, that the EU has been developing a 
common policy towards Iraq over the last two years 2008-2010, and it will 
have a central role to play in the future of the country. 
European Parliament Member, Ana Gomes’s proposal for a European 
Parliament recommendation to the Council on the EU’s role in Iraq was 
adopted in 2008, and focused on the start of a new era between the EU and 
Iraq, attempting to redefine the relationship. She requested the EU 
Parliament “forget the past and think about the present and future and how 
can we help and re-engage with Iraq and help the Iraqis”. It may be that 
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Gomes’s proposal enabled the EU’s delegation to play a more active role in 
Iraq. Although the new foreign policy approach to Iraq outlined in the 
recommendations of this proposal was adopted by a majority of the EU 
Parliament, Gomes maintained, “I think that the Lisbon Treaty with the new 
power and capabilities it has given it to the HR, Lady Ashton (HR) can be 
used to formulate policy to deal with Iraq in more proactive way. However, 
I do not see that she is using the power and capabilities towards Iraq yet”. 
Related to this, Smith stated that although the EU has a small delegation in 
Iraq, this delegation continually updates the EU Parliament and Council 
about the situation on the ground: “I know we have a small delegation in 
Iraq, but we keep in close contact with that small delegation. On security 
grounds, it is difficult for us to have anything bigger than that”. In addition, 
the European Parliament, after its election in June 2009, created a new 
delegation to manage relations with Iraq. Smith was appointed president of 
this delegation and stated, “I have been doing my job over one year; we 
have very much gotten involved in the politics, met with political leaders, 
had delegations from the Iraqi parliament. We visited Baghdad on three 
occasions. We had a lot of meetings with Iraqi politicians and leaders. 
Furthermore, this delegation always has full discussions with the UN 
delegation in Iraq. We want see democratic government, peace and security 
in Iraq".
The EU and Iraq continue to conduct negotiations in order to establish 
agreements in different fields such as trade and energy. Once realised, these 
agreements will form the cornerstone of the relationship between the EU 
and Iraq. Michel argued that this means EU-Iraq relations will remain 
limited until the finalisation of those agreements which will inform the 
future direction of the relationship. Furthermore, at the beginning of 2008, 
there was a stark change in the foreign policy positions of Germany and 
France towards Iraq. The German ambassador in Baghdad announced in an 
interview with the German media that his country had an interest in 
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improving the security situation in Iraq, and in engaging more actively in 
the civilian affairs of the country (Richard). 
As a result, there are many factors which have affected the EU’s 
foreign policy towards Iraq. First, the inequity of power distribution
between member states and EU institutions. Second, the EU’s institutional 
structure which was still evolving and, as a consequence, affected the 
effectiveness of the institutions to fulfill their functions. Third, the EU’s 
focus on the “low politics” instruments in its foreign policy towards Iraq 
which impacted on the overall effectiveness of its decision-making. Fourth, 
the influence of the member states on the EU’s decision-making minimised 
the role of the EU institutions. Fifth, member states’ national interests, 
preferences and sovereignty led to a lack of effective European political 
integration, impacting on the level of interaction and coordination between 
member states and EU institutions. Sixth, the EU’s lack of capability to 
implement policy objectives and its inability to define a well-structured 
strategy are due to complex internal governance processes and institutional 
structures. Finally, external factors such as the US and UN’s presence in 
Iraq, and Iraq’s unstable security situation. 
The next chapter discusses these factors in more contextual details.
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Chapter 7:
Discussion: Interaction between EU 
Actors on Foreign Policy towards 
Iraq
143
The Iraq crisis of 2001-2003 prompts divisive debate in the 
international community. The former High Representative of EU foreign 
and security policy, Javier Solana, stated that the Iraq crisis led to tensions 
and conflicts inside many organisations - in the EU, the Atlantic alliance, 
the United Nations - and in relations between the United States and 
European countries (Solana, interview: 20/04/2003). In light of this, this 
chapter examines the nature of interactions among foreign policy actors 
within the EU, and how their coordination affected EU foreign policy 
towards Iraq during 2001-2009. It discusses the empirical findings within 
both the broader literature and the theoretical framework adopted in this 
study. It deals with the key themes relating to the nature of interactions 
among EU foreign policy actors that emerged from the analysis chapter. 
The importance of the multi-level governance (MLG) approach is its 
ability to describe the interaction and coordination between various EU 
actors across different levels (Chardas, 2012: 6). Thus, the first part of this 
chapter focuses on the impact that inter-institutional interactions (horizontal 
interactions) among EU foreign policy actors had on the EU’s foreign policy 
towards Iraq during 2001-2009. The themes dealt with include the nature of 
power and authority distribution among EU foreign policy actors, the 
institutional structure of EU foreign policy, and the effectiveness of the 
instruments used by EU foreign policy-makers. The discussion then focuses 
on inter-level interaction and coordination (vertical interactions) and its 
impact on EU foreign policy towards Iraq. This discussion is divided into 
the following themes: multiple influences on the decision-making process, 
the impact of national interests and political integration on EU foreign 
policy, and the impediments to EU foreign policy implementation in Iraq. 
The third part of this chapter focuses on the external factors that have 
directly or indirectly affected EU foreign policy toward Iraq. These factors 
include the US’s presence in Iraq, the role of the UN, and the internal 
situation in Iraq. 
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The EU officials and academics who participated in this study 
provided engaged perspectives that gave rise to these three key themes. 
Discourse in Europe surrounding Iraq was identified as the major issue 
affecting EU foreign policy during 2001-2009. Much of the empirical data 
gathered in this study suggests that EU foreign policy had little impact on 
European member states, and ultimately was not constructive in the 
development of perceptions, policies and relations towards Iraq.
7.1. Horizontal Interaction and its Impact on EU Foreign Policy 
towards Iraq
One of the most significant characteristics of the EU’s MLG approach 
to foreign policy is the requirement for interaction and coordination between 
relevant actors across multiple levels (national, sub-national and 
supranational). This interaction may be seen as a mechanism for sharing 
competencies among the institutions in order to overcome the obstacles, and 
potential deadlock, of formal policy-making (Keukeleire and Justaert, 2009: 
10; Marks, 1993; Marks et al., 1996). MLG approach requires direct 
attention to increasingly complex vertical and horizontal interactions 
between actors (Bache, 2008: 37). This part of the study examines how the 
horizontal interaction between various institutions affected EU foreign 
policy in general, and towards Iraq in particular, over the period 2001-2009. 
This section focuses on the following themes: power sharing among foreign 
policy actors, the arrangement of EU foreign policy structures, and the 
effectiveness of instruments used by EU foreign policy-makers with other 
countries.
7.1.1. Power Distribution among EU Foreign Policy Actors
Marks et al. (1996: 356) highlight that multi-level governance in the 
EU is best exemplified in the European Council and the Council of 
Ministers’ power sharing with supranational and sub-national actors. In line 
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with this, Mette et al. (2003) observe that power and authority in multi-level 
governance systems shift from the central government upwards to the 
supranational level or downwards to the regional and local level authorities. 
In the case of the EU, the member states transferred some of their power to 
the supranational level (EU level), and to domestic lobby and pressure 
groups who participate at the EU level (Duke, 2001). As such, the member 
states are the most important actors in EU foreign policy formulation. That 
is, states no longer have a monopoly over their own foreign policy-making 
as they have conceded control to supranational and sub-national authorities 
(Mette et al., 2003: 392-94). This system of governance is characterised by 
the dispersion of authoritative power and competencies across various levels 
of government and between different sets of political players (Mette et al., 
2003). Thus, the distribution of power between several players becomes the 
key role in shaping the intra-regional interactions and achieving collective 
action (Paraskevopoulos, 2002: 15). An important question that arises out of 
such an arrangement, and is addressed in this part of the study, is: what is 
happening to the role, power, and authority of the EU institutions at a 
supranational level in the area of foreign policy?
The literature reviewed and the data collected throughout this study 
indicates that two major perspectives exist regarding the nature of the 
foreign policy roles played by EU institutions. The first perspective claims 
that although the EU is a multi-level governance system, many functions of 
government, including foreign affairs and defense, remain under the control 
of member states’ governments, known as "core state powers" (Genschel 
and Jachtenfuchs, 2011: 1). Member states have argued that because of the 
sensitive nature of foreign policy, this policy area should remain under 
state-level control. Thus, member states have not acted to reduce their 
central role and authority in EU foreign policy (European Parliament, 
12/03/2003: 7). Accordingly, member states have not transferred key areas 
of authority to the supranational institutions, in particular their control over
high priority policies such as foreign affairs and security. Therefore, EU 
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institutions continue to have a limited role in this regard, which is evident in 
the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq during 2001-2009; each member state 
maintained their own policy position and did not commit to forming a 
common EU policy position (Everts and Koehane, 2003). Accordingly, the 
EU “has zero influence if its member-states do not pull together” (Everts 
and Koehane, 2003: 176).
The Council of Ministers has the ability to place issues on its agenda 
which represent the interests of those national governments that comprise 
the EU (Lewis, 2003; Richardson, 2006). Accordingly, the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is developed under the exclusive 
authority of the Council of Ministers (member states), whereas the 
Commission’s external relations are mainly focused on trade and technical 
issues (Bunse, 2009: 32; Staab, 2008: 46). Thus, member states of the EU 
could transfer some of their sovereignty to supranational institutions by 
entering into voluntary agreements (Krasner, 2004). Such an arrangement 
may lead to the pooling of resources into an international organisation, 
demonstrating commitment to international and regional treaties which, in 
turn, have the potential to drive member states’ future collective action 
(Krasner, 2004). However, this transformation of sovereignty could be 
limited to specific areas of government (Mamudu and Studlar, 2009).
Member states in the EU have transferred some of their power to the EU 
Commission in areas including trade, energy and development. They have 
not, however, rescinded their authority over foreign and security policy. 
Thus, as Jordan (2001) argues, MLG approach may be a useful approach in 
some EU studies relating to particular policy sectors. However, it may be 
considered false to argue that the MLG approach is relevant to all EU policy 
sectors, or that multi-level governance has become a ubiquitous feature of 
the EU's system (Jordan, 2001). 
Key member states of the EU, in particular France, are adverse to the 
involvement of the European Commission in the area of ‘high politics’
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(Dijkstra, 2008; Portela and Raube, 2009; and Kostakopoulou 2006). ‘High 
politics’ refers to matters relating to national and international security 
concerns, such as include foreign policy, defense, criminal law and 
immigration policy (Kostakopoulou 2006; Brein, 2008: 1-2). ‘Low politics’ 
relates to economic and cultural matters that are deemed as non-threatening 
to the viability of the nation state such as economic integration, the single 
market program, and EU social and environmental regulation (Hix 2006; 
Brein, 2008: 1-2). Those states concerned about ceding their control over 
‘high politics’ have prevented greater Commission involvement by 
delegating various tasks to the Council Secretariat. As such, the Council 
Secretariat is performing tasks previously designated for the Commission 
(Portela and Raube, 2009). This is a preferred outcome for member states as 
the Council Secretariat operates transparently, and under the direct 
observation of the EU member states (Dijkstra, 2008). From a broader 
perspective, it may be that the Council Secretariat fills the gap created by 
the absence of the Commission in the field of the CFSP. Effectively, the 
Council Secretariat is strong in those areas where the Commission’s 
influence is weak (Dijkstra, 2008). Former Commissioner for External 
Relations (1999-2004), Christopher Patten, initially broadened the influence 
and prominence of this role; however, following his appointment, the 
balance of power between the High Representative and the Commissioner 
for External Relations altered over time: “if one looks at the balance 
between the Commissioner for External Relations and the High 
Representative since 1999, one will quickly conclude that Commissioner 
Ferrero-Waldner lost out” (Dijkstra, 2008: 5). It is clear that the member 
states lack a strong will to strengthen the foreign policy role of 
supranational institutions, namely, the European Commission. As such, this 
area of policy remains under the control of the Council of Ministers and the 
Council Secretariat.
The second major perspective regarding the nature of roles played by 
institutions in the formulation of EU foreign policy suggests that multi-level 
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governance is aimed at dividing power and sovereignty between national 
and regional levels of government in order to reduce the likelihood of an 
authoritarian, or an overly centralized, government. This perspective 
suggests that it is also designed to overcome the weaknesses of an overly 
de-centralized form of government. Therefore, multi-level governance is 
designed to distribute power among the different levels and units of 
government in order to promote cooperation, and to optimise the policy-
making capacity of the governance system as a whole. It is viewed as a 
means to achieve political pluralism in the system (Bache and Flinders, 
2004). Thus, the role of national actors within EU policy-making has been 
weakened, yet, simultaneously, the role of supranational institutions has not 
been strengthened (Scharpf, 1994). 
MLG approach considers that, due to the increasing number of policy 
areas, no single actor possesses complete competencies (Awesti, 2007: 3). 
Accordingly, overlapping competencies among a variety of actors at a 
variety of levels is the main merit of this approach. However, this does not 
mean national states are no longer authoritative actors, rather, states no 
longer monopolise the EU policy process (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 3, 
Awesti, 2007: 3). March and Olsen (1989: 165) recognise the role of 
institutions as "agents in the construction of political interests and beliefs", 
and are able to develop their own agendas and act independently (Peterson, 
1995: 81). This perspective sees institutions as independent actors in the 
policy-making process. Accordingly, the EU institutions have a role to play 
in all stages of policy: agenda-setting, formulation, and implementation 
(Cram, 1997: 12). In analysing the role of institutions in policy-making, 
Cram (1997) cites the role of bureaucratic politics in the EU, the role of the 
Commission as a key agenda-setter, and the Commission's role in the 
promotion of the EU regulatory regime. Further to these examples is the role 
played by the European Parliament as a co-decision body and a conditional 
agenda-setter. Therefore, the member states participate in the decision-
making process through a select number of available alternatives, while the 
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EU institutions are critical in coordinating expectations and shaping a 
"shared belief system" (Cram, 1997: 12) 
The Commission has an important role in "providing the catalyst for 
collective action, whether amongst member states, big business, or amongst 
broader social interest groupings" (Cram, 1997: 12). Thus, the gradual 
transfer of political, administrative and fiscal authority in Europe to the 
supranational and sub-national levels suggests that institutional factors may 
have an important role in shaping interest group strategies. The degree of 
political decentralisation, in particular, may determine political 
opportunities and the flow of resources (Constantelos, 2007: 40-41). As a 
result, a MLG approach acknowledges that member states will remain 
important pieces of the European puzzle in the near future (Marks et al., 
1996: 4; Jeffery, 1997: 184). However, the lines of authority and influence 
among EU institutions are sometimes ill-defined and fluid, and as such, 
power may shift between the EU Council and the Commission (Richardson 
2001: 160).
The EU political system is shaped by the lack of effective coordination. 
One reason for this is that, unlike other political systems, the EU lacks 
functional mechanisms associated with political parties (Peters, 2001: 84). 
Political parties may function as a mechanism for coordinating policies 
across institutions and even across levels of government (Richardson, 2001: 
84). Thus, political parties, which are the main actors in the coordination 
process in any political system, cannot oversee the coordination of policy 
priorities in the EU. The political parties within the European Parliament are 
national parties and generally lack the unity required to produce a coherent 
pattern of foreign policy (Peters, 2001: 84). As a result, the supranational 
institutions within the EU take the role of these political parties and 
coordinate with member states in order to reach a common foreign policy 
position (Richardson, 2001: 84). EU institutions generally aim to encourage, 
as much as possible, a common foreign policy position which is accepted by 
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the member states. In the case of the Iraq war of 2003, however, member 
states’ positions were completely divergent. Exacerbating this lack of a 
common policy position, the Commission, the Presidency of Council, the 
HR, and other supranational institutions were unable to take positions on 
behalf of the EU. 
The development of the EU’s foreign policy in relation to Iraq 
demonstrated that the Council Presidency has limited influence on this 
process. Although the Presidency may hold a certain point of view 
regarding foreign policy, it cannot impose this view on the Council of 
Ministers. Instead, it must oversee the development of a compromise in 
order to reach a common position (European Parliament, 18/02/2003). In 
addition, the Commission participates in developing a CFSP and has 
competencies to deploy instruments to make the CFSP more effective. 
However, on a number of issues, the Commission does not have the right to 
make decisions or execute actions in the name of the member states. Such 
issues remain under the realm of national sovereign state principles 
(European Parliament, 29/01/2003: 7-8). 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the crucial factor that would 
determine "the success or failure of the ‘new CFSP’ will be the capacity of 
the High Representative to create a common European political position on 
major international issues" (Verola, 2010: 49; European Parliament, 
26/04/2002: 49). The HR had a limited capacity to act on the Iraq issue 
during 2001-2009. On 17 February 2003, the HR and Greek Presidency at 
the time called for an emergency summit of the EU member states’ leaders 
to bridge the widely divergent positions between the pro-US states, led by 
Britain and Spain, and the states that opposed immediate military 
intervention, led by France and Germany (Indymedia Ireland, 2003). Solana 
was hopeful that the leaders of the EU would achieve a common position 
regarding Iraq, and stated "this is the best service that we can do for peace" 
(Indymedia Ireland, 2003). However, the efforts of Solana and the Greek 
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Presidency failed to bridge the divergences and achieve a common position 
and response among member states to the Iraq war. Solana confirmed this 
when he announced, “I have failed” (Solana, Interview, 20/04/2003). He 
elaborated:  “There we failed. And this is most bitter for me, as I saw this as 
my task… It is our obligation to deal with the coordination of our foreign 
policies” (Solana, interview, 26/03/2003). Thus, Solana’s failure to 
overcome the differences between member states regarding the Iraq war was 
due to the limitation of his power as EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs (The Telegraph, 1/12/2009). 
As a result, the EU lacked authority because a majority of foreign 
policy decisions made within the EU’s institutional framework were subject 
to approval by member states (Kallberg, 2007). EU officials could not take a 
clear position and decisive action on behalf of the EU towards Iraq between 
2001 and 2009 because they lacked a clear mandate from member states to 
do so. However, MLG approach does not concentrate on how power is 
distributed among different levels, rather it is focused on how changes in 
governance occur (Britz, 2001: 9). Accordingly, there is no equality of 
power among levels, or actors from different levels. Thus, it could be 
considered that the member states have more power than other actors at 
other levels. This does not mean that the member states who have the power 
dominates, and other actors at different levels do not have ability to shape 
policy because they have less power than member states (Britz, 2001: 9).
7.1.2. The Institutional Structure of EU Foreign Policy
The MLG approach states that the EU political system is neither a 
state nor an international organisation; instead, it views the EU as a multi-
faceted system (Aalberts, 2004: 24). The main value of the MLG approach 
is that it allows for an understanding of complexity at and between levels 
(Bache, 2008). This approach explores how the whole system works and 
how multiple levels are structured within the system (Portela and Raube, 
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2009: 2; Sweeney, 2005: 160-161).  Accordingly, a multi-level approach is 
applied more often to deal with the contemporary structures of the EU 
because this approach is consistent with its overlapping authorities and 
competing competencies (Aalberts, 2004: 23). Multi-level governance 
entails a conception of the EU as consisting of “overlapping competencies 
among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors 
across those levels” (Marks et al., 1996: 167). This means that the departure 
point of the MLG approach is the existence of overlapping competencies 
among multiple levels of governments (Marks et al., 1996). Accordingly, 
instead of the two-level game assumptions adopted by state-centrists 
(realists, liberalists and intergovernmentalists), MLG theorists posit a set of 
overarching, multi-level policy networks (Jordan 2001: 199).
Interaction among EU institutions, and coordination between these 
institutions and member states reflects the wide range of coordination 
activities in the EU, and how this affects its foreign policy actions (Gauttier, 
2004:25). Theoretically, if cooperation between the institutions involved in 
foreign policy is sufficient, then the influence of the EU in world politics 
will be enhanced (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007). It may be argued that the 
internal fragmentation of EU institutions acts as an obstacle to these entities 
playing a proactive role in foreign affairs. The effectiveness of the EU
Commission and Council, in particular, is being seriously impeded by such 
fragmentation. 
In the case of the Commission, internal fragmentation - a long-
standing and latent problem - has recently developed into a critical issue of 
institutional survival, particularly over the past five years (Christiansen, 
2001a: 758). Although the Commission is supposed to be the main 
institution involved in the EU’s foreign policy-making process, in practice, 
different actors’ impact on its effectiveness, including those within the 
Commission itself. Those commissioners with an influence over EU foreign 
policy formulation may be considered as political actors with a measure of 
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independent authority (Richardson, 2001: 82). According to the 
Commission rules, each member state is prohibited from seeking or taking 
instruction from any government or other body (George, Frantiz and 
Birmele, 1997: 119). Commissioners, however, still have the power to 
prioritise national interests over European interests. Indeed, individual 
commissioners tend to frame their portfolios in terms of the national 
constituency they represent. Such an arrangement allows member states to 
act as political parties participating in a coalition government with 
commissioners representing their respective member states’ interests and 
positions. As a result, within the Commission, commissioners work 
individually rather than collectively, and this situation undermines effective 
coordination among the 27 member states (Richardson, 2001: 84). 
Furthermore, the commissioners themselves may consider their appointment 
to such a position as an opportunity to advance their personal political 
ambitions. For example, they may believe that they can utilise policy 
activism within their portfolio as a means of progressing their political 
careers on either the national or the European stage (Richardson, 2001: 82). 
These issues affect the overall effectiveness of the EU as a supranational 
institution.
The Commission and the Council operate on the notion that coherence 
in EU foreign policy constitutes a necessary precondition for efficacy 
(Commission of the European Union Communities, 2006). Coherence is not 
only beneficial in the context of EU foreign policy; the foreign policies of 
any international actor need to be coherent in order to be effective (Portela 
and Raube, 2009: 4). While EU institutions - the Commission, Parliament 
and the Council - attempt to present themselves as unified actors, in reality 
there are many internal divisions within them. These divisions have the 
propensity to fragment policy-making and undermine the coherence of EU 
governance (Christiansen, 2001b: 749-50). The complexity of the EU 
system and the overlapping foreign policy competencies of different EU 
institutions, especially those of the Commission, the Council, and the HR, 
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lead to a number of problems in this area (Duke, 2006). Furthermore, this 
so-called “grey area” (foreign policy) shares fundamental competencies 
between the EU and its member states (Gauttier, 2004).  The member states 
attempt to keep this policy area under their control and thereby limit the role 
of the EU institutions in foreign policy.  
Relations between the Commission and the Council Secretariat 
demonstrate the nature of the challenge in achieving institutional coherence 
within the EU. Given this is only a partial perspective on the wider issue of 
coherence in the European polity, only limited conclusions can be drawn at 
this stage. The internal fragmentation of the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat (and other EU institutions) has increased particularly since the 
Iraq war. The growing size and expanded range of policy competencies 
have affected both institutions (Christiansen, 2001b). While within the 
Commission the divide between administrative services and the political 
level has been an issue that ongoing reforms seek to address, the Council 
Secretariat needs to accommodate its own internal changes. These result 
from the rapid expansion of its competencies in the areas of foreign and 
security policy. The issue, for the Commission, is finding which areas cause 
internal tensions that require man resources to resolve. With respect to inter-
institutional relations between the Commission and the Council Secretariat, 
the situation is different. Against a background of reduced expectations 
within the EU, the Commission and the Council Secretariat manage to 
cooperate effectively across areas of shared responsibility. These policy-
makers rely on informal relations in order to help bridge the inter-
institutional divide. Such relations build on the broad foundation of a shared 
allegiance to the European projects and an increased commitment to, and 
knowledge of, the details of policies under deliberation. Consequently, the 
coherence of inter-institutional relations, at least among these two 
institutions, is not as elusive as the formal institutional arrangement would 
lead us to expect (Christiansen, 2001b: 766).
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The Directorate-Generals, who operate within the European 
Commission, are responsible for tasks ranging from the ‘traditional’
business of the Council Secretariat in the areas of development and trade, to 
full executive tasks in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
directorates. Some of these tasks overlap, therefore, with the responsibilities 
of the Council Secretariat. As a result, in areas where the Commission is 
strong (for example in trade, EU enlargement and EU-Asia relations), the 
Council Secretariat is weak and merely carries out supporting tasks. 
However, in areas where the Commission is weak, in particular in the ESDP 
and its policy responses to the Middle East and Afghanistan, the Council 
Secretariat takes the lead (Dijkstra, 2008).
A lack of clearly defined competencies and responsibilities of various 
stakeholders may be seen as problematic for cross-pillar politics (Stetter, 
2004). Issues of coherence emerge when defining the competencies of each 
actor involved in EU foreign relations. Indeed, once a competency is applied 
to different actors, such as the Commission and the Council in crisis 
management, the likelihood of incoherent action increases (Portela and 
Raube, 2009: 18). As a result, the poor definition of foreign policy actors’ 
competencies leads to political rivalry and competition, impacting on the 
overall effectiveness of EU policies. Political rivalries between the 
Commission and the Council, and competition between the administrative 
structures of these institutions, are currently occurring as a result of the 
stipulations of the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty failed to delineate the 
limitations of the institution competencies in terms of external relations 
activities. There is also direct competition and strong political rivalry 
between the Director General of External Relations in the Commission and 
the Council Secretariat. The complexities that arise as a result of such 
political rivalries between actors working within the EU institutional 
framework have undermined the effectiveness of the foreign policy-making 
process. This, in turn, has decreased the effectiveness of the EU as a whole. 
These political rivalries among foreign policy actors are a result of an
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imbalance in the prescribed competencies of the EU-level institutions and 
member states (Mayer, 2005: 498). 
There are several actors associated with EU foreign policy, and this 
presents an additional challenge to effective policy-making. According to 
the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the creation of the HR for EFSP was 
designed to enhance the vertical coordination between member states and 
EU institutions, and to represent the EU externally. This duty-sharing 
arrangement between the Presidency and the Commission is in accordance 
with article 18 (3) of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. However, following 
the Amsterdam Treaty’s inception, a number of actors came to represent the 
EU externally, including the President of the Commission, the Presidency of 
the Council and the HR; rather than reducing the number of interested 
parties,  this introduced yet more actors into the process. (Portela and Raube, 
2009: 9). Such an increase in actors led to the overlapping of competencies 
and heightened political rivalry among these institutions. This phenomenon 
is similar to the effects of the Lisbon Treaty, which merged the HR and the 
Commissioner for External Relations under the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). The effect of this made the process of foreign policy 
formulation even more complex. Instead of reducing the number of people 
involved in foreign policy, the Lisbon Treaty effectively mandated another 
position, alongside the President of the EU, with responsibility for foreign 
policy. In attempting to remedy a major fault within EU foreign policy-
making process, a new obstacle to its effectiveness emerged. Accordingly, 
Bindi and Shapiro claim that the Lisbon Treaty has rendered EU foreign 
policy more confusing by introducing further complexity (2010: 344).
This division of EU foreign policy-making competencies among 
several posts reflects a lack of cohesion and is, overall, counterproductive to 
effective policy formulation and execution. Thus, the EU’s lack of 
institutional coherence is reflected in its failure to create a unified foreign 
policy (Bindi and Shapiro, 2010: 344). This is evident in the internal 
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rivalries between the Council and the Commission, and between the 
member states and the EU institutions (Cameron, 2005), in addition to the 
disputes that arose in the EU’s attempt to formulate a unified foreign policy 
response to Iraq. As a result, the EU has not been effective because it 
possesses no real mechanism for resolving internal disputes (Bindi and 
Shapiro, 2010: 346). Given the EU consists of a group of countries, despite 
its efforts to create common policy on issues, "if there is no consensus, there 
is no policy (Bindi and Shapiro, 2010: 346). 
The institutional framework of the EU Council and its substructures 
does not allow for effective coordination and cooperation across the broad 
range of issues that it is required to address. Council procedures require two 
parallel preparatory groups within the Council Secretariat, the Permanent 
Representatives of the member states in Brussels (COREPER) and the 
Political Committee, to develop its foreign policy proposals. This provides 
fertile ground for bureaucratic wars over competencies (Gauttier, 2004: 34). 
Furthermore, it is impossible to ‘coordinate’ policy development with 27 
ministers or 27 diplomats, each representing their own member states’ 
interests. This is in addition to the inability of the Presidency, the HR and 
the Council staff to assist the Council in overcoming this constraint with 
regard to all foreign policy issues (Keukeleire and Justaert, 2008: 10). As a 
result of the complex institutional structure of the EU system, the EU 
institutions always confront difficulty in coordinating effective action 
amongst themselves (Vanhoonacker, 2005: 146). This lack of coordination 
leads to incoherent policy, which in turn challenges intra-institutional 
relations (Christiansen, 2001b). 
If the EU is to have a united, coherent voice in the international 
political arena, one institution should be made responsible for this task. 
Such an institution must be able to coordinate with other internal actors on 
issues under debate to ensure that a common position is reached (Portela 
and Raube, 2009:22). The major limitation to such coordination and 
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coherence is the policy positions of EU member states. An obvious example 
of parallel interests at work in the EU’s foreign policy is that the EU 
Commission and individual member states are represented and participate 
simultaneously in international organisations, such as the UN. The 
Commission, however, unlike member states, wields no executive power 
and therefore may be considered a mere symbolic presence in such 
organisations. For example, due to their positions as permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, only France and Britain have the executive 
authority to approve legitimate military interventions. Although the 
Commission and other European institutions may interact with member 
states in order to reach a common position that reflects a European point of 
view, more often decisions reached by the UN reflect the interests of the 
permanent states of the UN’s Security Council. This further demonstrates 
the failure of the EU to act effectively throughout the Iraq crisis, particularly 
between 2001 and 2003. It shows that the position held by Britain and other 
European countries was incongruent with the EU as a whole, leading to a 
division within the EU that prevented a common position on the issue being 
agreed to by all member states (Portela and Raube, 2009: 22). This obvious 
incongruity became the major impetus for establishing the “new” High 
Representative for the EEAS and its administrative substructure. According 
to the Lisbon Treaty, the new HR assumed a dual role: Vice-President of the 
Commission and Chairman of the Council leading the EEAS, which consists 
of both the CFSP and ESDP branches of the current Council Secretariat. In 
the latter role, the HR also acts as the Director-General for External 
Relations (DG RELEX) of the Commission (Raube, 2009). This hierarchical 
executive position was designed to provide further mechanisms of 
coordination (Portela and Raube, 2009). 
The establishment of the EEAS, under the HR’s supervision, was 
designed to facilitate heightened coordination amongst the different 
representations of the EU. First, the Commission delegations are designed to 
merge with special representatives and create unified EU delegations. 
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Furthermore, these delegations are designed to enhance interaction and 
relations with member state representations in order to increase the 
coherence and effectiveness of the EU (Raube, 2009; Portela and Raube, 
2009: 22). However, the EU remains young in terms of foreign policy-
making and is still establishing the EEAS which, to date, is not yet fully 
staffed. The Council Secretariat staff, External Relations DG (Commission) 
staff and diplomats from the member states are all due to integrate into this 
new institution. Thus, improvements in EU foreign policy-making are not 
yet anticipated and will continue to be dependent on the will of the member 
states to act together to reach common policy positions. As a result, the lack 
of organisational ability and collective will among member states to achieve 
a common position regarding Iraq affected EU foreign policy (Gordon, 
1997-1998; Waltz, 2000). 
7.1.3. Efficacy of Instruments Used by the EU towards Iraq
The EU has several instruments, such as political, military, aid, 
development, and economic instruments, with which to deal with crises and 
significant events across the world. It deploys different instruments 
according to the nature of the crisis, the region, and the environment in 
which they are being applied. However, the main goal of the states, 
according to realists, is survival. This is achieved through an ability to 
protect themselves and their interests from any threat, and is based on 
having a monopoly over the instruments of coercion, in particular military 
power within their territory, and the autonomy of action to use them (Wright, 
2011: 10-11). Accordingly, theories of realism focus on the capabilities of 
the EU in terms of military capacity. Realists believe that the EU remains a 
weak international actor due to its lack of military power (Wright, 2011: 10-
11). Bull (1982) argued that it would be difficult to talk about an effective 
role for the European Community in the international arena if it continues to 
lack military capability. However, this view is too narrow because it focuses 
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on only one dimension and does not account for the full range and intensity 
of EU activity undertaken at the international level (Wright, 2011). These 
theories frequently consider outcomes in the context of the absence of EU 
military capability (Ginsberg, 1999). Although the EU lacks military 
capability, it can still use other instruments, such as aid and development, 
trade, and enlargement, to be an effective international power. Furthermore, 
the EU is not a state and therefore cannot reasonably be compared with state 
actors (Wright, 2011). However, according to the view of realists, the EU is 
considered in the same way as any international organisation that has 
member states. This view also ignores the role of the European Commission 
and other European institutions. The EU institutions play a role in 
formulating and implementing EU foreign policy, and therefore cannot be 
considered in the same context as any other international organisation 
(Wright, 2011).   
Liberalism considers EU as a soft power. Thus, economic and 
diplomatic instruments are able to confront the complexities of 
interdependence, both internally and externally (Wright, 2011: 9). The main 
difference between realism and liberalism is their assessment of the relative 
importance of military power vis-à-vis alternative sources of influence. 
Liberalists argue that the EU’s lack of military capacity does not mean that 
it is not an effective power in international politics (Smith, 2000). 
Furthermore, they argue that realism ignores the role of the Community 
pillar (Commission). This pillar has been engaged in several ways to 
strengthen EU foreign policy: through its enlargement policy; the 
development of bilateral and multilateral trade and economic relations with 
non-European countries; the increasing adoption of EU standards and 
regulations around the world; and the implementation of large development 
and aid programmes in developing countries (Ginsberg, 1999: 432; Wright, 
2011). Liberalists consider that the EU can be an effective actor in the 
international arena by utilising its other instruments - civilian instruments -
such as economics and trade (Manners, 2002: 236; Wright, 2011: 13-14). 
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Thus, the main assumptions of liberalism are: cooperation among nation 
states globally in pursuit of international objectives; focus on non-military 
instruments, especially economic instruments; and development of 
international structures to deal with critical issues in world politics (Maull, 
1990: 92). Liberalism considers the EU’s power in terms of its ability to 
deploy its economic and diplomatic influence in pursuit of international 
policy goals. However, it fails to account sufficiently for the impact of 
integration on the EU’s development, not simply institutionally or 
functionally, but also in terms of its international identity (Wright, 2011).
Constructivism focuses on the role of norms and principles in EU 
foreign policy rather than capabilities (military capacity or economy and 
trade components). According to constructivists, there are five principles 
which determine how the EU foreign policy behaves: peace, liberty, 
democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedom (Manner, 2002: 242). Although these principles are not exclusive 
to the EU, they are crucial in the context of its foreign policy, particularly 
the peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomatic means (Manner, 
2002: 241). Accordingly, constructivism considers that the notions of values, 
principles and identity are the main elements of the EU entity in the 
international arena. Thus, this theory argues that what the EU symbolises is 
as important as what it does, with its impact felt as much through the 
example it sets as the actions it takes (Wright, 2011: 9). However, this 
theory is unable to capture and examine the internal interaction among the 
EU’s foreign policy actors across levels and pillars, and, subsequently, how 
it affected the process of choosing the right instruments towards Iraq. 
This study applies the MLG approach to examine this issue. It does so 
because one of the main assumptions of the MLG approach is to understand 
the nature of the internal relationships between EU foreign policy actors 
rather than focus solely on the capabilities and instruments utilised to 
achieve it (Wright, 2011). Its focus is on the direct effect of the internal 
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debate and interaction between foreign policy actors on the range of 
instruments to be used to address foreign policy issues. For instance, if the 
actors from all levels (sub-national, intergovernmental, and supranational) 
have similar points of view regarding significant events in world politics,
the range of instruments that will be used is considerably large. However, if 
these actors have different points of view, the range of instruments that will 
be used is comparatively smaller.   
In terms of Iraq during 2004-2009, the Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar 
Zebari, met with the EU Council in July 2004 to discuss the areas in which 
the Iraq government hoped the EU could make a visible contribution. He 
requested the EU contribute to the political, economic and social 
development of Iraq (Youngs, 2004; Council Conclusion, 12/07/2004). In 
response, the EU applied several of its instruments under the UN’s 
supervision including humanitarian aid, police and justice training, health, 
education and public services. In November 2004, the European Council 
confirmed that the EU had a strong interest in contributing to the 
strengthening of stability and the rule of law in Iraq. In addition, the 
European Council announced that the EU was seeking an active and 
important presence within the UN mission in Iraq, and was willing to 
support the UN’s leading role in the promotion of political reforms and 
reconstruction efforts (Council of the European Union, 21/12/2004).
Despite the Commission’s significant commitment of nearly one 
billion Euros to Iraq following the Saddam Hussein era, EU foreign policy 
activities in Iraq since 2003 have remained limited. Such activities have 
been almost entirely focused on humanitarian aid and development 
programs while specific support for Iraq’s political reconstruction has 
constituted the EU’s lowest priority (European Commission, 2004). Solana 
(26/03/2003) asserted that the “second phase will concern the political 
reconstruction of the country [Iraq], similar to what is happening in 
Afghanistan. Unfortunately, at present we are still a long way from this 
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point”. However, trade with Iraq may become a higher priority among EU 
member states in the near future. In early 2009, the French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy, Germany’s foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and 
Britain’s trade minister Peter Mandelson, led a trade delegation of more 
than 20 construction companies from their respective countries to Baghdad 
(Gowan and Korski, 2009). In Baghdad, President Sarkozy promised there 
would be “no limits” to French involvement in Iraq's reconstruction (Gowan 
and Korski, 2009). However, the EU did not become involved in the 
political reconstruction. 
Currently the main areas in which the EU seeks to engage with Iraq 
are in supporting reform within the country’s security and political 
institutions and improving the capacity of these institutions to underpin a 
successful transition to a democratic Iraq. The EU needs to be more 
strategic in supporting Iraq in its progress towards becoming a democratic 
federal state (Hill, 2004: 152). To achieve this, the EU can build a solid 
partnership with the people of Iraq, and seek an ongoing commitment from 
its government to ensure security, reconciliation, and a willingness to 
cooperate (Hill, 2004: 152). However, while EU strategy suggests a 
willingness to contribute to institution-building challenges, member states’ 
governments remain uncertain about more practical involvement by the EU. 
Indeed, a coherent European democratisation strategy for Iraq has 
been conspicuously absent since 2003 with the EU having developed no 
clear position on the main political restructuring challenges facing the 
country (Youngs, 2004). Attempts to establish an EU envoy or a special 
representative in Iraq, as well as the establishment of an EU office, were 
blocked by a number of member state governments during 2003-2004. This 
reflects the diversity of positions and level of policy incoherence among the 
member states within the Council of Ministers (Duke, 2008; Youngs, 2004: 
7). In addition, immediately following the war of 2003, the EU was unable 
to play the role of neutral arbiter, which would have entailed acting to 
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negotiate a peaceful settlement between Iraq’s warring factions. It would 
have also entailed including these factions in a national dialogue and 
assisting Iraqis to overcome internal divisions and tensions between various 
communities, central and territorial governments, and political leaders. 
Additionally, the role would have required pressuring Iraq’s regional 
neighbours to prevent any potential flow of terrorism across their borders 
into Iraq (Dodge, 2006). Despite this, however, the EU did attempt to 
become involved in post-war Iraq through its participation in various 
conferences. For example, the former HR of the CFSP, Javier Solana 
participated in the Sharm el Sheikh international conference on Iraq, hosted 
by Egypt in 2004; he attended the international donors' conference for Iraq 
in Madrid in 2003; and the Iraq international conference, co-hosted by the 
EU and the US in Brussels in 2005. The EU also supported Iraq’s elections 
in 2005 by providing financial assistance through UN channels. However,
these activities are modest when understood in the context of the scale of the 
EU - 27 member states - in international politics. The EU’s relatively small 
role in Iraq after 2003 allowed the US to exert its influence and control over 
both Iraq and the surrounding region. As a result, although the EU has 
effective external aid and trade policies, it remains an ineffective diplomatic 
actor because it is poorly equipped to respond quickly to external crises
(Gordon, 1997-98: 88). Galeote Quecedo, a European Parliamentarian, 
confirmed this when he stated on 20 March 2003: “we all regret Europe’s 
failure in this crisis and the fact that the existing instruments for 
coordinating our foreign policy have shown themselves to be ineffective” 
(European Parliament, 20/03/2003: 17).
The lack of EU defense and security capacity also led to the EU 
playing an inadequate role during and after the Iraq war of 2003 (European 
Parliament, 20/03/2003: 20). It was unable to deploy military instruments 
because "the EU lacks in its capacity to employ troops outside EU 
countries" (Joseph, interview, 11/10/2010). This is due to the EU’s struggle 
to act effectively in the absence of a common security identity (Stahl, 2008). 
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This reflects the main issue with the EU’s security policy weaknesses, 
seriously impacting on its ambitions to become a prominent security actor in 
the international arena (Schirm, 1998; Stahl, 2008: 71). As a result, the EU 
has had limited participation in improving Iraq’s security since the end of 
the war, despite its establishment of training programs and improved 
facilities for Iraqi police forces. 
EU institutions and member states often fail to coordinate various 
policy positions and instruments, including in the areas of defense and 
diplomacy, in their pursuit of common objectives (Grant and Leonard, 
2006). As a result, the EU has been restricted to using limited instruments in 
relation to Iraq, both during and after the war. It has possessed the capacity 
to act only in the areas of “low politics”, thereby negatively affecting its 
foreign policy presence in Iraq. Furthermore, the nature of the EU's foreign 
policy decision-making procedures and its competing national interests have 
undermined effective political integration and implementation; affecting its 
foreign policy performance in Iraq.  
7.2. Vertical Interaction and its Impact on EU Foreign Policy towards 
Iraq
The interaction between member states and EU institutions (horizontal 
interaction), alongside the interaction among EU institutions, member states 
and sub-national institutions (vertical interaction), is crucial in the creation 
of effective foreign policy (Nasra, 2009: 15). This part of the study 
examines the vertical interaction to identify whether its nature has affected 
EU foreign policy in general, and more specifically, towards Iraq. Three 
themes are pursued in this objective: decision-making, national interest and 
political integration, and the implementation process.  
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7.2.1. Multiple Influences on the Decision-Making Process
Realists deny the existence of any form of collective will or 
personality in the international system (Waltz, 1979; Wright, 2011: 10-11), 
ignoring the role of international organisations in creating collective 
decisions and reaching solutions of compromise among the states. The 
international relations theories (realism, liberalism and constructivism) 
highlight that shared interests and common policy objectives by the member 
states are fundamental to effective decision-making and international action 
on the part of the EU. Thus, these theories reflect a limited capacity to 
analyse EU foreign policy, and do not account for the impact of EU 
institutions and sub-national actors on the foreign policy decision-making 
process, and the nature of interaction between foreign policy actors during 
its formulation and implementation stages (Wright, 2011: 20).     
Any policy created within the EU framework is the result of necessary 
communication and influence between all actors within a complex web of 
interaction (Awesti, 2007: 6). An MLG approach stipulates that decision-
making authority is gradually dispersed across different sectors and levels of 
action (Jordan 2001:199). Accordingly, governance in the EU is considered 
neither exclusively state-centric nor supranational. Its decision-making 
competencies are theoretically shared by actors at different levels rather than 
monopolised by nation-states (Marks et al., 1996). In other words, 
supranational actors have independent influence over policy-making. The 
MLG approach also stipulates that sub-national actors participate in national 
and supranational arenas. Bache (2008: 25) summarises that the MLG 
model makes three claims: first, decision-making competencies are shared 
by actors at different levels rather than monopolised by state executives; 
second, collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss 
of control by individual state executives; and third, sub-national actors 
operate in both national and supranational areas, creating transnational 
association in the process (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 3-4). Thus, according 
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to the MLG approach, all actors at all levels have a role in the decision-
making process, each drawing on their own resources. However, this does 
not mean that all actors have an equal influence on policy outcomes, as the 
levels of influence are dependent on the issue, institutional provision and 
public awareness (Marzeda-Mlynarska, 2011: 8).
The nation states, according to the intergovernmentalist perspective,
are the most important actors within the EU, and those actors participate in 
all decision-making negotiations. However, from this point of view, the 
European institutions are of only limited significance. These institutions are 
unable to drive decision-making further than is accepted by the central 
governments, and their main purpose is to facilitate intergovernmental 
bargaining by reducing transaction costs. Thus, according to this 
intergovernmentalist perspective, decisions, policies and main strategies are 
taken by nation states (Rosamond, 2000). In contrast, the MLG approach 
argues that negotiations can occur directly between actors operating at the 
level below the national states and actors on the supranational or 
transnational level (Britz, 2001: 8). Thus, Marks et al., (1996) consider that 
the MLG approach entails actors from different levels participating in 
different networks which deal directly with supranational actors. 
One assumption of the MLG approach is that member states no longer 
have a monopoly of influence on the EU’s foreign policy decision-making. 
This assumption is made because the competencies of this process are 
shared between various actors (Bache, 2008: 25). Therefore, EU member 
states can no longer claim that they alone represent the interests of their 
citizens, because the EU is a negotiating system comprising institutions and 
social and economic actors representing the interests of all European 
citizens (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 2002). Consequently, the member states 
should be considered mediators whose aim is to negotiate common positions 
among the competing interest groups. According to the MLG approach, 
nation states lose some of their power and authority both upwards to the 
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supranational level, and downwards to the sub-national level, however, this 
does not mean nation states necessarily lose their central roles in the 
decision-making process (Hermann-3DZáRZVND  -4). The MLG 
approach assumes that the states’ monopoly on decision-making is broken 
and that their activities are complemented by other participants of the 
policy-making process (Hermann-3DZáRZVND-4). Despite this, the 
member states still play a central role in terms of EU foreign policy 
formulation and implementation process. 
The member states are involved in all five stages of the EU’s foreign 
policy-making process: Working Groups, the Political and Security 
Committee (member states’ ambassadors), the Council Secretariat, the 
General Affairs Council (member states’ foreign ministers) and the 
European Council (Head of the Government). In the fifth stage, the member 
states have a more indirect involvement in the process through their 
representatives working within the Council Secretariat. Overall, though, it 
may be that member states play an influential role through all five stages of 
the EU’s foreign policy-making process. This is reflected in Gauttier’s 
(2004: 39) argument that there is "a concentration in Brussels of decision-
making bodies controlled by national organisations (Council, COREPER, 
and Working Groups)". Therefore, the role of supranational institutions may 
be merely supplementary to the role of nation states which, in practice, do 
not cede their control over foreign policy-making. 
Being the main executive body within its framework, the EU is a 
complex bureaucratic apparatus with the European Commission. The 
Commission has the sole right to initiate policies in the EU and is 
responsible for overseeing the implementation of, and adherence to, its laws 
and policies. However, the extension of the HR competencies by the Lisbon 
Treaty allowed the HR to become a full member and vice-president of the 
Commission, president of the External Relation Committee and to assume 
responsibility for the coherence of all aspects of EU foreign policy (Verola, 
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2010: 44). However, when its functions overlap those of the Council of 
Ministers, it is the Council which continues to have the central role in 
development of the EU's foreign policy (Verola, 2010; Jordan 2001). As
such, the member states play the key role in the foreign policy decision-
making process and hold ultimate executive power (Transki, 2008). This 
issue, as stated by the former Commissioner for External Relations, 
Christopher Patten, became the "main point of the weakness of the EU 
CFSP" (European Parliament, 12/03/2003: 7). However, this does not mean 
the supranational institutions and sub-national actors do not have a role to 
play as each are significant in conducting day-to-day policy-making 
(Rosamond, 2000).
All of the EU’s supranational institutions were opposed to the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Its institutions, including the European Parliament, 
European Commission and HR, did not issue any official stance supporting 
the US (Telo, 2006). Similarly, other EU institutions argued for solutions to 
the Iraq problem through peaceful means, in particular through the use of 
diplomatic and political channels, in order to avoid military conflict 
(European Parliament, 28/01/2003: 4). The EU remained fully supportive of 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1441 and called 
on Iraq to cooperate with the weapons inspection process (Dittrich, 2003; 
Kallberg, 2007); a position that was unanimously endorsed by the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2003. The EU’s position was completely 
opposed to any military operation conducted outside the UN’s "mandate" 
(European Parliament, 26/04/2002: 4). Furthermore, at its extraordinary 
sitting held on 20 March 2003, the European Parliament declared that it was
opposed to the war and described an invasion as a unilateral and unlawful 
act led by the US and its alliance (European Parliament, 20/03/2003). The 
Greek Presidency and the Commissioner for External Relations conducted 
several meetings with EU members, US leaders, UN officials and Arab 
countries’ foreign ministers and leaders, aimed at reaching a diplomatic 
solution to the Iraq crisis at the time. However, these meetings proved 
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fruitless as the US proceeded with a military invasion of Iraq, comprising an 
alliance which included some EU member states.  
One of the key factors that may be limiting the effectiveness of 
supranational institutions in EU foreign policy-making is the rotating nature 
of the Presidency of the Council. The Presidency of the Council is held by a 
different member state every six months, and therefore, the priorities of the 
EU's foreign policy shift every in line with each new Presidency’s agenda. 
Under this arrangement, if one of the large member states, such as France, 
Britain, or Germany holds the Presidency of the Council, it has an influence 
on its agenda and priorities. However, this is not the case if the Presidency 
is under the charge of smaller member states. As the passage of initiatives 
requires larger member states’ support, when smaller members hold the 
Presidency, they tend to draft proposals that avoid opposition from the large 
member states in order to see them adopted (Bunse, 2009: 59). Following 
the Greek Presidency in June 2003, the priority of the Iraq issue on the 
Council agenda was been scaled down significantly (Ishigaki, 2008). This 
was due to the division of key member states in their positions on Iraq, and 
the positions of smaller member states who held the Presidency at the time 
being largely ignored.
A second factor that may have limited the effectiveness of the 
supranational level of EU foreign policy-making is the multitude of 
institutions active within the Council framework, such as the Experts 
Working Groups and COREPER. These institutions have crucial roles in the 
decision-making phase as they frame appropriate foreign policy responses to 
international issues and crises (Smith, 2004a: 751; Peterson and Bomberg, 
1999: 246; Hyde-Price, 2004: 104; Vanhoonacker, 2005: 80). Accordingly, 
Smith (2004a)highlights that ‘most pre-decision deliberation takes place 
within such expert working groups, and their role in framing problems and 
suggesting appropriate policies is crucial to the smooth operation of the 
CFSP’ (Smith, 2004a: 751).
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Despite this, the complexity of the Council’s institutional structure 
means it is nearly impossible to achieve effective coordination and 
cooperation among the 27 ministers on the Council agenda’s broad range of 
issues, to the detriment of a viable and practical EU foreign policy 
(Keukeleire and Justaert, 2009: 10). This lack of coordination is exacerbated 
by the Presidency, the HR and the Council staff lacking any influence over 
foreign policy issues, and therefore being unable to effectively assist the 
Council. As a result, it is difficult for the EU to formulate coherent foreign 
policy as there is no single government that makes the ultimate decision 
over the course of action to be taken (Portela and Raube, 2009: 17).
A third contributing factor that may be limiting the effectiveness of 
supranational institutions in EU foreign policy-making is the Council 
Secretariat. The Maastricht Treaty allowed for the Council and the General 
Secretariat to be merged, while the Amsterdam Treaty provided for the 
creation of a new post, the HR, as an adjunct to the responsibilities of the 
Council Secretariat Secretary-General (Christiansen, 2001a: 755). The 
CFSP services in the Council Secretariat were created over time to limit the 
administrative burden on the rotating Presidency and the member states
(Peters and Borrás, 2009: 1). Gradually, the Council Secretariat has become 
the core of the evolving EU foreign policy machinery (Christiansen, 2001b: 
755). The Council Secretariat is not always politically neutral (Bunse, 2009: 
70) and its political power continues to grow. It assists the Presidency in the 
preparation of its term and ensures that Council activities correspond closely 
to the Presidency's work programme. It briefs the President before each 
meeting, offers policy advice, formulates compromise proposals and 
generally performs a wide range of activities necessary to gain Council 
support for policy decisions (Bunse, 2009: 70). Accordingly, the General 
Secretariat of the Council plays a central role in the Presidency’s gathering 
of information and works with the Presidency throughout negotiations
(Beach, 2002; Stubb, 2002). Small member states use the Council 
Secretariat more than larger member states in order to achieve some 
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political influence to overcome their lack of resources, coordinate activities, 
and achieve consensus through negotiation before each Council meeting
(Bunse, 2009: 70). Javier Solana (General Secretariat of the Council and HR 
of the CFSP) attempted to coordinate member states and negotiate a 
common position on Iraq in 2003, and he worked closely with the Greek 
Presidency at the time to realise this aim. Due to the division among 
member states, however, he failed in his task.
Marks (1993) argues that intergovernmental and neo-functional 
theories of the EU are inadequate because they are too narrow. According to 
Marks, these theories conceive the institutional building of the EU in a 
unique dimension, shifting from nation state domination to supranational 
domination. He argues that the debate between these theories is sterile 
because it does not take into account the mobilisation and empowerment of 
the sub-national level. A MLG approach assumes that sub-national level 
actors interact directly with supranational level actors and that such 
interactions undermine the authority of national states (Marks, 1993: 407). 
The intergovernmental approach assumes that national governments 
have the means to control the access of their sub-national governments to 
the EU’s main decision-making bodies (Moravcsik 1993). Thus, according 
to intergovernmentalist thought, even though sub-national actors are 
represented in EU policy-making, their capacity for independent action is 
severely constrained by the central governments. Therefore, 
intergovernmental perspectives assert that central governments are able to 
act as ‘gatekeepers’, controlling sub-national participation in EU policy-
making (Transki, 2008: 24). However, according to the theoretical model of 
the MLG, sub-national actors are sometimes as important as central 
governments and the EU institutions in the EU’s decision-making process. 
In certain instances, central governments are not even able to act as 
gatekeepers between sub-national actors and the EU (Sutcliffe, 2000). Sub-
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national actors are influenced by the decisions taken at the EU level and 
consequently have mobilised to participate in EU-level decision-making.
Marks et al. (2002) state that the sub-national presence has increased 
at the European level. The number of sub-national offices being established 
has increased in line with available funding. Interest groups in Brussels in 
1992 numbered 3000, including more than 500 European associations of 
which the majority had direct linkages with the European market. This 
demonstrates that while interest groups and associations are involved in
market and economic aspects, there is no single group interested in, or 
directly involved in, foreign policy formulation (Richardson, 2001: 31). 
Domestic actors and their interaction with supranational institutions 
influence EU policies (Awesti: 2007: 6). Sub-national actors are involved at 
both the national and supranational levels, creating what is called 
“transnational association” in the decision-making process (Bache, 2008: 
25). Thus, the role of sub-national authorities in EU policy formulation 
varies across member states, policy areas and the various stages of decision-
making. According to the MLG approach, sub-national institutions are able 
to pursue their interests at the EU level through formal and informal 
channels (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 4). National delegations in the Council 
of Ministers and the European Parliament can be considered a formal 
channel. These delegations can impose their national interests and take the 
interests of their sub-national units into consideration, while informal 
channels depend on the activity of regional actors and interests groups, or 
groups of experts (Romana, 2012; Awesti, 2007: 3).
Sub-national actors are facing challenges in some member states with 
nationally framed constitutional positions determining their influence at the 
EU level (Bomberg and Peterson, 1998: 219). These groups experience a 
number of financial, cultural and institutional problems that affect and limit 
their power and prevalence (Greenwood, 2003; Constantelos, 1996; Coen, 
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1998; Greenwood and Aspinwall, 1998). Therefore, some sub-national 
actors are more influential than others, in part because of their financial and 
political power at the domestic level (Transki, 2008: 24). The role of sub-
national actors in the EU, therefore, is not necessarily mediated by central 
governments. These actors may use domestic channels to access the EU, but 
they are not their only available channels. In summary, there is a role to be 
played by sub-national actors that affects the EU as a whole, but it is limited 
by national positions. According to this argument, sub-national actors may 
exist but their influence on foreign policy direction is not visible (Jeffery, 
2000: 3).
The MLG approach considers that decentralisation processes, which 
have taken place in the EU and different parts of the world in recent years, 
have led to an increase in the effectiveness of sub-national actors, 
particularly in relation to issues directly impacting local communities, such 
as peace and war (Marzeda-Mlynarska, 2011: 18; Piattoni, 2009: 12). 
Interests groups and other sub-national actors may influence governments 
by using pressure tactics including public relations campaigns and 
demonstrations. These actors may also lobby governments at any number of 
levels from supranational to communal (Greenwood, 2003; Constantelos, 
1996; Coen, 1998; Greenwood and Aspinwall, 1998). In early 2003, Iraq 
became an issue on the EU agenda. Millions of protestors staged mass 
demonstrations across Europe’s capital cities in opposition to a military 
invasion of Iraq (Hill, 2004: 152). Consequently, the government leaders of 
the EU agreed to a resolution that expressly approved of war only as a last 
resort. Despite being accepted by all of the participating governments, the 
resolution was contravened within weeks of its drafting, as a majority of EU 
states allied with the US and participated in the military invasion of Iraq 
(Schwarz, 2003). It is interesting to note, however, that some of these 
member states’ governments, such as those in Spain and Britain, were 
subsequently unsuccessful in re-election with public opposition to the Iraq 
war cited as a contributing factor (Joseph, interview: 11/10/2010). Sub-
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national actors and public opinion continued to place pressure on their 
governments until some, including the governments of Spain, Poland, and 
Italy, were forced to withdraw their military forces from Iraq. 
The MLG approach, as previously mentioned, focuses on the 
functioning of day-to-day policy-making. Such an approach is applied to 
facilitate multi-actor negotiation processes on specific issues, and includes 
the use of informal networks and coordination structures in the complex EU 
policy-making setting (Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 254; Keukeleire and Justaert, 
2009: 4). According to the MLG perspective, informal and non-
governmental mechanisms such as persons, institutions and organizations, 
should consider these informal networks and structures rather than focusing 
solely on governmental institutions and the EU's legal framework as 
effective means to develop policy. These networks and connections 
comprise EU officials and by working in the same policy areas, these 
officials have a crucial role in managing the connections between different 
pillars and levels, and amongst the Commission, Parliament, Council, and
member states. All of these informal interactions and negotiations assist in 
creating channels for dialogue to establish an understanding of the priorities 
and preferences of member states and for other foreign policy actors to 
address specific policy issues (Nasra, 2009: 8). This establishes a foundation 
for collective action amongst diverse interests, and the achievement of 
common positions on issues under debate (Nasra, 2009: 8; Clarke, 1999; 
Tallberg, 2004). As a result, the nature of the interaction and coordination 
between the EU foreign policy actors appears to depend more on informal 
negotiations and networks rather than constitutional and legal frameworks 
(Marzeda-Mlynarska, 2011: 9; Peters and Pierre, 2004: 77; Clarke, 1999).
Hooghe and Marks argue that “state sovereignty has been diminished 
by restrictions on the ability of individual governments to veto EU 
decisions”, and that national governments do not have full control over EU 
decision-making (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 4). Rather, decision-making 
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competencies are “shared by actors at different levels” (Hooghe and Marks, 
2003: 3). Within the MLG approach, collective decision-making among 
states means that individual member states face a “significant loss of 
control” (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 3). Furthermore, the collective decision-
making and independent role of the supranational institutions is eroding the 
sovereignty of national governments in Europe (Bache, 1998: 22). 
Accordingly, when a state cedes some of its power and control to 
supranational institutions, it results in the state losing part of its sovereignty. 
This is reflected in the qualified majority voting system in the Council of 
Ministers (Hermann-3DZáRZVND
In terms of foreign policy, the voting system still requires a consensus; 
foreign policy decision-making procedures require the consensus of all 
voting national representatives (Jordan 2001). As such, it does not provide 
flexibility or allow for a rapid response, further demonstrating that member 
states are not willing to surrender their sovereignty when making foreign 
policy decisions (Hermann-3DZáRZVND Schirm, 1998). As a result, 
the national governments still operate as gatekeepers at various stages of the 
foreign policy decision-making process, preventing a full emergence of real 
multi-level governance (Bache, 1998). It could be argued that, on occasion, 
the consequence of this behaviour is a political arena characterised by multi-
level participation rather than multi-level governance. In other words, sub-
national and supranational actors participate in the decision-making process 
but do not significantly influence the decision. Thus, the member states, 
each with a different history, different national interests and different styles 
of foreign policy-making, still dominate the common foreign policy-making 
process in the EU, even though its policy framework is capable of 
constraining the foreign policy behaviour of the individual member states
(Soetendorp, 1999: 1).
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7.2.2. National Interests and Political Integration in EU Foreign Policy
Realists highlight that the states always adopt different policies in 
order to pursue their national interests (Carr, 1946; Morginthu, 1948). Thus, 
according to them, there is no harmony of national interests among states, 
and national interests cannot be compromised at any cost. Thus, the main 
purpose of the state is to establish alliances with other states to protect their 
primary interests. National interest means survival for the state, and 
therefore, states always consider their interests carefully and remain 
extremely cautious about relative gains (Grieco, 1988: 602-603). However, 
according to the MLG approach, the EU is “a multi-dimensional polity 
where no specific centre for governance exists, but where different 
combinations of supranational, national and sub-national bodies cooperate” 
(Britz, 2001: 10). This reflects that national states no longer monopolise the 
EU policy process (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 3, Awesti, 2007: 3).
Accordingly, the EU institutions have a role to play in all stages of policy, 
from its formulation to its implementation (Cram, 1997: 12). Therefore, the 
EU institutions act as agents to coordinate and construct the common 
interests of all actors within the EU system (March and Olsen, 1989: 165; 
Cram, 1997: 12).
Attempts to formulate EU foreign policy have long struggled due to 
differences amongst the member states, differences between the EU level 
and the member states, as well as differences between the Community and 
the EU (Portela and Raube, 2009: 5). Thus, vertical policy coordination may 
be the most prominent example of incoherence in EU foreign policy-making. 
First, this incoherence is due to differences amongst member states, and 
second, it is a result of their unwillingness to utilise EU institutions (Portela 
and Raube, 2009: 20). The main reason behind the divisions among EU 
member states over Iraq in 2003 was their divergent interests (Wood, 2003).
The conflict of national interests of the member states constrained the 
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capacity of the institutions at the supranational level to operate effectively 
(Scharpf, 1997; Schirm, 1998; Wood, 2003).
The empirical findings reported in this study show that the primary 
influence on the EU’s foreign policy (both generally, and towards Iraq 
specifically) is the national interests of its member states. The coordination 
among various interests within EU foreign policy presents a major challenge 
to the EU’s pursuit of a common foreign policy (Smith, 2004b:740). 
National considerations have determined the commitment of member states 
to reach common policy positions, and have also reflected the limitations of 
member states’ abilities to formulate common foreign policy (Soetendorp, 
1999:150). Thus, it is difficult to achieve a truly common foreign policy 
because national interests are an indivisible part of a nation state’s position
(European Parliament, 03/09/2003). This reality means the EU is unlikely 
to develop a common foreign policy in the near future because of the 
dominance of the national interests of the member states (Solana, 
20/04/2003). Furthermore, key members, including France and Britain, will 
not voluntarily cede their power and influence within the EU (European 
Parliament, 03/09/2003). Therefore, the key European players appear to 
have given little priority to fulfilling their obligations under the EU’s 
common foreign policy to consult, inform and co-ordinate (Hughes, 2003).
EU member states’ interests are accommodated through negotiation at 
the Community level. Therefore, EU institutions have the ability to 
influence and shape areas of member state interests. This shaping process is 
always at risk of negotiation failure, particularly if the member states do not 
express their true preferences (Tallberg, 2004: 999). The divergent positions 
held by member states regarding the Iraq crisis in 2003 are a clear example 
of negotiation failure. EU institutions, such as the Commission, the 
Parliament, the Presidency and the HR, could not overcome these 
divergences because the key member states were unable to effectively 
communicate and leverage the existing EU institutions to reach a 
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compromise. In effect, the key member states did not sufficiently prioritise 
the formulation of a common foreign policy in this case (Portela and Raube, 
2009: 20). Accordingly, Hughes (2003) noted that if the key member states 
(Britain, France and Germany) had serious dialogue regarding Iraq from the 
beginning of 2002, their differences could have been much better managed 
and thus had less effect on the EU’s foreign policy (Hughes, 2003).
The key member states simply do not want the EU’s supranational 
institutions to be strong foreign policy actors. However, some small member 
states are willing to  transfer some of their power to the supranational level 
in order to build their capacity and to more efficiently achieve their policy 
goals. According to the MLG approach, this does not necessarily mean these 
states are being weakened (Hermann-3DZáRZVND  Key member 
states, however, weaken EU interaction and coordination in the realm of 
foreign policy. While EU foreign policy exists in its own right, the leaders 
of key member states reduce its effectiveness through the pursuit of their 
own foreign policy objectives. This allows their state to retain a level of 
international influence and authority which is partly motivated by the 
considerations of their national constituencies (Bindi and Shapiro, 2010: 
339). In the absence of sound mechanisms to create a common political will, 
the key member states will remain the driving force underpinning EU 
foreign policy development, with incoherent, yet high-profile, results 
(European Parliament, 12/03/2003: 8). As such, EU institutions are 
constrained in achieving a unified foreign policy (Chari and Cavatorta, 
2008). Strong and effective EU foreign policy cannot be achieved unless the 
member states, in particular the key member states, are willing to develop 
genuine common strategies, and to coordinate and operate consistently 
within those strategies across all major foreign policy challenges (Hughes, 
2003). 
The EU could not agree on a strategy towards Iraq in 2003 due to 
some member states’ national interests. The foreign policies of these 
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member states prioritised their own alliances with the US over their 
alliances within Europe (European Parliament, 20/03/2003:14). For example, 
a number of Central and Eastern European countries (ECE) preferred to 
align with the US instead of their European allies. The security dimensions 
of the Iraq war of 2003 dictated this approach as these post-Soviet states 
placed greater importance on an alliance with the US to protect them from 
Russian influence (Solana, 11/07/2003); they were motivated by 
opportunities to leverage both an expansion of US military assistance to 
their countries, and increased US power and influence in their region, as a 
counter-balance to Russia’s influence (Rhodes, 2004). Economic benefits 
were also anticipated in return for support for the US (Rhodes, 2004), 
including sharing in lucrative contracts associated with post-war 
reconstruction in Iraq. These countries also aligned their interests closer 
with those of the US in order to enhance their autonomy and effectiveness 
within the EU (Schuster and Maier, 2006).As demonstrated, the foreign 
policies of nation states are ultimately determined by their national interests, 
even though the public opinion within these states may contradict these 
interests. For example, from early 2002, the British government supported 
the US’s preference for military action against Iraq despite 60 to 80 per cent 
of British citizens were opposed to the war (Wood, 2003). Britain’s support 
of the US was partly resulted from its hopes to gain some influence in its 
relationship with the US (Hughes, 2003).
Consequently, internationally, the EU plays the role of an economic 
giant but a political dwarf in terms of foreign policy (Staab, 2008:134; 
Schirm, 1998). The interests of the member states  are considered the most 
serious obstacle to the emergence of a truly common European foreign and 
security policy (Qhrgaard, 2004:32-33) they prevent the EU’s foreign policy 
from transcending those of the member states (Staab, 2008: 55).
If the EU member states abandoned some of their individual interests 
and acted collectively in the interests of the EU, creation of a credible, 
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effective and coherent EU foreign policy could be achieved (Kaya, 2008: 
1745). It could be argued that not only would the EU function as a coherent 
actor in the international arena, but the influence of individual EU member 
states, in comparison with acting individually, could also increase (Kaya, 
2008: 1743). The division over the Iraq war of 2003 reflected the lack of 
coherence among EU member states which contributed to its position as a 
weak actor in the international arena. This was evident when the EU, 
opposed to military conflict in Iraq, was unable to effectively influence US 
foreign policy and prevent it from commencing military operations (Kaya, 
2008:  1745). Accordingly, the EU member states failed to agree on policy 
towards Iraq, not only with each other, but with the US too. It became 
apparent during the period from September 2002 to April 2003 that the EU 
divisions were not only over policy towards Iraq but also over how to 
handle the transatlantic relationship (Hughes, 2003). These divisions clearly 
reflected the EU’s struggles to achieve political unity. 
There is difficulty in defining the EU’s role in world politics. Ginsberg 
(1999: 432) describes the EU as “neither a state nor a non-state 
actor…neither a conventional international organisation nor an international 
regime”. Thus, it is a unique entity in international politics. The EU 
attempted to establish new institutions through the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, 
such as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the President of 
the EU, in order to promote political integration within the EU. These
efforts at political integration, however, continue to suffer from high levels 
of segmentation (Peters and Borras, 2009: 8). According to the empirical 
data collected in this study, it is clear that political integration is a major 
obstacle to developing an effective and coordinated EU foreign policy. 
Although the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 established the contemporary EU 
with the aim of enabling political integration alongside economic integration, 
this objective is facing considerable challenges from national interests and 
the principle of state sovereignty (European Parliament, 14/05/ 2003: 122; 
Richardson, 2001: 30).
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Some international relations theories (IR), especially the state centric 
paradigm, ‘realism’, considers that European integration was created in 
order to empower individual states through common means,  suggesting that 
integration among European countries is little to do with Europe, and 
everything to do with the states (Norris, 2002: 36). This is because realism 
considers the sovereign state as a primary actor in the international system. 
Furthermore, it considers sovereignty to be axiomatic of statehood 
(Morgenthau, 1978; Wright, 2011: 10). Accordingly, realists highlight there 
is no supreme body above the national states which could implement its 
authority. This means that all national states have absolute independence 
and sovereignty in dealing with their internal and external affairs. Therefore, 
the national states have the full ability to exercise their sovereign duties 
(Amin et al., 2011: 4-5). 
While integration theories such as intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism aim to explain the nature and speed of European 
integration (Bache and Flinders 2004: 2), intergovernmentalism resembles 
realism in highlighting the central role of national governments in the 
process of integration. In contrast, neofunctionalism suggests that states are 
increasingly losing control in a “web of interdependence” which provides a 
role for supranational actors and organised interests in shaping the direction
of integration (Bache and Flinders 2004: 2). However, the MLG approach 
often assumes that to the extent that sub-national, supranational and non-
state actors have gained power through the process of European integration, 
it may be at the expense of state power and sovereignty (Bache, 2008: 36). 
Hooghe and Marks (2003: 4) argue that “state sovereignty has been 
diminished by restrictions on the ability of individual governments to veto 
EU decisions”, and the decision-making competencies are “shared by actors
at different levels” (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 3). Thus, the national 
governments do not have full control over EU decision-making.
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The EU’s political integration remains fragile and confused due to the 
unwillingness of the member states to transfer sovereignty in sensitive 
policy areas such as foreign and security policy (Gauttier, 2004: 23). Some 
EU member states do not want to integrate politically as they cling to the 
sovereignty and remain reluctant to transfer certain aspects of governmental 
control to the supranational level. For example, Britain has argued that the 
sovereign national state is the natural unit of political life and that the EU 
must limit itself to commercial concerns (European Parliament, 14/05/2003: 
122). The EU’s member states continually prioritise their own sovereignty 
when considering foreign policy decisions (Chari and Cavatorta, 2008). 
Thus, the strength of state sovereignty, and the maintenance of its power, is 
the most important factor contributing to the EU’s inherent weakness and 
inability to act effectively through foreign policy (Gauttier, 2004: 24).
The key member states are overly concerned with their sovereignty, 
while some small member states are more willing to consider a genuine, 
deeper pooling of sovereignty (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004: 137; White, 2004; 
Hughes, 2003). This has led to the establishment of two opposing forces 
within the EU (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004: 137; Hughes, 2003). Some of the 
smaller member states prefer a supranational foreign and security policy, 
while key member states oppose any significant limitation of their national 
sovereignty. Accordingly, “governments with higher power capabilities will 
be less supportive of supranational integration in foreign and security 
matters than governments with lower capabilities” (Koenig-Archibugi, 
2004: 145). The key member states are unwilling to confer the EU with the 
sufficient legal and authoritative legitimacy to effectively participate in the 
international arena on behalf of the EU member states (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 330). This is because these member states consider 
themselves as having the strongest voices internationally in pursuing their 
own national foreign policy objectives (Hughes, 2003). 
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The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the key member states are neither 
ready nor willing to give up substantial amounts of national sovereignty in 
order form a unified European foreign policy. The key member states, in 
particular Britain and France, are not ready to surrender their international 
role to contribute to a collective European voice (Hughes, 2003). While 
these member states may accept nations such as Brazil, Germany, India or 
Japan as permanent members of the UN Security Council in the future, it is 
considered unlikely they will accept the concept of a single EU seat in the 
same position. This means that these member states still prioritise their 
national interests and their respective individual role in the international 
arena, rather than that of the EU (Hughes, 2003). 
As a result, the absence of European political integration has affected 
the authority of supranational institutions (Winzen et al., 2012: 5). 
Furthermore, the lack of European political integration, and the 
unwillingness of key member states to transfer part of their sovereignty to
the European level, has affected the EU’s ability to achieve a unified foreign 
policy and, in relation to the Iraq crisis in 2003, has resulted in a fragmented 
policy response (Gordon, 1997-1998:100; Andreatta, 2005; Cugusi and 
Stocchiero, 2010: 3).
7.2.3. Impediments to EU Foreign Policy Implementation in Iraq
According to the MLG approach, the implementation of EU policies 
reflects a form of interaction and coordination between EU actors across 
different levels, and thus may be seen as one form of vertical interaction 
(Bjorn, 2008: 9). Hooghe and Marks (2001) associate multi-level 
governance with the dispersion of authoritative decision-making across 
multiple territorial levels as a result of a member state implementing EU 
regional policy. In practice, both the Commission and national governments 
share the competencies of formal executive power and implementation 
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(George et al., 1997: 119). National governments monitor the executive 
powers of the Commission in conjunction with sub-national governments 
and local-level actors. Conversely, the Commission has become involved in 
activities associated with policy implementation and has contact with sub-
national authorities and interest groups (Transki, 2008: 30). Therefore, 
although the Commission does not have a strong influence on the CFSP 
process, it is directly involved in the implementation of this policy (George 
et al., 1997). There are also other actors in the EU who deal with the CFSP 
implementation process. For example, the Presidency and the HR are 
responsible for political dialogue with non-European countries (Smith, 
2004b: 744). Thus, both the supranational bodies of the EU and the member 
states project their foreign policy positions to the international community 
simultaneously. 
A ‘Joint Action’ refers to a situation where the EU executes policies 
such as expenditure, while a ‘Common Position’ occurs when EU member 
states reach consensus on a particular foreign policy issue (White, 2001) 
Article six from an EU Joint Action in 2004 indicated that the Presidency 
was to be responsible for the implementation of these Joint Actions in full 
association with the Commission (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). 
The Presidency and the Commission were charged in particular with 
ensuring appropriate visibility of the EU’s contribution (Christiansen, 
2001b; Miller, 2009; Nugent, 1999; Gauttier, 2004: 26; George et al., 1997: 
120). However, in terms of Iraq in the post-2003 war era, the EU lacked 
visibility because its programs were implemented by the UN and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). This will be explained further in the 
next section of this chapter.  
The construction of effective EU foreign policy depends on a certain 
level of coherence between member states and EU institutions (Portela and 
Raube, 2009: 4). According to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU shall 
ensure the consistency of its external activities, and the Commission and the 
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Council in particular shall cooperate to this end: "Council ensures the unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union” (TEU, 1992: Article 
13). Thus, the foreign policies of the member states and the EU should be 
complementary (Nuttall 2005; Smith 2003: 65). A major issue impacting on 
this coordination is that the EU does not have unified delegations in non-EU 
countries; it has multiple representations. For example, there are 
Commission delegations, the HR Special Representative, and member 
states’ embassies, and coordination between each of these actors remains 
limited. This division of representations may be seen as confusing for non-
EU countries in regards to their understanding as to who they should engage 
with (Alcalde and Bouchard, 2008).
The member states’ division regarding the Iraq war in 2003 affected 
the EU’s ability to implement a common policy position in response to the 
crisis. Indeed, some European Parliament Members continue to be affected 
by this major rift and do not want to engage on divisive issues for the sake 
of maintaining some semblance of unity. The Presidency, at the time of the
war, confirmed there were a number of difficulties and challenges facing the 
EU when applying its priorities in Iraq, and that one of these challenges was 
the differences between member states (European Parliament, 14/05/2003: 
8). Divergences between EU member states on how to respond to the war in 
2003 led to a lack of harmonisation between EU institutions and individual 
member states in relation to capacity-building and democratisation efforts in 
Iraq (Burke, 2009: 16). These divergences prevented the EU from sending a 
diplomatic contingent to Iraq, thus delaying the EU’s presence in the 
country until 2005 (Youngs, 2004: 4). As a result, it continued to be difficult 
for the EU to implement some of its programs in Iraq following the military 
conflict, particularly when the member states’ positions remained divergent 
even in the post-war era. 
According to the MLG approach, foreign policy implementation is 
dispersed among a variety of actors at a variety of levels. This assumption 
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directly challenges the sovereignty of member states (Nasra, 2009: 8). 
Although member states delegate some of their foreign policy areas (for 
example, trade and humanitarian aid) to the EU institutions, they maintain 
their rights to act unilaterally and conduct their national foreign policy 
objectives outside the auspices of the EU (Nasra, 2009: 8). This is reflected 
in the level of assistance afforded to Iraq since the war, which has varied 
across EU member states. Two categories of bilateral relations between Iraq 
and EU member states have been observed. The first category consists of 
those states that were involved in the Iraq war in 2003, while the second 
category consists of those states that were not. Those countries active in the 
Iraq war have provided approximately 94 per cent of the EU’s share of 
humanitarian aid to Iraq. For example, Britain deployed approximately 
46,000 troops to Iraq operations in 2003 and expended around six and a half 
billion US dollars in military and civilian activities (Burke, 2009: 1). Those 
countries that did not involve themselves in the military invasion have not 
developed bilateral ties with Iraq. For example, France, which did not 
engage with Iraq in the period from 2003-09, provided Iraq with limited 
assistance through the EU, Northern Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), and 
UN programs. France did provide aid for humanitarian projects in Iraq from 
2007-08, but this was less than the contributions of small European 
countries such as Ireland (Burke, 2009: 8). There has been no major 
program created or led by France, although it did announce in 2007 that it 
would re-engage with Iraq from 2009 (Burke, 2009: 5). Member states also 
chose to control their contribution to specific projects in Iraq. For example, 
Germany, Italy and Britain each assumed responsibility for supporting 
different areas of Iraq’s security apparatus. Germany was involved in the 
development of Iraq’s police forces, Italy supported the development of 
Iraq’s judiciary, and Britain supported efforts to address the prevalence of 
drug-related crimes. The result of this arrangement was an unproductive 
mess (Gowan and Korski, 2009). If these member states had presented 
themselves as united in one policy and one programme under the auspices 
of the EU, member states’ overall contribution could have been more 
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productive. While there is coordination between member states and the EU 
regarding their programmes in Iraq, member states work primarily on the 
basis of their national interest which has a detrimental effect on EU foreign 
policy overall. 
The EU has taken steps to develop its relations with Iraq since 2003 in 
different ways. These steps include the provision of financial support and 
humanitarian assistance, participating in reconstruction activities, 
supporting UN-led actions, and the deployment of the civilian crisis 
management mission EUJUST LEX. They also include the establishment of 
a multi-donor instrument for channeling international support for the 
reconstruction process. However, "the EU still struggles to define and above 
all implement a well-structured strategy towards Iraq" (Tocci and Voltolini, 
2010: 127). This is due to the EU foreign policy-makers and member states, 
when dealing with crisis or war, failing to formulate a proactive agenda. 
Moreover, the EU’s response to events in Iraq was to tactically add some 
competencies in foreign policy at the supranational level rather than to 
devise a clear strategy (Bindi and Shapiro, 2010: 343). Consequently, the 
EU had no coordinated policy on Iraq, and the efforts it expended in support
of rebuilding Iraq were insufficient (European Parliament, 03/09/2003). 
The EU’s implementation capacity in Iraq is limited due to a lack of 
human resources (Mette et al., 2003: 392-93). Before May 2005, the EU did 
not have any delegation in Iraq. This was due in part to the divergence 
among member states, the high expenses involved in establishing the 
delegation, and the dangerous security situation in Iraq. Christopher Patten, 
the Commissioner for External Relations, highlighted that “in the longer 
term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented 
on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, 
expensive, and potentially dangerous” (Patten, 15/09/2004). Although, in 
May 2005, the EU established a small delegation in Iraq, but its limited 
scope did not allow it to carry out all of the EU's projects without the 
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support of other parties (Gomes, 2008: 5). Added to this was the logistical 
difficulty of operating in places outside the ‘green’ security zone in Iraq’s 
capital, Baghdad, or in other Iraqi provinces. The EU’s delegation in Iraq 
comprised only thirty staff compared to the UN’s staff of 300 (Gowan and 
Korski, 2009). This arrangement rendered the EU delegation limited in its 
ability to effectively implement the full scope of the EU’s programs. For 
example, foreign policy implementation requires bi-lateral cooperation to be 
undertaken by the Commission. However, the Commission is not 
responsible for directly carrying out the programs and projects, but does so 
through its contracts with local partners, NGOs and UN agencies. The size 
of the EU delegation may also be perceived as a lack of commitment to 
engage meaningfully in Iraq reflecting its largely invisible political role in
Iraq (Genderen, 2010), as an Iraqi diplomat stated: “Iraqis do not know what 
the EU does, they don’t see the EU. I myself don’t know what they do…” 
(Burke, 2009:1).
Complex internal governance processes and the institutional structure 
of the EU system prevent quick implementation of its foreign policy 
objectives, and prevented a coherent EU response to the 2003 war in Iraq 
(Mette et al. 2003: 387). Solana indicated that because the EU is not a 
country but a collection of countries, many decisions and policies take time 
in order to be implemented (Solana,13/07/2003). However, it was not these 
reasons alone that affected the EU's foreign policy implementation in Iraq; 
many external factors also negatively impacted the EU’s foreign policy 
performance and visibility in Iraq.
7.3. External Factors Affecting EU Foreign Policy towards Iraq
EU foreign policy is seen as part of an evolving multi-actor global 
system resulting from complex interactions produced at different levels of 
action, “national, transnational and international” (Bretherton and Vogler, 
2006: 13; Hill and Smith, 2005: 9; Rosamond, 2000: 175-176). The 
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theoretical approach of this study provides a flexible conceptual framework 
to understand the relationships between national, regional and international 
governments (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). Furthermore, the MLG approach 
enables a focus on how the EU’s governance system affects its capacity to 
act towards the outside, and how the outside affects its foreign policy 
(Filtenborg, et al., 2002). Accordingly, the EU approach towards any region 
across the world is affected by the region’s internal environment as well as 
the external attitudes towards this region. Therefore, the EU’s foreign policy 
towards Iraq during 2001-09 is affected by the country’s internal situation, 
the UN and US presence in Iraq, and the attitudes of Iraq’s neighbouring 
countries towards Iraq.   
A key impediment to the EU’s involvement in Iraq during the post-
war period was the disjointed relationship between the EU and Iraq. The EU 
had no political or contractual relations with Saddam Hussein’s regime 
throughout his time in power, andas such, EU-Iraq relations were limited. 
After Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed in 2003, the EU maintained a low 
level of involvement, particularly during 2003 and 2004. This was due to 
the absence of an elected Iraqi government at the time. Although the EU 
engaged in informal political dialogue with the Interim Iraqi Government, 
which was established in accordance with UN resolution 1546, it did not 
seek a formal relationship with Iraq until an elected government was 
established. The EU planned to develop a long-term and comprehensive 
partnership with Iraq rather than pursue immediate engagement with an 
interim governing authority (Youngs, 2004). Eventually, in 2010, the 
"Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” was signed by both parties, 
forming the basis of a new contractual relationship between the EU and Iraq 
in the areas of trade, development, and regular political cooperation and 
dialogue (European Commission, 2010: 2). However, the considerable time 
taken for this agreement to be approved continues to delay its full 
implementation. Evidently, between 2001 and 2009, the EU did not have a 
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clear framework to inform its relationship with Iraq, despite its contributions 
under the auspices of the UN. 
The role of the EU foreign policy towards Iraq in the post-war era 
lacked a single direction due to the failure to establish a clear approach on 
how to address the issue. The European Commission had no clear strategy 
on how to deal with Iraq due to its limited relations with the country –
restricted to humanitarian aid during economic sanctions imposed by the 
UN between 1990-2003 (Burke, 2009: 9). Thus, the EU had a paucity of 
policy history in Iraq during this time. However, some member states, 
particularly those who had opposed military conflict against Iraq, were 
unwilling to become involved in Iraq and adopted a ‘do nothing’ position. 
Accordingly, those states highlighted that the EU should ‘do nothing’ and/or 
‘let the UN do it’ (Lewis, 2008: 14). Thus, these member states were willing 
to increase the UN’s role and involvement in Iraq in the post-war era. This 
position was expressed at a critical point before reconstruction deliberations 
among the foreign ministers progressed. Consequently, the UN role’s did 
increase and it became a key player in Iraq’s post-war reconstruction, while 
the dialogue among EU foreign ministers was focused on what means and 
methods of EU involvement would be the most effective (Lewis, 2008:16). 
Accordingly, the EU member states highlighted that “the [EU] stands ready 
to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq…[and] invites the Commission 
and High Representative to submit proposals for an EU contribution” 
(Lewis, 2008: 18). Moreover, the member states requested that the 
Commission become more involved in Iraq’s reconstruction, for example, 
through aiding in the organisation and implementation of basic political 
conditions and frameworks within Iraq. However, it remained difficult for 
the Commission to have an effective role in the absence of a political 
framework to inform its relationship with Iraq, the establishment of which 
was still to be addressed by the EU (European Parliament, 14/05/2003). 
Furthermore, most of the EU’s contributions to Iraq’s post-war construction 
were conducted under the auspices of the UN. This reflected that the EU 
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and its member states were unwilling to become key and effective players in 
Iraq. 
The lack of political stability in Iraq, and the limited administrative 
infrastructure available for the implementation of investment programs
offered by the EU are also key factors which have affected the EU’s 
visibility in Iraq since the war. Iraq has endured many intractable problems 
since, including a divided society and political leadership, an unstable 
security situation, sectarian conflict and damaging insurgency, and an 
absence of the rule of law. It has also endured a lack of public services and 
infrastructure, immense displacement of the populace, and fractious 
relations with its neighbouring countries (Gomes, 2008). Consequently, 
although the EU demonstrated a willingness to play a proactive role in 
supporting Iraq’s reconstruction and development post-war, the absence of a 
solid foundation both within Iraq and the EU contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of the EU’s initiatives.
It may be considered that security concerns have been a major factor 
impacting the EU’s involvement in post-war Iraq. From 2005 to 2008, Iraq’s 
security and stability became more complex and insecure due to the number 
of attacks on Iraqi civilians by insurgency groups (Iraqi and foreign 
insurgents). These comprised a number of different ethnic, political and 
sectarian militias who targeted civilians in public areas according to their 
faith or sect. These terrorist acts have led to a number of minority groups 
with shared identities living together to protect themselves against attack. 
Other citizens, however, have moved to neighbouring countries, such as 
Syria and Jordan, for protection. This ongoing security vacuum in Iraq 
together with multilateral attempts to rebuild the Iraqi state have been major 
obstacles to greater EU involvement in post-war Iraq. The consequences 
have been profound, prohibiting the efficacy of work undertaken outside the 
‘green’ security zone in Baghdad or the coalition military bases that are 
located across the country (Dodge, 2006; Kuzmicheva, 2008).
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Another reason for the EU not being strongly involved in Iraq from 
2003 to 2009 was due to many EU actors considering Iraq to be a defence 
and security policy issue. This may have driven the EU to believe that the 
US was the only actor capable of dealing with Iraq’s security issues and that 
the EU could only participate upon the resolution of these issues. The 
security situation in Iraq, however, continued to deteriorate, and the EU has 
remained incapable of participating in a significant way until these 
conditions improve. Development programs and activities may be increased 
by some member states, but these are also dependent on Iraq remaining
stable and secure (Schmid, 2008). Thus, the EU’s role in Iraq has remained 
limited due to this instability (Kuzmicheva, 2008).
Following the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, all 
EU member states supported the US’s war against terrorism and the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan. However, when US President Bush decided to 
extend the war against terrorism to Iraq, several EU member states 
(including France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium), supported by a 
majority European public opinion, opposed such an extension of military 
operations (Kaya, 2008, 1753). As a result, the US’s presence in Iraq may 
also be considered as having affected EU involvement in Iraq from 2003 to 
2009. A reason the EU did not become strongly involved in post-war Iraq 
was due to some member states, such as France, who viewed Iraq’s 
reconstruction as the responsibility of the US. Accordingly, the US and its 
allies, including Britain, assumed responsibility for the re-establishment of 
law and order in Iraq and security of its population. The US alliance 
requested assistance from other countries and it was in this area of foreign 
policy that the EU was perceived as willing to be involved (Solana, 
20/04/2003). However, some member states, such as France, were reticent 
to form a relationship with the new, interim Iraqi government as the US was 
considered the primary actor in the interim leadership’s appointment in 
2004 (Youngs, 2004). This was illustrated by France’s cancellation of a 
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diplomatic visit to the French capital by the President of Iraq, Gazi al-Yawar, 
as part of his tour of Europe in 2004. 
France and Germany’s opposition to the US invasion of Iraq reflected 
self-conscious efforts “to constrain and contain the US” which overrode 
their concerns regarding Saddam Hussein’s potential stores of weapons of 
mass destruction (Rhodes, 2004). This is an example of how the key 
European states tend to act in opposition to the US in order to enhance their 
own autonomy and influence in the international arena (Schuster and Maier, 
2006). However, the US made concerted efforts to secure support from a 
number of European countries during the build-up to the 2003 war, and in 
doing so, attempted to isolate France and Germany (Wall, 2004: 133).  In 
early 2003, when the US decided to extend its ‘war against terrorism’ to 
Iraq, the diverging interests of EU member states led to divisions. . These 
divisions prevented the adoption of a common policy position and 
demonstrated a lack of coherence, undermining the EU’s effectiveness as an 
important actor in global politics, and reflecting an inability to respond to 
events as they unfolded (Kaya, 2008: 1745; Wall, 2004: 131). 
Some of Iraq’s neighbours, such as Iran and Syria, were hostile to the 
US’s presence in Iraq after the war of 2003. In the case of Iran, this reflected 
long-standing tensions with Western nations in general, and with the US in 
particular. Iran’s President Ahmdinejad has continually reinforced Iran’s 
anti-US and anti-Western stance (Zuhu, 2006: 4). Iran and Syria feared that 
the US would seek regime change in their own countries following its 
mission in Iraq in 2003. This fear has driven these countries’ strong 
involvement in the internal situation in Iraq (Dobbins et al., 2009: xiv). Iran 
and Syria have also supported a number of Sunni and Shia insurgency 
groups’ resistance to the US involvement in Iraq since the war, further 
impacting on Iraq’s stability. According to US intelligence, some 
neighbouring countries, such as Iran, supported insurgency groups inside 
Iraq by providing them with shoulder-fired missiles, multiple rocket 
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launchers and rocket-propelled grenades. Furthermore, Iran supported some 
Iraqi factions financially and provided training support for others (Carpenter 
and Innocent, 2007: 71). As a result, the security situation in Iraq worsened, 
and that affected the EU’s willingness to become involved more effectively. 
Almost all of the Arab Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait supported the US-led invasion of 
Iraq, and the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. Simultaneously, 
however, these nations did not necessarily wish for the US to be fully 
successful in establishing a new democratic political system in Iraq,  as they 
saw a strong and democratic Iraq as a potential threat to maintaining 
political stability within their own countries (Alterman, 2007: 3). 
Consequently, these countries are facing many challenges as a result of the 
collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Alterman, 2007: 2). First, the Arab 
Gulf countries feel threatened by Iran’s strong military forces. This fear has 
led to efforts to bolster their own military strength, fuelling competition or, 
more precisely, hidden conflict between these countries and Iran. Such 
conflict has negatively impacted on Iraq’s stability (Carpenter and Innocent, 
2007: 72-73). A second challenge is that as jihadist movements in the region 
have developed, sectarian tensions have become more apparent inside Arab 
Gulf countries, affecting their own stability. Sectarian conflict and political 
instability continues to persist in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.  
The majority of Arab leaders remain concerned about Iraq-Iran 
relations, particularly following the Shia political parties’ assumption of 
power in Iraq in 2005. The ensuing strong relationship between Iraqi Shias 
and the Iran regime has implications for the future security of their own 
nations. In 2006, former Egyptian President Mubarak declared, “the Shiites 
are always loyal to Iran. Most of them are loyal to Iran and not to the 
countries in which they live.” These public statements reflect the anti-Shia 
and anti-Iranian sentiment that predominates in the Arab Middle East, in 
addition to their discontent with the US (Zuhu, 2006: 3-4). This point of 
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view has impacted on Iraq-Arab relationships since 2003. Nearly all Arab 
countries have interfered in Iraqi political affairs, providing some sectarian 
factions with financial support, in opposition to Shia political actors, and 
thus fuelling the ongoing sectarian conflict that persists in Iraq to this day. 
In summary, the US’s presence in Iraq has affected the entire region’s 
stability, further minimizing the involvement of the EU’s. 
EU members, in particular France and Germany, believed that the UN, 
as a representative of the international community, should have assumed a 
stronger role in response to the Iraq war, not just in re-building the country’s 
infrastructure, but in also being responsible for the management of the 
country’s resources (Ortega, 2002). German Chancellor Schroder 
announced in 2003 the willingness of Germany to participate in the 
reconstruction of Iraq if there was a clear UN mandate and a strong role for 
the UN in Iraq (Harnisch, 2004: 19). However, the implementation of EU 
programmes under the auspices of the UN has affected the visibility of the 
EU in Iraq. The EU supported the major role played by the UN in all areas 
of Iraq’s reconstruction. The EU’s position was that if the UN led the 
international community’s response to reconstruction in Iraq’, it would 
provide the necessary legitimacy for the process. In particular, the EU 
believed it would provide legitimacy for the establishment of a stable, 
democratic system, including the conduct of elections, the creation of a new 
government, and the development of a new constitution. Therefore, almost 
all EU assistance for Iraq, which has amounted to nearly one billion Euros, 
has been implemented through the International Reconstruction Fund 
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), managed by the World Bank and the UN. This
arrangement may have obscured the EU’s visibility in Iraq. As a result, the 
report entitled “the European Union's role in Iraq” introduced in the 
European Parliament by Anan Gomes (Member of European Parliament) in 
2008 encouraged the EU Council and the Commission to play a more active 
and visible role, to engage more deeply with Iraqi government and civil 
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society institutions than it had done previously, and to seek more effective 
ways to use EU resources (Gomes, 2008: 14).
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Chapter 8:
Conclusion
199
This study has set out to explore the relationship between a variety of 
actors within and across different levels of the EU, each comprising 
competing interests and priorities. The study has predominantly sought to 
examine how the interaction and coordination within the EU body, both 
horizontally (across pillars), and vertically (across levels), impacts on the 
EU’s foreign policy performance in general, and towards Iraq during 2001-
2009 more specifically.
The relationships of the EU’s foreign policy actors are affected at 
different levels: at the intergovernmental level (member states), at the 
supranational level (EU institutions), and at the sub-national level (interest 
groups, lobbies, public opinion) (Kaya, 2005). Thus, any potential for policy 
harmonisation may theoretically be achieved through an interaction among 
the foreign policies of the 27 member states on the one hand, and through 
the EU’s own supranational institutions on the other. This kind of 
interaction is very important to ensure an effective approach to EU foreign 
policy making. Against this background, this study has sought to map out 
how the interaction and coordination among the EU’s foreign policy actors 
occurs, and the extent to which these interactions were a key factor in 
determining the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq during 2001-2009. This 
study’s findings suggest that low interaction and coordination between the 
EU’s foreign policy actors has affected its foreign policy towards Iraq 
throughout this critical period.
This study examines the EU foreign policy towards Iraq during 2001-
2009, and how this topic relates to the international relations theories (IR). 
The EU, being neither a state nor an international organisation, is an entity 
that comprises a group of nation states which interact and cooperate under 
the EU umbrella. Thus, its position towards any issue in the international 
arena depends on the respective positions of its member states and other 
actors from different levels. According to one of the key IR theories 
(realism), this position can be interpreted as a non-position, in which case 
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the EU does not count as an actor at the international level as it is highly 
GHSHQGHQW RQ WKH SRVLWLRQV RI HDFK RI LWV PHPEHU VWDWHV 7DUĠD 
Realist theory considers nation states as primary actors in the international 
arena which are fundamentally engaged in the struggle for survival through 
maximisation of power (Nuruzzaman, 2006, p. 241). According to this 
theory, “every state must strive to ensure its own security and survival” 
(Nuruzzaman, 2006, p. 241). Because of this ongoing security dilemma, war 
LVDOZD\VFRQVLGHUHGLPPLQHQW7DUĠD+RZHYHUWKLV tenet of realist 
theory exposes its weakness, as in the contemporary world, war between 
states is not imminent, and the current international situation is considered 
RQH RI WKH TXLHWHVW LQ KLVWRU\ RQ WKLV IURQW 7DUĠD  Furthermore, 
realism fails to examine the EU sufficiently because it considers only 
sovereign states as actors, while the role of institutions such as EU remain 
unaccounted for  in international politics (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 
2008: 328-329). On the other hand, realism can be useful in examining the 
foreign policies of individual member states, particularly those states which 
supported the US-led war against Iraq in 2003, and how this affected the EU. 
Liberalism theory considers that the states are able to pursue mutual 
interests and cooperation through international organisations, and according 
to international law. Liberalists consider the EU a peaceful institution and a 
civilian power, sometimes referred to as a ‘soft’ power. This is because the 
EU’s activities are increasingly focused on trade and development, human 
rights, the rule of law, and democracy (Britz, 2001). Thus, the liberalists 
focus on non-military instruments, and argue that the state can be a key 
player in the international arena through these instruments rather than 
military instruments. One of the assumptions of liberalism is that the state 
does not use power against other states. According to this theory, one of the 
main principles of the EU is to function as a peaceful entity globally without 
resorting to military conflict. However, “the most fundamental principle of 
European foreign policy cooperation is that EU member states must avoid 
taking fixed positions on important foreign policy questions without prior 
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consultation with their partners” (Smith, 2004b: 101). The majority of the 
member states such as Britain, Spain and Italy who participated in the US-
led war of 2003 against Iraq, did so without consulting the EU institutions 
and their partners within EU (Lewis, 2008; Dimitrakopoulos and Passas 
2004). This reflected an EU identity crisis which affected solidarity and its 
institutional functionality and effectiveness (Herman, 2012: 7). Furthermore, 
liberalism fails to consider how the interactions between EU supranational 
institutions affected its foreign policy. However, liberalism may be useful to 
account for the effects of divergent individual national interests on EU 
foreign policy towards Iraq in 2003, and also examining how the non-
military instruments, utilised by the EU during 2003-2009, affected its role 
in Iraq. 
In contrast to realism and liberalism, which are focused on material 
factors such as power, economics, and trade, constructivism emphasises the 
impact of ideas. Constructivism “pays close attention to the prevailing 
discourse(s) in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and 
interests, and establishes accepted norms of behavior” (Walt, 1998: 4). The 
common theme between constructivist theorists is “the capacity of discourse 
to shape how political actors define themselves and their interests, and thus 
modify their behavior” (Walt, 1998: 4). Accordingly, constructivists 
highlighted that the European institutions’ responsibilities are to shape the 
preferences and interests of EU member states according to EU norms, 
principles, values and identity. These elements, according to constructivist 
theory, are constitutive elements of the EU’s foreign policy (Kartal, 2006). 
However, although these elements are important in the formulation of EU 
foreign policy, the differences in power and interests remain crucial 
variables in determining the foreign policies of member states, and whether 
a common EU foreign policy is achievable (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 
2008: 332). For example, during the Iraq war, the EU member states had 
different positions which affected the EU’s ability to achieve a common 
position towards Iraq.  
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Functionalism is one of the integration theories which argues that 
cooperation in economic and low politics areas will lead to the achievement 
of political integration (Mitrany, 1971). Furthermore, functionalism 
highlights that the creation of supranational institutions enables the 
integration process (Rosamond, 2000; Cini, 2003). Thus, the main 
assumption of functionalism is that national states are increasingly losing 
control in a “web of interdependence” that provides a role for supranational 
actors and organised interests in shaping the direction of integration (Bache 
and Flinders 2004: 2). However, cooperation in low politics areas does not 
always lead to political integration (Hansen, 1969; Rosamond, 2000). In 
addition, the member states of the EU are unlikely to easily accept loss of 
their sovereignty, particularly in relation to foreign policy and security 
(Risse, 2004: 9). Furthermore, this study does not focus just on the 
supranational level, it also focuses on the interaction between all levels and 
pillars within the EU in order to account for, and evaluate, the EU foreign 
policy and its position regarding Iraq during 2001-2009.
In contrast, another integration theory, intergovernmentalism, argues 
that nation states are the main figure of the integration process while the 
supranational institutions remain under the members’ control (Hammel, 
2009: 23; Awesti, 2007). Accordingly, nation states are responsible for all
decisions, policies and strategies within the EU. However, this theory 
ignores the role of the supranational institutions in shaping the common 
interests of the member states, and also ignores the day to day processes of 
policy-making withininstitutions (Ujupaan, 2009: 1; Risse, 1996). As a 
result, intergovernmentalism fails to account for the important role of the 
EU institutions in foreign policy formulation and implementation (Awesti, 
2006: 17).
As some writers argue, IR theories and integration theories have no 
place within EU foreign policy because the EU is built on a multi-level 
system (Jordan, 2001: 199). Accordingly, this study applies the MLG 
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approach as a theoretical framework to enable an analysis of the EU’s 
complex structures (Aalberts, 2004: 23). It considers the EU political system 
as unique, comprising neither a state nor an international organisation. 
Instead it views the EU as a multi-faceted system, highlighting the interplay 
between the supranational, intergovernmental and sub-national levels in the 
foreign policy formulation and implementation phases (Hurrelmann and 
DeBardeleben, 2008: 1). Therefore, the application of the MLG approach in 
the context of the EU can analyse the type and degree of interaction 
between: EU institutions (supranational level), EU member states 
(intergovernmental level), and public and private institutions, such as 
interest groups, lobbyists and public opinion (sub-national level). 
Importantly, it can analyse how these interactions affect EU foreign policy 
formulation and implementation. The overall effectiveness of the EU's 
foreign policy may be seen as variable in line with the range of interaction 
and coordination among these levels.
In employing the MLG approach to examine the EU's foreign policy 
towards Iraq during 2001-2009, this study’s findings suggest that there are 
more factors that have affected the EU’s foreign policy objectives and 
outcomes than simply the interaction and coordination among foreign policy 
actors. External factors are also found to have impacted on the EU’s foreign 
policy towards Iraq during this period, most notably the US and the UN’s) 
presence in Iraq. Therefore, this external dimension would suggest that the 
MLG theory requires some modifications if it is to account fully for this 
study’s findings. 
The previous chapters provide an analysis of the EU’s foreign policy 
towards Iraq during 2003-09 according to the MLG framework. The next 
section provides an evaluation of the findings. 
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8.1. Significant Findings 
By utilising the thematic content analysis tools, this study applied the 
MLG approach in order to assess and explain the EU's foreign policy and, 
specifically, its stance towards Iraq. This study identified a number of 
significant findings which are explained below.
Theoretically, power and authorities in multi-level governance systems, 
such as the EU, are supposed to shift from the central government upwards 
to the supranational level or downwards to the regional and local level 
authorities (Mette et al., 2003; Marks et al., 1996, 2001; Duke, 2001). 
However, this study identified that the EU institutions (Commission, 
Parliament, Presidency of the Ministers Council, President of the European 
Council, and HR) lacked authority as a majority of the foreign policy 
decisions made within the EU’s institutional framework were subject to the 
approval of its member states (Kallberg, 2007). This does not mean that EU 
institutions have no role to play in terms of the foreign policy formulation 
and implementation stages. These institutions have the ability to make 
proposals or express their opinions regarding issues under debate, but they 
do not have the ability to enforce their adoption by the member states. Thus, 
the member states sometimes act according to the suggestions of the 
institutions, and at other times reject them. For instance, in relation to the 
Iraq war of 2003, it was clear that the European institutions (Commission, 
Parliament, Presidency, and HR) tried to achieve a peaceful solution, but 
failed to reach a common position between member states, and subsequently 
failed to prevent some EU members in their active support for the US 
alliance. This does not mean that the European institutions have no power 
within the EU. The MLG approach does not focus on how power is 
distributed amongst different levels, but is concentrated on how changes in 
governance take place (Britz, 2001: 9). According to this, there is no 
equality of power among levels or actors from different levels. Thus, it 
could be considered that the member states have more power than other 
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actors at other levels. However, this does not mean that the level with the 
most power dominates every issue and actors at different levels do not have 
the ability to shape policy or reach decision because they have less power 
(Britz, 2001: 9).
The key member states remain unwilling to transfer some of their 
power and authority to the EU institutions in relation to foreign policy. This 
is mainly attributable to member states’ consideration of foreign policy as 
an indivisible part of their sovereignty; there is a strong preference for 
foreign policy decisions to remain under their control rather than that of the 
EU. Consequently, EU officials lacked a clear mandate from member states 
to articulate a clear position and undertake decisive action on behalf of the 
EU towards Iraq during 2001-2009. This impacted on the capability of these 
institutions to fulfill their responsibilities which, in turn, affected the 
effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy in the international arena. 
This study highlighted that the influence of individual states over EU 
foreign policy is variable. The key member states such as Britain, France, 
and Germany have more impact on the EU's foreign policy direction 
compared to that of smaller member states. This impact increases and when 
responding to sensitive “high politics” issues such as international war and 
conflict. Thus, the impact of the key member states on the EU’s foreign 
policy decision-making becomes more influential when the issues under 
debate are related to military conflict and security issues. This is due to the 
lack of shared foreign policy goals among member states, and furthermore, 
the divergences of their national interests (Wright, 2011: 10-11). As a result, 
strong and effective EU foreign policy remains difficult to achieve unless 
the member states, in particular the key member states, are willing to 
develop genuine common strategies, and coordinate and operate consistently 
within those strategies across all major foreign policy challenges (Hughes, 
2003).
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Instead of the two-level assumptions adopted by state-centrists 
(realists, liberalists and intergovernmentalists), the MLG theorists posit a set 
of overarching, multi-level policy networks (Jordan 2001: 199). This means 
that the departure point of the MLG approach is the existence of 
overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments (Marks et 
al., 1996). The MLG approach argues that because the number of policy 
areas is increasing, there is no single actor within the EU which possesses a 
complete set of competencies (Awesti, 2007: 3). The European institutions 
have a role to play in all stages of the policy-making process, from agenda-
setting to implementation (Cram, 1997: 12). Furthermore, these institutions 
have a significant role in shaping the common interests and beliefs of the 
EU (March and Olsen, 1989: 165). As a result, the overlapping of 
competencies among EU actors ensures the member states can no longer
monopolise the EU policy process (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 3, Awesti, 
2007: 3). 
Due to the complex institutional structure of the EU, the internal 
institutions tend to always confront difficulty in managing effective 
coordination among various players (Vanhoonacker, 2005: 146). The EU 
foreign policy competencies overlap between different actors, in particular 
those of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, HR, and member states 
(Gauttier, 2004). Although these actors attempt to present a unified foreign 
policy, in reality there are many internal divisions between them. These 
divisions have the propensity to fragment policy-making and undermine the 
coherence of EU governance (Christiansen, 2001b: 749-50). In addition, a 
lack of a clear definition of the competencies of each actor within EU 
foreign policy leads to political rivalry and competition between them, 
impacting on the overall effectiveness of EU policies. For instance, once a 
competency is applied to different actors, such as the Commission and the 
Council in crisis management, the likelihood of incoherent action increases 
(Portela and Raube, 2009: 18). Political rivalries between the Commission 
and the Council, and competition between the administrative structures of 
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these institutions, continue to occur as a result of the stipulations of the 
Lisbon Treaty; the Treaty failed to delineate the limitations of their 
respective competencies in terms of external relations activities. This, in 
turn, has decreased the effectiveness of the EU as a whole (Mayer, 2005: 
498). 
There are several actors associated with EU foreign policy and this 
presents an additional challenge to the development of effective foreign 
policy. A number of actors represent the EU externally, including the 
President of the EU, the President of the Commission, the Presidency of the 
Council and the High Representative for the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) (Portela and Raube, 2009). This division of representations 
amongst several posts reflects a lack of cohesion and is, overall, 
counterproductive to effective foreign policy formulation and execution. 
Thus, the EU’s lack of institutional coherence is reflected in its failure to 
create a unified foreign policy (Bindi and Shapiro, 2010: 344). This is 
evident in the disputes that arose in the EU’s attempt to formulate a unified 
foreign policy response to Iraq between 2001 and 2009. 
Governance in the EU is considered neither exclusively state-centric 
nor supranational. Its decision-making competencies are theoretically shared 
by actors at different levels rather than monopolised by nation states (Marks 
et al., 1996). The findings of this study confirmed that the supranational, 
sub-national and non-state actors have gained power through the process of 
European integration. Although the EU foreign policy decision-making 
procedures require the consensus of all voting national representatives 
(Jordan 2001), this does not provide flexibility nor allow for a rapid 
response. Furthermore, this also demonstrates that member states are 
unwilling to surrender their sovereignty when making foreign policy 
decisions (Hermann-3DZáRZVND   Schirm, 1998). However, this 
does not mean the supranational institutions and sub-national actors do not 
have roles to play; these actors have significant roles in day-to-day policy-
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making (Rosamond, 2000; Jachtenfuchs, 2001). The MLG approach 
emphasises that regions and local authorities increasingly participate in 
European foreign policy-making and that this participation often determines 
the control of the traditional gatekeeper, the nation state executive (Marks et 
al., 1996). As a result, the EU’s foreign policy involves European, national 
and sub-national actors (Marks et al., 1996).
The day-to-day policy-making within the EU captures the multi-actor 
negotiation processes on specific issues, and the informal networks and
coordination structures created within the complex EU policy-making 
setting (Keukeleire and Justaert, 2009: 4; Jachtenfuchs, 2001). According to 
the MLG perspective, informal and non-governmental mechanisms such as 
persons, institutions and organisations, should consider these informal 
networks and structures rather than focusing solely on governmental 
institutions and the EU's legal framework as effective means to develop 
policy (Nasra, 2009). One of the key findings of this study is that the 
informal interaction between EU officials across levels and pillars has 
affected the EU’s policy-making. By working in the same policy areas, 
these officials have a crucial role in managing the connections between 
different pillars and levels amongst the Commission, member states, the 
Council, and Parliament,. All of these informal interactions and negotiations 
assist in creating channels for dialogue to establish an understanding of the 
priorities and preferences of member states, and for other foreign policy 
actors to address specific policy issues (Nasra, 2009: 8). This establishes a 
foundation for collective action amongst diverse interests, and the 
achievement of common positions on issues under debate (Nasra, 2009: 8; 
Clarke, 1999; Tallberg, 2004). As a result, the nature of the interaction and 
coordination between the EU foreign policy actors appears to depend more 
on informal negotiations and networks rather than constitutional and legal 
frameworks (Marzeda-Mlynarska, 2011: 9; Peters and Pierre, 2004: 77; 
Clarke, 1999; Smith, 2004b: 751; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). 
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This study demonstrates that the interests of nation states are 
considered the most serious obstacle to the emergence of a truly common 
European foreign policy; they prevent the EU’s foreign policy from 
transcending those of its member states (Qhrgaard, 2004:32-33; Staab, 
2008: 55). Thus, national interests have determined the extent of member 
states’ commitment to reaching common positions, resulting in the 
limitation of their abilities to formulate common foreign policy (Soetendorp, 
1999:150). Consequently, as shown by this study’s findings, the main factor 
contributing to the divisions among EU member states over Iraq during 
2001-2009 was their divergent interests. Competing national interests 
impacted on the effectiveness of the supranational level institutions as the 
EU is unable to act when its member states have divergent interests. The EU 
institutions such as the Commission, the Parliament, the Presidency and the 
HR could not overcome these divergences as the member states were unable 
to communicate and utilise the institutions to reach a compromise (Portela 
and Raube, 2009: 20).
The coordination among various interests within EU foreign policy 
presents a major challenge to the EU’s pursuit of a common foreign policy 
(Smith, 2004b:740). The EU institutions are having difficulty in 
coordinating effective action amongst themselves (Vanhoonacker, 2005: 
146). This is due to the difficulty in coordinating policy development with 
27 representatives, each representing their own member states’ interests. 
Furthermore, the EU institutions such as the Council Presidency and HR do 
not have sufficient ability to assist the Council in overcoming this constraint 
with regard to all foreign policy issues (Keukeleire and Justaert, 2009: 10). 
There are several examples where this lack of coordination has led to 
incoherent policy which, in turn, challenges intra-institutional relations 
(Christiansen, 2001b). 
The key member states, in particular Britain, France, and Germany, 
appear to have given little priority to fulfilling their obligations under the 
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EU’s common foreign policy to consult, inform and co-ordinate (Hughes,
2003). The study’s findings demonstrate that the member states continue to 
develop and maintain their own foreign policies, embassies, bilateral 
relations and finance for projects in Iraq. Although there was coordination 
and interaction on the ground between the EU delegations and the embassies 
of member states, the member states’ actions continued to be influenced by 
their national priorities. This impacted on the overall effectiveness of EU 
foreign policy in Iraq.
The main aim of the MLG approach is to understand the nature of the 
internal relationships between EU foreign policy actors, rather than focus 
just on the capabilities and instruments utilised to achieve such a foreign 
policy (Wright, 2011). This is because the internal debate and interaction 
between foreign policy actors regarding significant issues outside the EU 
(such as Iraq) directly affects the range of instruments which will be used. 
Due to the differences among EU actors towards Iraq, the range of 
instruments which could be used was limited. The majority of the EU 
instruments and tools employed at the international level are civilian
(economic, aid, trade and development) and normative (peace, liberty, 
democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedom) (Wright, 2011). However, in relation to security, the EU continues 
to be weak. It has failed on several occasions to act effectively, and in some 
instances, failed to act at all. Iraq is a clear example of this (in) ability to act 
effectively. The key instruments utilised to implement the EU's foreign 
policy towards Iraq after the 2003 war until 2009 were mainly economic, 
developmental and technical (‘low politics’ instruments). Importantly, the 
EU lacks its own military and diplomatic capabilities (Youngs, 2004). The 
EU could not deploy any military forces even for normative reasons, such as 
international peacekeeping. This is due to the member states’ continued 
perception that security issues should remain within the confines of their 
sovereignty. This reflects that the ability of the EU to act internationally is 
“directly related to the level and degree of integration achieved in the policy 
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area in question” (Wright, 2011: 20). Accordingly, the EU may be able to 
act effectively in terms of finance, economic, trade and development 
because it has achieved a high level of integration in these fields. However, 
in terms of foreign and security policy the EU still requires more time and a 
stronger commitment of member states to achieve greater effectiveness.  
The findings of this study highlighted that political integration is a 
major obstacle to developing an effective and coordinated EU foreign policy. 
Although one of the significant aims of the EU is to achieve political 
integration, this objective is facing considerable challenges from the 
principle of state sovereignty (European Parliament, 14/05/2003: 122; 
Richardson, 2001: 30). The key member states are unwilling to integrate 
politically as they hold on to their sovereignty and are reluctant to transfer 
certain aspects of governmental control to the supranational level (Chari and 
Cavatorta, 2008). Thus, this is the most important factor contributing to the 
EU’s inherent weakness and inability to act effectively through foreign 
policy (Gauttier, 2004: 24).
This study demonstrates that there was a lack of visibility of the EU in 
Iraq during 2001-2009. The first and main reason for this was a lack of a 
distinct human capability (Mette et al., 2003: 392-93). The EU only 
maintained a small delegation in Iraq, preventing it from implementing all 
of its projects without third-party assistance (Gomes, 2008: 5). This explains 
why almost all of the EU programmes were implemented through the UN 
and other non-government organizations, exacerbating the visibility of the 
EU in Iraq. The US’s presence in Iraq may also have affected EU foreign 
policy from 2001-2009. Some member states, such as France, saw Iraq as 
the  responsibility of the US to resolve and that it was not in the EU’s 
interests to become directly involved. Accordingly, France was reticent to 
form a relationship with the new democratic Iraqi government until 2008. 
Furthermore, France and Germany’s positions in opposition to the US-led 
invasion of Iraq represented self-conscious efforts “to constrain and contain 
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the US” rather than take action against Saddam Hussein’s acquisition of 
weapons of mass destruction (Rhodes, 2004). Thus, the key member states 
tend to act as a counter-balance to the US in order to enhance their own 
influence in the region and the international arena (Schuster and Maier, 
2006). In addition, the lack of security in Iraq, the lack of political stability, 
the absence of a contractual relationship between the EU and Iraq, and 
Iraq’s limited administrative infrastructure for the implementation of 
investment programmes offered by the EU, are also key factors which have 
affected the EU’s visibility in Iraq since the war of 2003. 
8.2. Theoretical and Methodological Limitations
Whilst undertaking this study, a number of methodological limitations 
were identified. First, it was difficult to secure the participation of EU 
officials on a large scale due to the sensitive nature of the topic under 
examination. Second, many of the current member state representatives in 
the EU declined to participate as they were new in their positions and were 
unfamiliar with the EU’s foreign policy towards Iraq from 2001-2009. Third, 
Iraqi officials in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Iraqi embassy 
in Brussels declined repeated invitations to participate in this study. Despite 
these challenges, the overall quality of the data collected remain sound as a
sufficient number of participants who hold key roles within the EU were 
interviewed.
Theoretically, this study demonstrates that the MLG approach has 
been little used in the study of the relationships between the EU institutional 
actors and their non-European partners, or in the study of governance in 
other regions and polities. A majority of the research which applies the 
MLG approach to the EU’s foreign policy is primarily focused on the 
decision-making processes in EU circles, between the institutional actors of 
foreign policy and national constituencies within the member-states. In 
other words, applying the MLG approach to EU foreign policy is focused 
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mainly on the formulation phase of foreign policy. However, this study 
applied some modifications to the MLG approach to enable an appropriate 
framework.  
8.3. Implication of Study and Future Research 
Some normative implications can be deduced from this study. First, 
applying an MLG approach assists in breaking down a state-centric 
understanding, and to better characterise the relationships between different 
actors horizontally across pillars, and vertically between different levels of 
governance (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009; Bache, 2008). Thus, this approach 
explores how the whole system works, and how multiple levels are 
structured within this system (Portela and Raube, 2009: 2; Sweeney, 2005: 
160-161). In another words, in order to capture the complexity of the EU’s 
foreign policy, the concept of MLG has to focus both on the formulation 
and the implementation phases; the latter requiring an analysis of the set of 
actors that have affect the policy outcomes on the ground. Accordingly, the 
application of this theoretical framework allowed the study to identify 
distinct variables that influenced the type, and level, of interaction and 
coordination between the various EU actors regarding its foreign policy 
towards Iraq during 2001-09.
Second, any analysis of the EU’s foreign policy has to be situated at 
the international level and, accordingly, has to focus on the interactions 
between the institutional actors involved, both in the formulation and 
implementation of the policy in practice.
Third, the EU is characterised by two elements: first, a weak centre -
the central political institutions are thin compared to national institutions 
and have limited autonomy. Second, the principle of informal interaction 
between different levels under and above the member states (Britz, 2001: 8).  
The interaction and communication takes place directly between different 
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levels within the EU even though these are widely separated from each 
other in the system (Britz, 2001: 10). 
Fourth, the sovereignty of the member states over foreign policy 
matters is the main obstacle hindering the EU’s foreign policy performance. 
Furthermore, the national interests of the member states prevent them from 
developing a common response to significant events in the international 
arena, such as the Iraq war of 2003. This impacts member states’ abilities to 
formulate a common foreign policy. This resulted in a lack of political 
integration which affects the ability of the EU to achieve a unified foreign 
policy, leading to fragmented one.
Finally, the efficiency and visibility of the EU’s foreign policy depends on 
contributions from all the various players. Such effectiveness can only be 
realised if local and regional authorities are genuine partners rather than 
mere intermediaries. Accordingly, if cooperation and interaction between 
the actors involved in foreign policy is sufficient, then the influence of the 
EU in world politics will be enhanced (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007).
In regards to future research, the MLG approach is a useful framework 
to analyse the EU’s foreign policy towards non-European countries. It is a 
more effective framework to apply than other IR or integration theories 
when considering the complexity of the EU. It allows an examination of the 
EU’s entire foreign policy-formulating processes, and explores the ways of 
implementing it outside the EU. Furthermore, it allows an exploration of the 
interaction between foreign policy actors across pillars and between 
different levels, providing assistance when evaluating the size and 
importance of each actor within the EU’s foreign policy formulation and 
implementation phases.  Further work should focus on other case studies in 
order to consider whether similar conclusions are realised. In addition, 
further work should concentrate more specifically on the role of the sub-
national actors in EU foreign policy-making. This will allow for an analysis 
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of the actual impact of these actors on the entire foreign policy-making 
process.  Moreover, future studies should focus on the interaction between 
the sub-national level and supranational institutions in order to explore the 
nature of this interaction, and how it has affected the power of EU member 
states in relation to foreign policy. Comparative studies between the 
economic and political integration of the EU should be examined in order to 
clarify the challenges to the EU’s to political integration. Finally, future 
studies should also focus on the effect of external factors, in particular the 
role of the US, in order to explore whether these have affected the unity and 
coherence of EU foreign policy. 
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